

On March 15, the Kalinga leaders met in Baguio to strategize for an organized opposition. And they came out with three resolutions in their meeting: first, to work for the retraction of the first consent of those who went to Manila with the Panamin; second, to work for the resignation of Panamin employees – the Kalingas who became employees of Panamin; third, to make use of the Bodong system to deal with Kalinga traitors. And they worked on these three resolutions during the following months.

Now, besides the National Power Corporation, there was the Panamin and the local PC. Later on these would be reinforced with the 55th Battalion which would serve until November 1977. In November 1977, the 60th Battalion took the place of the 55th Battalion.

Meantime among the people, they held a lot of demonstrations like dismantling the camps of the NPC and the PC at the dam sites of the Chico IV. And for this as well as for grabbing the survey instruments of NPC, about one hundred eighty of the Kalingas were detained. Fifty of them for eight months in Camp Olivas, and one hundred in the Bulanao PC stockade.

This narration of the story simply demonstrates a show of force by the government side during the second period, and a show of opposition from the people's side which got more and more violent. The people would be joined here in the later part of 1977 by the NPA. And just to cut it short, last month the Panamin was withdrawn from Kalinga. Five hundred thirty-seven (537) employees of Panamin were laid off.

There are speculations among the people that the pullout of Panamin might mean heavier militarization or a complete take over of Kalinga by the military. So far these are the main events that I could describe about the Chico River Project.

TO KNOW THE MEANING OF THE CHICO PROJECT

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The first part of my paper deals with what Fr. Guyguyon had talked about this afternoon. I'm sorry I would like to go directly to

the rest. I don't present this as an analysis but I would like to point out in my paper everything that we should consider and which we should criticize with respect to future analysis of the Chico river situation.

Aside from the record of miscommunication over the Chico River Project, we have little, by way of empirical data to go by, in making an analysis. Furthermore, I have been under some constraints of time and circumstance in writing this paper. I was requested last Friday, July 14, to prepare this paper as Dr. Carlos Fernandez could not attend the conference as originally planned. I do not expect to make a presentation at the level of analysis which Dr. Fernandez's qualifications would have achieved. I have not done the field-work in Kalinga or Bontoc which would be necessary to speak of empirical data. Neither have I the time to make an appreciable dent in the literature which could be used in support of the presentation. Still, I felt it necessary that the Chico River population have the opportunity of consideration at such a forum as this, in the hope that the necessity for detailed study of the problem attracts the efforts of other social scientists to give it attention. What I present then is whatever I *have* read on basic concepts, what I recall from reading various accounts of relocation problems in newspapers and newsletters, and what I have gleaned from discussions with such persons as a *pangat* from affected Kalinga barrios, and from those who have concerned themselves with documenting the Chico situation and the people's reactions to it. There are some references you might turn to for detail. John Bodley's *Victims of Progress* is a rather comprehensive discussion of varied problems involved in economic growth and planned development and people's responses to it. On the Chico situation and related issues such as the Pantabangan and Ambuklao experience, there is the Montañosa Social Action Center report, and various articles from national newspapers and local journals, as well as files compiled by the PAFID.

The Chico River Development Project plans the construction of four dams, two in Mountain Province and two in Kalinga sub-province. Chico I (Sabagan) was ordered suspended apparently in response to the unified opposition of the Bontoc villages along the Chico, but more probably as a result of questionable feasibility.¹ Chico III (Basao) which is dependent on the construction of Chico II was suspended as early as 1975, but its cancellation was publicly announced on July 19, 1978 as concession to the deteriorating peace and order situation in the Basao area (Kalinga-Bontoc border). Whether these two dams will eventually be built is uncertain.

Estimates of the extent to which people and lands are affected by Chico II (Anabel-Tucucan) and Chico IV (Tomiangan) are difficult to make. Some settlements are totally and directly affected, their populations to be rendered both homeless and landless. Others are partially affected by loss of some fields or houses, or by total loss of fields although settlement site may be untouched by the dam waters. And in most discussions of the effects of the dams, it is easy to forget that the necessary provision for watershed reserves will deprive swiddeners of their produce from kaingin plots — produce which often makes a difference between starvation and subsistence. To qualify effects with such words a "direct", indirect," "partial," and "total" may not really make too much sense in many cases. We cannot honestly or accurately say how many kaingin plots maintain the swidden cycle at sufficient levels of production for a number of people, or whether half a rice field is really better than none. And while some people will not lose their homes, the loss of land in a subsistence agriculture economy renders house possession insignificant.

