

Genealogy and Critique of the Upland Development Discourse

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Simultaneous with the issuance of PD 705 known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, primarily aimed at managing any form of forest occupancy, the academic community likewise formulated and adopted the Integrated Social Forestry Program as a developmental concept for the uplands. Social forestry had a twofold objective: economic and political. Firstly, it was intended to mobilize forest resources for the economic and social progress of the nation through the involvement of kaingineros and other forest occupants. Secondly, it was envisioned to control and pacify communism in the countryside. Central to the discourse is the question of whether or not social forestry was indeed conceived as a solution to the poverty in the uplands, or as a control mechanism to protect the development of the lowlands from the alleged destructive effects of upland farming and a political tool to pacify the growing discontent in the rural upland communities.

Introduction

Development, as a word, has become a catch-all for all types of change which have accompanied modernization. The birth of the word development was attended by the dominance of economics as a discipline and of economic growth as the idiom from which its logic was derived. Today, despite honest attempts to exorcise development of its economistic interpretations and practices, there still remains a pervasive belief that the current ways of talking about and doing development are still governed by the economic calculus.

The dominance of economics as the discipline from which the development logics and imperatives were drawn did not accidentally come into being. The logic of development was a direct descendant of the idea of progress which emerged during the Enlightenment. This idea of progress was based on a necessitarian and teleological interpretation of history, and a materialistic explanation of human existence. The realization that man is capable of mastering his natural environment through the application of laws that will govern his pursuit of pleasure has legitimized the entrenchment of a science of values—the science of economics.

However, it must be understood that the word development assumed its present meaning only after the Second World War, and only during a time in history when the global power game was already being played by an East-West opposition.

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Development, and its first and foremost principle of economic growth, became an ideological child of the cold war. It became an ideological weapon of the West in containing the spread of communism to the Third World. In truth, development is a discourse with a meaning which was socially constructed using Western metaphors, beliefs, principles, and experiences. While the East offered the newly emerging states socialism, the West offered them development along capitalist lines. It is, therefore, not surprising that development has always been identified with capitalism.

Development, in its current usage both as a theoretical and a practical discourse, is a teleological process whose essential project is the transformation of society to a better state. However, the hegemonic discourse of development is based on the imperatives of rationality and control: rationality in the way people convert resources into capital, and control of the ideological base and the power structures which sustain such modes of production. As a process, development is not free from struggle and its tactics and strategies have to be revised in order to deflect the challenges that could threaten its dominance. Thus, participatory types of development, like the Integrated Social Forestry Program adopted by the Philippine government vis-a-vis its upland societies, could be seen as ways by which the development discourse is made to smile. However, despite these revisions, development will always be anchored on a power nexus.

This paper shows that the discourse of development which the Philippine state adopts vis-a-vis the uplands is a logical and historical extension of the global development discourse. This discourse, marked by the hegemony of rationality and control imperatives, is not weakened by the advent of participatory and community-oriented forms of development like social forestry. At best, these are attempts by the state to maintain its legitimacy. Thus, any claim that such attempts are a liberating form of development is a contradiction and is highly problematic. Social forestry, just like any other state-sponsored program to empower people, remains a discourse which sustains asymmetrical power relations: it is not designed to control the upland societies less, but to control them better.

The Roots of the Discourse: The Colonial Years

In the era of Spanish colonization, Philippine society was dichotomized between the colonized and the uncolonized, the Christianized and the heathen. There existed a form of knowledge which divided the colonized between those who allowed themselves, either by force or by their own free will, to be drawn into an alien discourse, and those who did not. During the Spanish colonization, religion was the codifying and normalizing instrument. Those who fell outside the margins of the normal and the acceptable were subjected to both political and religious persecution.

The very first people who fell into this category were the indigenous peoples of the mountains and hinterlands. In the eyes of the Spanish friars and

conquistadores, they were mere savages and heathens who worshipped idols and who refused to recognize the power of both the Christian God and the Spanish Crown. They became objects of conversion and/or persecution—activities instigated by the Spanish colonial administration which amounted to the destruction of the indigenous characters of these peoples. Only those who opted for conversion were allowed to join the mainstream of colonial life. Those who resisted suffered at best, marginalization, and at worst, death.

