

MBN Implementation in Barangay Pantig

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Barangay Pantig was one of the pioneers in installing the MBN information system. Despite this edge, the barangay was not able to phase in the other requisites of successful project implementation (SAPIME or situation analysis, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation). Inadequate social preparation of the community for the entry of the MBN intervention was a major flaw. This was worsened by the Barangay Captain's top-down leadership style, which isolated him and his reliable workers from the local populace. Although the barangay leadership has produced initial successes, these feats could hardly be sustained because the community lacks a sense of ownership of the activities in the locality.

Background

This is the story of Barangay Pantig (not the real name) which was once noted for having started the installation of MBN information system, the first to have ever been set up in one of the biggest cities in the country. Pantig is situated in a city where the total number of poor persons is nearly equivalent to the total population of the Cordilleras. In fact, in the past it was the favorite place to be visited by the participants of a training institution which advocated Primary Health Care (PHC) and the Minimum Basic Needs approach to national health workers, local executives and their staff. Visiting the area provided encouragement for some local executives to initiate the adoption of the MBN information system. One of the mayors who visited the barangay even became a *Galing Pook* awardee in 1997 after more than a year of implementation of the MBN information system and the other strategies in MBN in his municipality.

While Pantig provided inspiration for others to replicate the information system, it was doomed to fail from the beginning since it prematurely installed the information system before preparing the community and the local government to operate in a convergent manner and for the latter, to motivate community involvement in decisionmaking processes.

We will relate here how Pantig failed to sustain the initiative to draw lessons that will guide practitioners, policymakers and students concerned with the advocacy of MBN.

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The Context

Barangay Pantig was one of the areas piloted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to institutionalize one of its projects, the Social Welfare and Development Indicator System (or SWDIS for short). In the guidelines issued by then Secretary Corazon Alma de Leon on 12 May 1994, the set of indicators embodied in this system drew inputs from nongovernment organizations (NGOs), government, local government units (LGUs), and academe. It encompassed concerns not only of social welfare but of other agencies of the social development sector such as health, education, nutrition and labor. The introduction of SWDIS was significant since some of the indicators incorporated here became the set of indicators adopted in the Minimum Basic Needs Information System of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA).

The SWDIS began as "an integrated data system for monitoring the changes in the quality of life of the economically and socially disadvantaged population" (DSWD-PMS 1994b). It was designed to help review and evaluate the responsiveness of the policies and programs to the needs of the target population as well as the planned targets of agencies and institutions concerned with poverty alleviation.

Six regions were targeted to serve as the experimental areas for SWDIS. In these areas, SWDIS focused on socially depressed barangays in low income municipalities based in 25 priority provinces for poverty alleviation and countryside development jointly identified by the Presidential Council on Countryside Development (PCCD) and the Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty (PCFP).

The selection of Barangay Pantig actually deviated from the original plan since it was not a target municipality in the region where it is based. It was selected through the decision of its Regional Office since the region was concerned with targeting areas which it could handle considering the limited resources it had. The region selected the barangay because it could be managed easily by the financial resources available for the project, considering its proximity and population size.

The barangay has a total land area of .6478 square kilometers and had a registered population of 19,433 based on National Statistics Office Data as of 1995 or less than one percent (.97 percent to be exact) of the 1,989,410 of the city (NSO 1995). This population figure declined over the 1990 National Statistics data with a population of 21,187. In 1990, the barangay's population constituted 1.3% of the population of the city.

In 1990, the density of the population per square kilometer at Pantig was 32,706 and was much higher than compared with the density of the entire city of 10,000 per square kilometer (cited in DSWD n.d.).

The data utilized by DSWD to select the barangay as priority area in the city were the number of families with income below the poverty threshold of ₱4,735.00. They constituted a total of 91.7 percent in 1990 (DSWD n.d.).

Before the MBN information system was installed, the barangay already had eight neighborhood associations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, two public elementary schools, a health center, a barangay hall and five day care centers (DSWD n.d.).