The report of the Montañosa Social Action Center (1976:1-2) estimates that Chico II will directly affect 3,000 persons and 120 hectares of fertile rice land; Chico IV will directly or indirectly affect 972 families (roughly 6,000 persons) and rice lands to the value of about ₱400,000.00 (as estimated according to Kalinga measures of difficulty of paddy construction and irrigation or productivity). Considering all possible damage to homes and means of productive activity, including the enforcement of bans on swiddening within the dam watershed areas, we might estimate the minimum of affected persons at least 10,000.

For the Philippine government, the Chico project is a problem in national development. For the people whose lands the dam will occupy, the problem is one of imminent dislocation, both physical and social (this latter involving not only interpersonal relations but political, religious, economic and cultural aspects). The national drive for economic growth demands a large source of hydroelectric power, and the inhabitants of the Chico River Basin are asked as Philippine citizens to yield local welfare — if not a total community — for that national need, and with the promised benefit of potential participation in a sound national economy.

But the documented events of the project's history, summarized just now by Fr. Pat Guyguyon, lead us to the recognition that the problem is not wholly one of the perspectives nor the other. I see the issue largely in terms of the meaning of the confrontation of two

perspectives — that of the government as representative of that entity we call the Philippine nation, and that of the Kalinga and Bontoc as ethnic communities subsumed by that nation. The confrontation can hardly be called communication or dialogue, as the record shows. It is most significant, however, to keep in mind that the Kalinga and Bontoc, when they first found out that dams were to be built, expressed both verbally and in action their desire to discuss the matter with the government, with the National Power Corporation, and with Panamin. I was in Tucusan in October 1974, when a meeting in Bontoc was planned between NaPoCor and representative elders from all affected Bontoc villages, as requested by the Bontoc people. It was the second such plan for discussion and negotiation and the second to be aborted by the failure of the NaPoCor to appear. The record of attempts to communicate with the agencies involved in the dam project is marked by, above all other things, the refusal, neglect — call it whatever you will — of the agencies to explain their position, to hear out the position of the Chico inhabitants, or to in any way seek full information on all aspects of the proposed project and the larger context of the project.

In addition, the national media printed little but government statements on the need for the dams, or reports of, for instance, Kalinga support of the project — though the reliability of the latter is questionable. Information regarding the problems encountered by the people in relocation projects of other dam sites such as Pantabangan and Ambuklao are not publicized, although a single news article in a national daily in 1974 or 1975 reported the discovery of anomalies and resultant social problems in the relocation settlements for Pantabangan. No follow up was issued. Strictures have been placed on research in the Kalinga and Bontoc areas as proposed by those who want to base development decisions on concrete facts of social, cultural, economic, ecological or political conditions. Certainly no move has been made to officially commission such a study as a basis for sound planning of the proposed relocation.

To date, neither the affected populations nor the Philippine public knows much beyond the fact that dams will be built and that there is local resistance to the building of those dams. There is little indication that the planners themselves have much information on the project other than on its technical feasibility and the economic cost-benefit in national terms. No comprehensive justification for the dams in terms of national and local need, in terms of economic and social value, has been detailed and explained. No similarly comprehensive, well-considered projection for relocation has been

brought forward in the interests of safeguarding the relocated people from unnecessary trauma and for the purpose of rendering them economically and socially stable in the relocation area.

In view of this lack of information, one cannot expect much other than perspectives and biases to be at issue. As social scientists presumably attempting to make sense of the Chico River situation, we will inevitably add to the confrontation of perspectives our own particular attitudes. On the one hand, we assume ourselves committed to the accepted requirements of detachment from value judgment. But on the other hand, there is an undertone of another commitment which has never left the social sciences since August Comte articulated it in the 19th century. This is, that all the rigor to which we aspire has no purpose apart from its connection to the benefit of the humans and human relations that we have chosen as our domain of study. In view of the pressures which people universally experience in these times, pressures of practical necessity and increased knowledge, pressures of ideology, this latter commitment, as Jurgen Habermas (1973: 41-81) maintains, is no longer simply ethical or moral issues of *salus publica or bonum commune*, but a question of focusing on the conditions of human survival. In effect if we are committed, we are engaged in discovering accurate empirical data in constructing adequate concepts with which to verify our conviction that human rights are a priority in any form of development.