However, Spanish domination failed to incorporate the most remote sections of the hinterlands of the Philippines. Thus, at the end of Spanish rule, there were still indigenous populations which were free from the reach of the discourse—not because they actively resisted it, but because the discourse failed to place them in its power. Their tragedy is the fact that the politics of colonization is not based on actual penetration of every sector of the population. In the eyes of Spain, all the 7,100 islands of the Philippine archipelago were its possessions and, therefore, were subjected to its power. Consequently, when the Spanish empire collapsed after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the American forces took possession of the archipelago and claimed every part, including those who had never experienced the power of the Spanish empire, as its own. In one stroke of a pen, the indigenous uplanders, to whom Spanish power was unknown, were, together with the rest of the Filipinos, turned over to a new master.

The discourse of colonization changed during the American period. Unlike the Spaniards, who used religion as the main instrument of subjugation, the Americans mainly relied on education to effectively colonize the Filipino population. Moreover, the logic of capitalism, the expansion of wealth, and the bureaucratization of governance started to be assimilated and integrated in Philippine society. The effectiveness of this method of colonization was seen in the way Filipinos allowed themselves to figure in an unequal relationship with the United States. The hegemony of American values and systems has been well-entrenched in the way Filipinos govern, control, and structure their affairs.

The dichotomization of Philippine society, formerly a function of religion, was now based on the logic of capitalism—dividing those who were developed from those who were undeveloped. During the Spanish era, those who fell outside the norm were subjected to conversion to the Catholic faith and those who refused suffered religious persecution. On the other hand, in the American era, those who fell outside the norm, the undeveloped, were subjected to conversion to the capitalist faith, as either its subjects (as owners of capital) or its objects (as labor). The discourse of Spanish colonization was aimed at the spiritual fear of the Filipino, the fear of going to hell; while the discourse of American colonization was aimed at the material fear of the Filipino, the fear of being poor.

With poverty as a main virtue of the Catholic faith, the advent of materialism accentuated the basic contradiction in the Filipino psyche: a superego based on

Catholicism and an id based on materialism. In the end, it was this very contradiction which formed the root of the production of discourse in development—a discourse which is both compassionate and punitive, one that has to evince the virtue of compassion as it cracks the whip.

The Philippine upland societies, formerly labelled as a haven for savages by the Spanish friars and conquistadores, became, with the advent of American capitalism, a region of undevelopment. Thus, the uplands became objects of conversion to mainstream of capitalism. However, during the colonial period, the logic of the colonial political economy was structured in such a way that development was perceived solely as the extraction of capital to benefit American interests. The Philippine uplands was seen mainly as an open frontier for capital accumulation and surplus extraction. Large tracts of forest lands had to be converted to plantations or had to be devoted to logging operations for the benefit of American companies and consumers. By 1910, the Americans had already established 97 major plantations, averaging over 100 hectares, in Mindanao alone (Lynch 1984).

While this was going on, the upland peoples were never allowed to benefit from this process. Instead, they were subjected to further Christianization by the Protestant missionaries. With this, one can easily recognize a two-pronged discourse of colonization adopted by the Americans relative to the uplands. As the missionaries preached the Protestant ethic, the capitalists busied themselves with the extraction of timber and minerals to fill their coffers.

However, unlike the Spanish friars, the missionaries did not limit themselves to the use of force and religion in civilizing the indigenous populations. Education was included as a part of the package deal offered by the various Protestant congregations to the uplanders. This tactic proved to be very effective and successful, as seen in the ease with which those who refused to accept Catholicism, as offered by the Spaniards, allowed themselves to be baptized as Lutherans, Congregationists, Methodists, or Baptists.

Thus, the discourse of American colonization limited the definition of the uplands to the bodies of forests and unexplored lands which had to be subjected to capital accumulation and surplus-extraction activities. The people of the uplands—the indigenous tribes—were excluded as beneficiaries of that development.

The Internal Reproduction of the Discourse

In the early years of American colonial rule, the remnants of the old Spanish colonial Filipino aristocracy – the *ilustrados* – enthusiastically welcomed and, in the process, collaborated with the Americans (Constantino 1975). As owners of capital themselves, the *ilustrados* saw in the Americans an opportunity which the Spaniards had denied them. They were allowed to participate in the extraction of

surplus, primarily as suppliers of cheap raw materials needed by American industries. Later, the ruling elite—primarily of the wealthy urban-based families—gradually assumed the role their colonial tutors formerly occupied. They become the perpetuators and reproducers of the discourse of capitalism. After independence was granted, the capitalist logic and world view were already deeply entrenched in the fabric of the Philippine political economy. The lowland-based ruling class became the new articulators and the prime beneficiaries of progress.