Process and Content of Advocacy of MBN Through SWDIS

The advocacy of the indicator system was different from the process applied in the other areas where the approach was introduced. In the first place, it was mainly set up as an information system. The participatory approach was not applied as an approach in SWDIS. Hence, advocacy focused mainly on the adoption of the information system as a tool which could guide the local development council in its planning process rather than as a system which invited the participation of organized groups in the community. In view of the absence of PO interface in the management cycle, convergence was not realized.

The task of advocacy primarily rested on a Social Welfare Officer who served as the Planning Officer of the region. She initially paid a visit to another Social Welfare Officer who was based at the barangay and was in charge of the Productivity Skills Capability Development Project. The person in charge already had rapport with the captain. Her office was based right at the barangay hall. The project was funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency which supported the livelihood projects in the area. The disadvantaged women were able to avail of the skills training on food processing and preservation at the center. This also provided capital assistance to the populace (DSWD n.d.).

The barangay captain concurred with the idea of having a one-day orientation. This was conducted by the Planning Officer. It involved the staff of the productivity center and Barangay Health Workers (BHWs) who were tapped by the barangay captain. The advocacy mainly focused on how to gather data in the latter part of 1995. Three staff members of the productivity center and three BHWs were deployed for this purpose.

The first round of the survey was ironically facilitated by a tragedy: the houses of some 60 of the target families in houses were razed by fire. As the families were kept at the barangay center, the promise of being provided amenities facilitated obtaining the necessary information. In the first cycle of the survey, a total of 1,056 families was covered by the enumerators. Enumerators were mainly tasked to gather information and were assigned quotas to meet in gathering data. No promise of incentive was made yet the BHWs agreed to collect the information. In Christmas of 1994 the Planning Officer decided to provide monetary incentives and t-shirts to demonstrate appreciation for their involvement.

The daily monitoring of the implementation of the first cycle of the enumeration was done by the Planning Officer. Her work, in turn, was supervised by the Regional Planning and Monitoring Team (RPMT) composed of the Regional Director, the Project Coordinator, a Statistician and a Management Audit and Audit Analyst. The first cycle was actually implemented with a budget of ₱60,000. Processing of data was not the responsibility of the workers nor of the local government. This fell on the shoulders of the RPMT. In fact, practicum students assisted in processing the data. In order to facilitate the location of the families, a spot map was formulated by the enumerators. This defined the areas where they are located. A masterlist of persons was generated through the survey. Only 33 percent of the families were covered in the first cycle. Twenty nine (29) indicators were included in the first cycle.

In 1995, a directive was issued in order to saturate all households in the conduct of the survey. The fund support for the enumeration was increased to ₱100,000.00. The second cycle was able to cover 3,350 families or a total of 85 percent of the 4,154 families. Thirty (30) indicators were included by this time, the same set of indicators adopted in carrying out the third cycle. This was completed by the latter part of 1995 and covered all families. Since the staff of the productivity center were no longer available for this cycle, ten Barangay Health Workers were assigned by the Barangay Captain to support the enumeration process.

It was during the visitations made by the different batches of the training for PHC-MBN approach that the barangay became aware that other methodologies could be applied in advocating the set of indicators. Questions were raised by the training director and the participants of the training program regarding the processes applied by the barangay in installing the information system, zeroing in on the nature of participation of organized groups in decisionmaking processes.

In 1996, formal exposure to the MBN approach was experienced by the Planning Officer by participating in a regional training conducted on MBN by an NGO, as a partner of the Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty. This led her to advocate the new methodology. This was done through a one-day seminar which involved the barangay captain, some of his kagawads, the BHWs and an NGO. The whole day seminar highlighted the role of MBN in the SRA, how it differed from SWDIS, the importance of harnessing other strategies like convergence, focused targeting, and setting up an information system that is community-based. However, the emphasis was given on how to tabulate and analyze the forms. Materials were given to the captain to read to make him appreciate the details of the MBN process. These materials included the Primer on MBN and the Manual to install the information system. The Planning Officer did not provide instruction on the process of community organizing. She explained that this was not her forte being an engineering graduate.