Unfortunately, as I have pointed out, there is little enough on which to base any analysis of the Chico problem. However, without presuming to make an analysis we know enough to do three things:

1. First, we can be reminded that such project as the Ambuklao and Pantabangan dams, for instance, have caused severe problems for relocated populations, mainly due to unsound planning based on minimum information. These problems still confront the Philippine government today.
2. Second, we can ask some basic questions about the validity of a few of the basic concepts which frame the Chico issue. One is the concept of development itself: its definition and its relationship to the local population and areas it affects. Another is the concept of the relationship between a government and an ethnic segment of the national population, which relationship involves considerations of obligation and legitimacy.
3. Third, we can stress what should be involved, by way of information, before a decision can be made to build a

dam and certainly before any relocation of affected populations can be thought of or effected with a minimum trauma to those populations.

Reminders from Other Times and Other Places

One of the fears expressed by the opposition to the Chico project is that the experience of those relocated from the Ambuklao and the Pantabangan dam sites will be replaced for those relocated from the Chico. While we cannot assume offhand that what has happened elsewhere will happen again, neither can we find concrete evidence that the lessons have been learned and that a guarantee is extended against such a repetition. All we know — all the Kalinga and the Bontoc people know — is that to this day the resettlement areas face severe deprivation of basic resources and also deprivation of options for alleviating their situations.

The Ibaloi who were resettled in Vizcaya found themselves hopelessly farming salinated fields. When they moved into neighboring areas to farm or to pursue livestock raising, they also exerted pressure on the Ilongot hunters and swiddeners into whose territory they were moving. Those Ibaloi who remained around the Ambuklao areas settled for fishing in the dam reservoir, and for a while posed another problem for the authorities due to dynamite fishing. What dietary problems they faced, what problems of grasping for subsistence, still remain to be documented — we only hear rumours of their difficulties and their discontents.

The Pantabangan resettlement areas are likewise on arid and unproductive land. I have been told that the relocated now must travel to distant areas to find more productive agricultural sites, or to other towns to seek employment. The conditions of relocation and compensation were extremely unfavorable. Although the National Power Corporation may satisfy itself that it spent a considerable sum on the relocation, there was no effective monitoring of the disbursement of those funds after they were released. Bolstered by the newspaper account of 1974 or 1975, I am bold to bring up what may not be entirely hearsay. In the compensation for lands lost, the values were inflated by as much as 100%, the "adequate" return going to the relocated, and the balance to those handling the relocation. In the construction of houses at the relocation site, building materials were delivered only to be spirited away by persons unknown, and the people to be relocated could not attend to the guarding of materials due to the distance of the relocation site from their villages. While free electricity was made available to the resettle-

ment population for the first year of their occupancy, they have not since then had the means or access to means for paying for continued service, and have not availed of it.

But electricity, in such a situation, can be dispensed with, believe it or not. Perhaps more crucial was the months long delay in the provision of food supplies which were promised but could not be produced for lack of funds.

I believe we can safely say that, in both cases, relocation did not mean, even at best, a temporary trauma which was to be met and adapted to like any voluntary migration to a new locale. It has been a long-term and continuing struggle to regain a capacity for at least subsistence, a control which the people formerly had within the limits of their traditional situation. Whatever the cause of the failure to subsidize and safeguard the transition to resettlement areas and the successful adaptation of the relocated to the new situation, whether the cause be unforeseen circumstances, oversights, negligence or graft and regardless of what individuals or entities may be held responsible, the effects of the failure on the lives of the relocated cannot be dismissed. People are still suffering from them, experiencing immediate physical discomforts and deprivations, economic instability, and the psychological damage caused by uncertainty and lack of control over even the basic requirements to sustain life. Whether or not Ambuklao and Pantabangan have solved an economic problem of power supply and whether or not their utility justifies their construction, there are social problems left to be solved as a result of the dams' existence. I like to think that these latter problems are also concerns of development, all the more urgent because the life span of a human being is not so very long as to allow them an indefinite time to wait for help.

And with these problems still unsolved, it is excessively optimistic to trust that the inhabitants of the Chico will not face the same relocation situations, particularly since there has been no presentation of a comprehensive relocation plan with preventives for possible social problems built in.