In 1996, two cycles of MBN surveys were conducted. The official set of indicators of the SRA was adopted this year numbering 33 in all.

Thus, a total of five cycles of MBN data gathering was implemented from 1994 to 1996 at Barangay Pantig.

Leadership and MBN

Role in SAPIME

The fact that the barangay captain was willing to test the new methodology in gathering data "is already laudable" said one of the kagawads. Despite the fact that the captain was already "old," he showed willingness to learn the approach, which meant finding resources to supplement those provided by the DSWD, especially when the fifth cycle was to be implemented and DSWD wanted to phase out misinvolvement.

However, unlike in other areas, the installation of the information system did not proceed according to the usual processes in MBN implementation. Volunteers who were tapped were mainly trained to gather data and not to critically analyze the information together with the community. There was no advocacy for community involvement undertaken in the management processes.

While the information had been useful for planning purposes, data had been mainly utilized by the barangay captain in defining the projects where substandard MBNs could be addressed. Solutions were unilaterally decided upon in the Barangay Development Council (BDC), although occasionally obtaining the approval of the BHWs. The observed change in the emphasis given to the nutritional supplementation to children, since malnutrition was noted to be one of the key problems in the second cycle, was pointed out by the captain and validated by the volunteer workers and kagawads. The captain claimed to have negotiated the allocation of about P60,000 per year to provide feeding at least three times a week to about 700 children. The BHWs alternated in preparing the food for feeding.

On the part of the volunteers, the children who were fed were identified by BHWs based on the masterlist of families with substandard MBN requirements for nutrition. The fact that the BHWs resided in the area where they operated helped in communicating with the families of malnourished children. However, an officer in a neighborhood association commented on the lack of clarity to them of the basis for feeding the children. He said: *Lahat ng bata pinapakain... para lamang silang nagpa-party. Nagpapakain sila ngunit wala namang resulta—hindi naman nasusubaybayan ang kalusugan ng mga bata. Ginagawa lamang ito kung may pera... para lamang political gimmick.* (The children are being fed... As if they are having party. Feeding program is undertaken but there is no favorable result—there is no follow-up on the health of the children. This is being done only when funds are available... as if it is a political gimmick.)

Daycare centers had increased hours for instruction having 7:00-10:00 a.m., then 10:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m. and 1:00-4:00 p.m. after it noted that children in the 3-6 age group were not attended by elders. There was an effort on the part of the captain as a member of the Lions' Club, to solicit allowances for volunteers who tended the day care centers.

However, the Social Welfare Officer assigned to the Productivity Center noted that the implementation of the MBN information system and the response to the problems obtained in the data were "management centered." BHWs were merely mobilized to "assist" (*bilang alalay lamang sila, subalit hindi gaanong naintindihan ng husto ang prosesos*). (They only served as assistants but hardly knew the meaning in this involvement.) Therefore, the activities undertaken were not "owned" by the participating members.

Interface with NGOs/POs

While NGO contributions were solicited by the barangay captain, they were not actively involved in making decisions in the management processes. Interaction by the captain with the NGOs was merely to get their support for projects which the barangay had already identified. In fact, one area volunteer of an NGO, *Unang Lingap Kapwa Philippines Incorporated*, who assisted in the nutrition program claimed to have been invited in the last year of the captain's administration mainly to be mobilized to re-install him in his bid for another term of office.

People's organizations had been activated in the barangay, especially in the depressed communities. Neighborhood associations had their own set of officers. However, seven of the neighborhood leaders representing four neighborhood associations who had been interviewed do not recall having been invited to help in making decisions to address the problems in their area based on the information obtained on MBN. However, neighborhood associations had been very functional for them since they were able to negotiate with the captain on the problems they perceived their local government should be able to address. For instance, they were able to negotiate with the captain regarding the construction of public faucets. One association negotiated for the expansion of their canal to avoid flooding.

In interviews of four neighborhood associations, seven leaders said they were formed not mainly to assist in making decisions but to "complement the activities of the barangay." For instance, in supervising the conduct of basketball games among the youth, the association normally took the initiative since the Sangguniang Kabataan was not constituted. Furthermore, they also took the lead in resolving problems regarding drug addiction and maintaining cleanliness in their neighborhood. They spearheaded the construction of pushcarts to convey garbage to collection areas where dump trucks passed by. However, when asked about their familiarity with and involvement in MBN decisionmaking, the leader said "no." They only remembered

being "surveyed" but had no participation in validating the data and in helping make decisions on the types of projects to be implemented in the area. While one of the officers of a neighborhood association claimed to have regular meetings on a monthly basis, involvement of the residents is still a problem. She could only count a total of 50 out of 300 households in the area who could be counted upon in case community assemblies were held.

Two elected kagawads for the current barangay development council who served as elected representatives of NGOs felt they were not informed of the MBN approach while it was being implemented in the area. They said, "*siya lang at yung malapit sa kaniya ang nakakaalam ng nangyayari sa MBN.*" ("He and those close to him are the only ones who are familiar with MBN.") They knew about the visits conducted by participants of the PHC-MBN training program for both local and national officials conducted by a nearby state university, but there was no appreciation among the NGO representatives of the purpose of such visits. They were not aware of the mechanics and the advantages of the MBN information system. They were consulted on infrastructures projects but not on what characterized MBN. There were even occasions when agreements had been made in the council but the decision would be overturned by the Captain.

A Profile of the Barangay Captain

Emergence and Preparation

The barangay captain was 55 years old when he was drafted to serve Barangay Pantig after the EDSA Revolution. A relative of Benigno Aquino invited him to serve when the barangay officials under the former dictator were eased out of office. In the regular electoral process, he ran and won. Thus, he served in this position for a total of 11 years until he was deposed by the current captain in the last barangay elections in 1997.

He does not come from a family with political leanings. He obtained a Bachelor of Arts Degree and thereafter served the private sector. He joined a paper mill company for the most part of his life prior to entering politics. His last position was as supervisor.

He decided to join public service for the simple reason that he "liked to serve the people." It was an honor to be able to be given this opportunity although he claimed that it was a difficult job since people came to see him at odd hours and he should be ready to serve any time of the day. He was on call for 24 hours.

He conceded that he lacked formal training in public management so he learned the trade on-the-job. He was fond of reading so he could update himself about his tasks. For instance, he studied the Local Government Code in order to know his responsibilities.

However, learning about the processes required in MBN approach came too late in his term of office. He did not have enough time to organize the community and to involve them in decisionmaking. In fact, he tried to involve the doctor of the health center and the principal of the adjacent school but the activities pursued were already in place and they did not have a part in the decisionmaking. The doctor declared lack of familiarity with the approach itself and was stunned with questions addressed to her on MBN by participants of the training program on PHC-MBN when an open forum was conducted.

Qualities of Leadership Manifested

Reflecting on how he performed his role as a captain, the local executive said he relegated what his feelings were in order to ensure the welfare of the barangay. He said he gave much of his time in order to carry out the barangay's projects. He believed that he could be remembered for building the barangay hall, promoting cleanliness and raising revenues for the barangay. He claimed he was innovative in imposing fees and charges to raise the barangay's income such as for instance, initiating the passage of ordinances to exact fees from peddlers and hawkers, sari-sari store with liquor, excavation permit, etc. From fees imposed by the barangay, he would raise about P250,000 annually and augment the internal revenue allotment for his barangay. These innovations were also appreciated by a former kagawad, two BHWs and two officers of the neighborhood association. They observed his regular presence at the hall, *at napaka-sipag naman*. (He was industrious.)

Furthermore, the captain claimed to have avoided the use of force. He tried to talk to people in a way that he considered *mahinahon* and *pakikipag-usap ng maayos*. Some of his counterparts bullied their constituents and were physically abusive, he said.