For lack of time, we need not go on to cite further instances of the failure to consider human social problems along with technological and national economic problems of development. There are many cases, and not confined to dams nor to the Philippines, and they are available to anyone who might be interested. If such situations obtain, however, it should be important to turn our focus on why the neglect of the human factor continues.

Development: The Government and the People

Of the various definitions and connotations which the concept of development has acquired over the last two decades, it is almost certain that the least understood, and the most frequently ignored is that which concerns the socio-cultural fabric. *The Widening Gap: Development in the '70's*, a critique of things taken for granted in development policy and planning, stresses the need to distinguish between economic growth and social development. While economic growth is an increase in production output, social development is "a set of structural changes that are needed to sustain future growth of output and to respond to changing needs of society. (Chenery 1971: 29)." Certainly increases in production do not necessarily imply, for instance, an equitable distribution of incomes. Dalton, from the experience of Africa, demonstrates that a national economy may be progressing nicely in terms of its own impersonal growth while local communities disintegrate and income distributions are grossly inequitable. He maintains that "there is no such thing as economically successful local development accompanied by traumatic social malaise; and that the social disintegration of local communities is itself an indicator of incomplete and unsuccessful economic development (1967: 161)."

The failure to consider the necessary integration of economic growth and social development has led to an exaggerated emphasis upon national economic concerns as well as to a mislaying of blame for development failure upon the resistant and stubbornly traditional objects of development. As one development planner in Iran has been quoted to say, if only we could get rid of the people for five years, we wouldn't have these problems. In a review of the literature on agricultural development, an economist deplores the fact that such research — his own included — has not considered the matrix of relations between economic growth and the sociocultural system but continues to view "human inelasticity" as the most serious problem in Southeast Asia (1965:22).

To view successful development as a matter of economic feasibilities is myopic enough. But to relate development failures to value-inflexibility of the communities to be developed is more than just short-sightedness. It is an unfounded bias. While it may be true that sometimes cultural elements lag behind more rapid technological change and certainly some value persist for no apparent functional reason even in highly economically developed societies, culture is still basically a mechanism of human adaptation (Malinowski 1961:42-43; Geertz 1973:49). And by adaptation I do not

mean a homeostatic, pattern-maintaining adaptation, but the capacity of society as an open system for self-regulation such that "the system may change or elaborate its structure as a condition of survival or viability (Buckley 1968:490)."

It has certainly been unproductive, if not damaging to view development in terms of unilineal stage theories of development and in terms of a largely exaggerated "traditional-modern" dichotomy. This view would have us believe that a traditional society (the object of development is characterized by such traits as personalism, ascription and particularism) and a modern society (the developed) is characterized by such traits as rationality, achievement-orientation, and universalism. Furthermore it reinforces the notion that societies are mutually exclusive with respect to these predetermined traits, and that all societies, to develop, must progress to that best and ultimate form of society as exemplified by the Western industrialized countries — which were the basis of the establishment of the dichotomy in the first place. Not only does the arbitrary linkage of modernization to development impose Western patterns and standards on all societies, it often ignores what was not modern in the West (such as for instance, relatively recent development of mechanized agriculture in some industrialized European countries) and what might be modern in a traditional society. If thrift is considered to be one of an industrial society's modern values, Nash (1958) found it demonstrated by the peasants of Cantel, Guatemala. If achievement motivation is modern and industrial, swiddeners in Northern Kalinga display it to an extent that would delight Max Weber (De Raedt 1969) and the MacLelland. If rationality is modern, Polanyi's definition of rationality allows any society to possess it:

"Means are anything appropriate to serve the end, whether by virtue of the laws of nature or by the rules of the game. Thus "rational" does not refer to ends or to means but rather to the relating of means to ends. . . . For whatever the end, it is rational to choose one's means accordingly, and as to the means it would not be rational to act upon any other test than which one happens to believe in (1968: 142-3).

Arguing against the culturally determined biases of a limited perspective on development and development problems Singer (1960:275) says.

The values usually adduced as necessary conditions for industrialization have their counterparts in many non-industrial and preindustrial countries. *What differs is not the abstract values and motives, but the social and cultural contexts from which they have been abstracted.* If these values have not propelled the newly developing countries into an advanced stage of industrialization, perhaps this only shows the *limita-*

tion of values as motive forces in the absence of capital, skill, favorable government policy and other concrete requirements of industrialization, rather than the people of these countries have a different value system and character (italics mine).

To carry the argument yet a step further, while industrial development may be an ultimate goal, in view of the national imperatives of involvement with a world market, paths to economic growth and structural transformation are certainly not tied to the standard exhibited by one country at a particular time, and are not limited any more than the evolution of cultural forms throughout the world has been limited. Taming the waters of development might well be a matter of riding the favorable currents rather than rechanneling the stream to take the form which other countries have found viable.

The Philippine government's development thrust is still largely towards economic growth, and specifically conditioned by the demands of industrial development. Many factors may be involved in conditioning this thrust. Partially, it is reflected in and maintained by the predominance of technical personnel (e.g. engineers) and economists on development planning and consultative staffs. It may also, in part, be a response to felt pressures for rapid increase of national economic capacities, and industrialization is certainly more quickly accomplished and has swifter results than agricultural development.

Furthermore, despite the government's expressed policy of regionally oriented and directed development, attention to politically defined regional areas has not been identified clearly with the specific local needs and local economic situations of ethnic communities. The ethnic communities, for instance, are dispersed through Regions I and II, in which context they are readily lost in the lowland identity of the dominant populations. Neither do the ethnic communities have specific channels for determining and communicating felt needs outwards, although the channels for receiving directives on development are present. Again, the record of attempts by the Kalinga and Bontoc to communicate with the government and its agencies and representatives clearly supports this. Without doubt, it is important, if we continue to think of ourselves as a nation, to consider development from the macrolevel of national needs. However, since it may be questionable whether national economic development necessarily implies that microlevel economies are flourishing, and since it is also possible that the disintegration of microlevel economic balances will ultimately affect the overall economic strength, we must still think in terms of discovering a linkage between national and local priorities.

The argument of minority sacrifice for majority good may be irrelevant at least on three counts. First, even if we refrain from questioning the extent of the benefited majority and the real, contextual value of the proposed benefit, we must still ask, in each particular instance, whether a sacrifice is necessary and what kind of sacrifice must be made. For instance, we may temporarily take it for granted that hydroelectric power benefits a majority even in the context of an economy which is largely dependent on small-scale (often subsistence-level) non-mechanized farming, and in which inequities of income distribution make capital investment or even saving by individuals relatively rare. Or we may assume that electricity availability will eventually be of economic benefit to a majority. But, in providing the majority with electricity, are conditions like these in, say, the Pantabangan resettlements, a part of the required minority sacrifice for development?

Second, as Chico project history substantiates, the majority-minority argument may very well be premised on the assumption of minority expendability — and here we have a definitely ethical issue. If a price is to be paid, who will pay the price? Most likely, those without power bases, those who are invisible and inaudible, those in areas of difficult geographical and social access. After all, to the Metro Manila dweller, who is an Igorot? Unless he is the provider of strawberries, the take of heads or the ethnic dancer. Surely, anything he gets is better than what he has — particularly electricity so that he can buy a refrigerator and a TV.

Third, there remains the question of which minority is to sacrifice what. In a multi-ethnic society pocketed with hunting and gathering groups and swidden agriculturists, subsistence farmers and urban slum dwellers or peripherally “urbanized” small communities, who is a minority? As one Kalinga *pangat* said: “We are not against the dam. We are just opposed to the dam site.”

Since the government assumes the responsibility for development planning and implementation, a central issue in development involves the relationship of the governing to the governed, in our situation. We cannot assume national integration — it is an ideal and not a reality. The Philippines is a multiethnic society and its government must accept the difficulties of taking differentiated communities into account in constituting its capacity for overarching control.

Walker Connor uses the nation versus state distinction to create an argument against assuming that integration (however it be defined) will ultimately and naturally obscure ethnic identities and identification processes. To para-phrase: while a state is defined in

terms of its legal conceptualization as regards territorial occupation, political institutions and government, a nation is defined in terms of common culture and a sense of homogeneity. Under the latter rubric, less than 10% of the world's states would fall, and the familiar term "nation-state" is not reflective of empirical condition. The term "nationalism" is used to define loyalty to the state, which in most cases is not coterminous with the boundaries of the nation. But loyalty to the nation, Connor asserts, is the more fundamental and deep-lying of a people (Connor 1972: 332-6).

Daniela Weinberg's study of the organization of cultural pluralism in Switzerland also points at the same confusion between the concept of nation and that of state as obscuring the dialectic processes which substantively occur between the collectivity or social wholes as political units and independent sub-units of these collectivities (1975: 95).