The captain said he was open to learning. He read many materials which helped a lot in improving his management style. He was credited, too, by his kagawad with trying to innovate. In fact, adoption of MBN information was one instance which they liked about him and the way he used the information for implementing projects based on objective data.

He found a lot of time to carry out his projects since he was not saddled with rearing children because they were already engaged in their respective careers. He was "practically married to his job," said his wife.

Officers of the neighborhood association interviewed conceded that the barangay captain was always available when you approached him. He was accessible. They said, "*nandiyan kung kailangan mo*," ("he is there when you need him") and "*madaling hingan ng tulong*."

They also acknowledged that he fulfilled the promises he made. For instance, he implemented the ordinances passed by the local sanggunian. The taxes imposed were collected which made the barangay generate additional income.

One association leader also liked the captain for being uninvolved in drug addiction syndicates and in too much social drinking. "*Hindi tomador,*" (He is not a drunkard) said one and therefore he could perform his duties well.

Qualities They Expected Him to Manifest

Two neighborhood association leaders expected him to interact with them and to get to know their problems from their community's point of view. "*Ang kulang sa kaniya, hindi siya bumaba,*" ("The trouble with him was that he did not go down to our level.") said one. "*Hindi naman sa aming punto de bista ang mga proyektong pinapatupad niya. Hindi amin ang mga proyektong isinagawa.*" (The projects he implements did not emanate from our points of view. These projects are not ours.) They expected him to relate with them. "*Mahalagang makipag-ugnay siya sa amin. Hindi ito masyadong naipakita,*" ("It is important for him to coordinate with us. He failed to do this.") said one of them. Projects were instituted based on his own initiative and not through team decisionmaking. This was confirmed by two NGO leaders who were elected to the council. They said they were even treated as "second class." Only the kagawads were called for a meeting. They were not consulted as often.

One of his BHWs said they were not treated fairly. When the captain negotiated the relocation of some squatter families to areas where ultimate ownership was part of the plan, her family was not included. She could not understand the rationale for the selection of other families. This was not made known to the residents. The BHW claimed that while she helped much in improving the condition of the community as a volunteer worker, she was not considered in the relocation.

All of the respondents noted some self-centeredness as a cause of his downfall. They said he was only concerned with getting the credit for himself and did not recognize the efforts of the other members of the community. "*Siya ay makasarili,*" (He is self-centered.) said one BHW. "*Kami ang nagtrabaho pero ang gloria, nasa kaniya.*" ("We are the workhouse, but he gets all the glory.") They resented the fact that the attribution of the efforts initiated in the implementation of projects focused on him. He often missed acknowledging the contribution of the BHWs, his kagawad or even of the Social Welfare Officers.

The Social Welfare Officer said, he could have lost in the 1987 election because he failed to involve the people. The projects he implemented were not visible to them. There was no sense of identification with what was initiated. MBN was doomed because of his lack of commitment or training in organizing the community and in

actively drawing their involvement in the decisionmaking process. He organized neighborhood associations as a means to impart to them projects which he decided upon unilaterally. Even the Captain admitted this failure. He said that people failed to see what he was able to accomplish.

He expected the volunteer workers to be loyal only to him instead of seeing them as leaders of the community as originally designed in the Primary Health Care policy for which BHWs were trained. In fact, in one of the visits made by participants of the training program, the captain pointed out that the BHWs were loyal to him only. He claimed, "*Pag wala na ako, wala na rin sila.*" ("If I am gone, they'll be gone too.") Technically speaking, though, BHWs are volunteer workers who are trained by public health workers in order to equip them with the skills to mobilize the community and to render primary care services. Thus, their loyalty should be given to the community rather than the local executive.

Value of MBN to the Community

It was conceded that the captain was guided by the MBN data in making plans for the barangay. For instance, feeding increased to three times a day instead of two prior to MBN assessment. The feeding program also covered more children; its coverage more than doubled (700 children) when MBN was installed, compared to previous years when an average of 300 was covered. Day care center shifts were also increased from two to three and covered more children. About 100 children were served when MBN was installed unlike previous years when the centers catered to only 60. The stipends of the teachers were also supported by the barangay.