If we refer to the stated viewpoints and goals of our government, we can assume that in this country the fundamental relationship of the political system to society, as ideally accepted, is one of obligation. If the political system exists to authoritatively allocate, to resolve conflicts, and to establish rational control over social processes through making authoritative decisions, all these functions are performed with reference to the members of the polity and such groups or segments as these members constitute.

The reciprocal obligation of the members of the polity is then to support the political system by legitimating its authority so that the political system may perform its functions, and — more to the point — meet demands made upon it by the members of the polity.

Jurgen Habermas, however, presents us with the consideration that the motivations of citizens are largely bound by socialization processes into the communicative structure of social action (1973: 10). So, particularly in a multi-ethnic situation, legitimation of the political system's (and subsequently the government's) authority must be accomplished in a welter of differing communicative bases for accepting political decisions.

This perspective sets no easy task. The government must justify its development decisions in terms that the culturally-based communication system of the governed can accept. It is also on this condition that the government can fulfill its obligation and claim its return in obligation from the citizens. If there has been a breach of confidence created between government and government, and if ethnic communications systems and their cultural bases are not considered, no decision for national welfare can be expected to

secure the support of a minority which is expected to make a sacrifice. I firmly believe that this is the case in the Chico development issue.

The Internal Situation: What We Must Consider

The Kalinga and the Bontoc, throughout the history of their contact with external groups, have always been considered minorities, as have other Cordillera populations. I doubt that they considered themselves in this role as long as they retained their internal systems of political, economic and — in general — social self-regulation. Villages were largely autonomous and economically self-sufficient, and dealt with each other as such, establishing linkages through intermarriage and possibly for purposes of trade in special goods occasionally food exchange in times of acute food shortage. (Refer to Barton 1947 for comment on rice surplus "export" by some Kalinga villages; Claver 1975 also refers to traditional relations of food exchange in lean periods between otherwise self-sufficient villages.) Progressively, from Spanish contact, through the American occupation, and finally in the present contact with lowland populations and the national personality, the Bontoc and Kalinga have lost their insularity, and therefore also have lost their prerogative for self-regulation and self-direction. Contact has been asymmetrical with the Bontoc and Kalinga at a disadvantage. Presently, there are no more foreign colonizers, but lowland groups which have more access to national decision-making centers and more access to the nationally accepted bases for participation in various social processes have slipped into that vacuum. In a sense, it is one ethnicity as against another, the dominant ethnicity being that identified by geography and fortuitous circumstances with the national segment. (Refer to Horowitz 1971 and Connor 1972.)

The Bontoc and Kalinga economies are, by and large, subsistence level systems, with surpluses creating a few local status slots based on wealth. The major exceptions to this are such activities as mining, which are not, however, controlled by the Bontoc or Kalinga, whose participation is mainly that of wage labor. It is also mainly in terms of wage labor that they could profit temporarily from the presence of a dam. Neither is it conceivable that many of them would benefit from any productive use of electricity for some time to come nor be able to pay for its use as a convenience. With reference to the Chico project, therefore, they would simply constitute the present occupants of an area which can be used as a resource. The eventual return to the Bontoc and Kalinga of benefit

from the use of this resource is still to be established with any amount of credibility.

The technological inadequacy to meet new criteria for economic viability and the asymmetrical relations with those who do have made it difficult for Chico River populations to integrate economically with the national economy.

No longer insular, they remain peripheral. And without a fundamental capacity for productive self-actualization, it is unlikely that their participation in any other process can increase, particularly after relocation and its uncertainties. *This* is an issue in development.

If the Bontoc and Kalinga have channels for political communication, for need-articulation, leading outwards to the national segment, they are not obvious in the context of the Chico experience. They have not participated in the planning and have not been able to explain their stand in relation to the project. And yet, we have no reason to assume that they have no experience of their own condition and no capacity to say what they need to be able to live and develop or to specify how they wish to proceed. Neither do we have any basis for assuming that their experience, their needs, and their wishes are immaterial or insignificant.

At the same time, the government has access to channels for relaying policies and decisions to the people of Kalinga and Bontoc. The government's designated representatives have utilized these channels, and apparently, have taken advantage of the impossibility of resort.

To some extent, Bontoc has as yet been able to maintain a consolidated internal stand, most probably due to traditional village solidarity and the indigenous political strengths of the *ator* system (Refer to Brett 1975).

Together, the affected villages agreed to seek dialogue with the government's representatives in the Chico project. When the attempt failed, they decided with a similar consensual force not to confront the government further and also not to relocate.

The Kalinga case is different, unfortunately, weaknesses in consensual processes and in the general system of social relations were effectively utilized by government representatives to create support for the Chico project.

In this political sense, then, the people of the areas affected by the proposed dams are no longer insular but peripheral. They are even peripheral, it would seem, to the Chico development project itself. It may be difficult for some to imagine the psychological impact of the ensuing sense of powerlessness, insecurity, and

uncertainty that can be produced by such a situation. Few of us have had to feel that there is little more to give up — unless life itself is yielded. And no matter what the argument may be for general good, for eventual good, or for the adequacy of compensation, the history to date of the Chico project has strained the protesting populations beyond the capacity to believe that they will not be deprived.

I feel very strongly that decision which can produce such stress even before they are implemented and certainly after they are implemented must have as much basis as possible in information about the widest range and variety of possible effects. Without an intensive and broad social analysis, only the technical aspects are fully illuminated, and not even the economic advantages and disadvantages can be considered fully understood.

To begin with, the government's approach to the Chico project planning and to the planning of the relocation is not supported (as far as we are informed) by full data with respect to ecological relationships which might be affected by the dams. It is difficult to determine without study whether possible ecological effects are significant enough to merit a reconsideration of the project. Present pressures for land use, for instance are a consideration which must be fully dwelt on since land is a fixed resource and dams generally affect the most fertile agricultural lands in a given area. This is important specially in an agricultural economy such as ours basically still is. Ecological factors, further, are related to economic considerations — resource availability and rational applications of resources given their distribution and the general national resource picture. Unconsidered resource exploitation may not have the desired economic effects. In Bangladesh, for instance, a desperate government rested hopes for improving an already improverished economy upon the building of hydroelectric systems. These systems occupied 260 square miles on the best agricultural land, occupied by the Chittagong Hills people. The Hills people, formerly the most self-sufficient population of Bangladesh, were forced to seek wage employment, and became dependent on an already burdened cash economy, and already grave land scarcity was aggravated (Bodley 1975:9-10).

It will be argued that the Philippines, unlike Bangladesh, has innumerable resources to exploit. However, we must also seek information about the economic process — not as a formal system and in formal terms, not only on the national level but also on the local level. We must turn, as Polanyi (1957:255-6) to the recognition of "the substantive meaning of economics" which "refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment." What for instance,

will be the relationship of the Kalinga and Bontoc, to the general economy after the building of the dams? Will they have to rapidly adjust to a cash economy which, even now, is causing some degree of social dislocation as it intrudes on a basically subsistence level economy? We cannot assume that cash, or at least the transition to dependence on cash, is always beneficial. As wage earners, what role will these people play in the relationship of labor to production, and how will their capacities for self-determined economic participation be affected? We must also ask that the "economic benefits" referred to as justification for the dams are specified. If the dams are to supply industry in Cagayan, are to attract industry to Cagayan, from where will the capital for industrial development come and to whom will the profits return? Are returns really sufficiently distributed so as to constitute a more equitable income distribution and so effect economic capacities at the individual level?

If, after such considerations, founded on intensive investigation, still result in the justification of the need for the dams, information is still needed with respect to the Kalinga and Bontoc communities as a basis for the planning and implementation of equitable and non-traumatic relocation. We do not as yet know the balances which their system provides, and we do not know what will be disrupted by relocation. Even dietary changes that could result from a change in settlement site could adversely affect the people.

In addition, we should know what went wrong in other relocation areas as regards the monitoring, the administration of the relocation and compensation mechanisms, and also why to this date there is no relief for the relocated people who have been so disadvantaged. If previous relocation did not provide for such a basic requirement as an adequate water supply, how do we expect another relocation proposal, not backed by information, to catch the nuances which may mean success or failure of the relocated populations to make the shift to a new site and adopt to whatever new conditions they may meet there?

The dam has waited a long time and can possibly wait longer. At present, the cancellation pending the carefully-weighted results of an extensive social analysis committed to both methodological soundness and to the interests of the Chico populations is our only hope for the slender chance that Chico will be justly understood, and fully participative. Then we may decide whether dam or no dam is really the issue.

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