Peace and order was mentioned as a key problem of the barangay which the barangay captain helped in solving. When MBN assessment was conducted, this was not included among the top 10 unmet MBNs. BHWs and officers of the neighborhood association mentioned this as a key accomplishment of the captain. The barangay organized *tanods* who could assist in maintaining peace and order. One of the problems mentioned by the neighborhood leaders which affected their security was drug addiction. This was responded to by the barangay through the creation of an Anti-Drug Abuse Committee which conducted twice a year seminars against drug abuse. The Committee also assisted law enforcers in the apprehension and rehabilitation of pushers. The construction of a basketball court was also undertaken in order to channel the attention of the youth to more wholesome activities.

The only problem was that the decisionmaking process did not involve the BHWs who were only treated as his "*dakilang alalay*" ("righthand man"). Furthermore, neighborhood associations were organized but did not have a sense of authorship of the activities initiated by the barangay. In fact, some of them treated the MBN survey as a chore which took much of their time. They thought it was only another "*pamumulitika*" (political gimmick).

Table 1 shows the MBN data for the second cycle of 1995 and that for 1996 which were both able to cover 100 percent of the families in the barangay. It is noticeable that the top 10 problems registered in 1995 improved in condition by 1996.

Table 1. Comparing MBN Data for 1995 and 1996

Indicator No. for 1996	Indicators	2 nd Cycle				
		1995 (%)	Rank	1996 (%)	Rank	% Change
31	Children below 15 not engaged in hazardous occupation	82.97	1	24.36	16	58.61
2	No severely and moderately underweight children under 5 years old	71.39	2	30.30	12	41.09
33	Children below 7 years old not left unattended	71.19	3	20.43	20	50.76
25	Children 3-5 years old attending day care/pre-school	69.10	4	58.96	3	10.14
1	Birth weight of newborns at least 2.5 kg.	68.95	5	40.08	9	28.87
9	No deaths in the family within the year. Children are not made to beg in the streets (not in 1996)	68.64	6	41.44	8	27.2
23	Other members of the family 15 years and above employed	67.99	7	62.54	2	3.13
8	No family member got sick of diarrhea/Not more than 1 diarrhea episode per child (indicator in 1996)	65.67	8	42.23	7	20.66
27	Children 13-16 years old in high school	62.69	9	52.85	4	9.33
24	Families with income above subsistence level (not in 1995 indicator system)	62.18	10	65.28	1	
26	Children 6-12 in elementary school	50.68	11	47.9	5	2.78
29	Family members involved in at least one people's organization	44.14	12	43.83	6	.31
11	Couples practicing family planning	28.1	23	35.65	10	-7.55

Reduction in substandard MBNs is consistently manifested in almost all indicators, with the exception of one indicator which was no longer sustained as an indicator in 1996 (Children made to beg in the streets). The top five indicators with the highest percentage of reduction in substandard MBN include: (1) Children below 15 not engaged in hazardous occupation, 58.61 percent; (2) Children below 7 years old not left unattended, 50.76 percent; (3) No severely and moderately underweight children under five years old, 41.09 percent; (4) Birthweights of newborns at least 2.5 k.g., 28.8 percent; and (5) No deaths in the family within the year, 27.2 percent.

The marked improvement in the second to the fifth indicators could be attributed to the special attention of the captain to nutritional and day care needs of children. This was recognized by the leaders of the neighborhood association.

On the whole, judging from the data on MBN for the two years, marked improvements in the top ten substandard MBNs have taken place. In spite of the weakness in involving community members in decisionmaking processes, initiatives of the captain to respond to these problems reaped benefits. However, the issue of sustainability has surfaced as a problem in view of the weak interface of people's organizations in the management processes. Also, since the data were not turned over to the next barangay captain, there was no opportunity for the new leader to use the information and to learn from the lessons obtained in the area.

Lessons Learned

From the experience encountered in MBN installation in Barangay Pantig, the following lessons can be learned:

1. *Value of leadership motivate MBN implementation*

Leadership endorsement is crucial in installing MBN. Allocation of resources (both human and financial) hinged on the commitment of the Barangay Captain to engage in the activity. This could be seen in the deployment of BHWs and the allocation of resources to support the projects which address substandard MBNs.

2. *Premature implementation of MBN leads to the difficulty in sustaining it.*

The difficulties encountered by the community in making the barangay development council, neighborhood associations and the community appreciate MBN could be attributed to the weakness of the technology of SWDIS. It lacked the requirement of having the different sectors involved in the SAPIME cycle. Furthermore, because SWDIS did not emphasize the value of community involvement, projects and activities which were undertaken by the local executive were not fully appreciated since these were undertaken in a top-down manner. While improvements were noted in substandard MBNs, these were not fully understood by some of the members of the BDC and the neighborhood associations.

3. *CO requires training/orientation*

To implement MBN effectively necessitates capability building. This cannot be learned overnight. The experience of Pantig shows that it is not enough to have a leader who is hardworking and one who is committed to use MBN data in making decisions. The community appreciates activities which flow from their own efforts and decisions.

In Pantig's experience, the local executive could have been imparted with the knowledge of the processes and value of community organizing and convergence strategies. More interface of the community organizations in making decisions could have occurred if the implications of this dynamic were imparted to the local leaders.

4. *Lack of training for leadership makes management a tedious/circuitous process*

Training for the task of a barangay captain becomes a tedious process if there is no prior preparation for it. As the barangay captain of Pantig said, he had to learn by doing. MBN as a management technology which came later in the life of the Captain could not be learned without preparation for the requirements of the process. MBN is not only the installation of the information system but also entails preparation for convergence and processes to ensure the implementation of a community-based approach, among others.

5. *MBN contributes to rational decisionmaking*

The MBN information system has contributed much in helping the leaders make a decision. This has rationalized the basis for the identification of activities to be implemented. However, rational decisionmaking need not be confined to the official leaders mainly. Community organizations could benefit from the information and make them involved in the decisionmaking process. This dimension of decisionmaking was not fully utilized in the case of Pantig. The utility of the information was mainly the prerogative of the Barangay Captain.

Empowerment becomes an agendum that is difficult to accomplish when the information is mainly accessible to the formal leaders.

Conclusion

On the whole, this study has shown that exercise of unilateral or top-down leadership can bring positive results. Leaders who make decisions to respond to priority problems of the community obtain improvements in the quality of life of the community. However, sustaining the efforts of the leader becomes a problem when the community does not have a sense of ownership of the activities in the locality. MBN as an information system had been useful for the barangay captain. However, community members did not appreciate the value of collecting the information since they had not been actively involved in analyzing the information and pinpointing the activities for implementation.

Preparing leaders for new roles and expectations is necessary. Since MBN is a new management perspective, barangay leaders have to be formally instructed on what the set of strategies entails. For instance, making leaders appreciate the value of empowerment necessitates orientation on basic principles of community organizing. Making barangay leaders implement MBN information system in a convergent way as spelled out in the MBN approach requires capacity building for barangay leaders to know the implications of convergence in the SAPIME cycle. Knowing how to apply focused targeting using MBN requires basic knowledge of the steps involved in processing information in order to utilize the MBN data.

Thus, leaders have an important role in MBN process. While they already manifest some basic personal attributes and capacities, formal orientations may facilitate the learning process instead of leaving leaders on their own to learn the expectations in the application of the technology.

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Key Informants

Current and former barangay captains
 2 former NGO representatives and currently elected kagawads
 2 Barangay Health Workers
 7 officers of 4 neighboring associations
 1 former kagawad
 Regional Planning Officer of the DSWD
 Social Welfare Officer in charge of the Productivity Center
 Physician of the health center
 2 Barangay Nutrition Scholars