In this arrangement, the upland societies remained marginalized. They remained as objects of the capital extraction activities of lowland-based individuals and groups. This was seen in the burgeoning of logging and mining operations, hydroelectric dams, and other infrastructures in the uplands. Moreover, land speculators and lowland migrants, all in search of the good life which the lowlands failed to give them, flocked to the uplands. All of these factors have contributed to the displacement of the indigenous upland societies. The discourse which considered the uplands as mere resources for capital growth remained in place. The welfare of the communities within upland areas was either dismissed as inconsequential or, at worst, was considered a constraint. The needs of the lowland-based industries were considered far more important for the growth of the economy.

The Logic of Domination

The success of the lowland-based interests in marginalizing the uplands was attended by the birth of the concept of land ownership. During the Spanish era, all lands in the Philippines were supposed to have been under the ownership of the Spanish Crown, unless proper documents of ownership could be shown. This doctrine of land ownership came to be known as the Regalian Doctrine (Lynch 1984). When the Americans came, the US colonial administration was quick to use this doctrine to justify its claim of ownership over 90% of the Philippine land mass, a majority of which was upland. Unless documents of ownership from the former colonists could be presented, the Americans insisted that a piece of land was public, that is, owned by the United States (Lynch 1984).

The adoption of this policy virtually made the upland communities, which at the time lacked the necessary documents to prove their ownership of the land, into illegal settlers. The emphasis on documents as proofs of ownership, which was further emphasized in the Public Land Act of 1945, became an effective tool in displacing indigenous upland communities (Lynch 1984). Later, the lowland migrants who settled in the uplands in search of better lives also became victims of this policy.

The Public Land Act of 1945 explicitly stated that all lands occupied by Filipino citizens or by their predecessors before 4 July 1945 are subject to ownership claims, thereby allowing an opening for the upland communities to be entitled to

their right of ownership. However, the proviso of the policy stipulated only one way to legitimize such ownership claims, and this was by giving the upland dwellers the opportunity to get a title of ownership.

This strategy, though done with good intentions, failed to recognize two very important points which led to the exclusion of the uplands from the legal classification of land ownership. First, and especially in the case of indigenous tribes, land-ownership legitimized by a document was a concept which was totally alien to most of the indigenous tribes. Most of them believed that the land, like the air and the water, could not be alienated and disposed of to any single individual. Only the products of the land could be subjected to individual or personal claims. It was very common for tribal groups to practice communal systems of land use (Lynch 1984). Hence, a concept of land ownership, particularly one that is based on written documents, was totally incomprehensible to these peoples. Second, the process of applying for a land title, in itself, was also prohibitive for the uplanders to comply with (Makil 1984). The uplanders were not familiar with the bureaucratic mechanisms which went with the said process. In the discourse of the lowlands, these uplanders were simply illiterate and poor. They could not function in the language used by the lowland people and they did not have the wealth or influence to successfully present their case to the cognizant government agency.

What made the whole politics pathetic was the way the lowland-based logging, mining, and land interests took advantage of this in forcing themselves into the uplands, thereby causing the displacement of thousands of people. Thus, while the lowland interests were engaged in investing in capital-accumulating ventures, things which the discourse of modernity had called vital in the development process, the uplands were subjected to a punitive discourse which took its logic from the power of law. The juridico-legal apparatus of the state, as maintained by the government bureaucracy, formulated policies which sought to arrest, prosecute, and eject the upland communities from their lands. In the eyes of many, such steps were not only necessary but also justified.

Later, the discourse of punishment took a new logic. Increased knowledge of forest, soil, and environmental sciences ushered in a different kind of labeling and exclusion. This time, upland farming practices became the object of scientific classification. They were considered destructive because they burned the forest cover and exposed the soil to the elements, thereby hastening the leaching of soil nutrients. Thus, the upland societies, the legally-classified criminals and squatters, were further classified and labeled as an environmental threat. And this time, the claim drew its justification from the neutral realm of science. In the eyes of the lowlands, the state and the bureaucracy which it sustains and which in turn protects its interests, nothing could have deserved more severe punishment.

At that point, it is interesting to know that the practices of the logging and mining companies, which had far more destructive impact, were tolerated by a

regulatory mechanism and a political system that was riddled with corruption. The state could afford to do this for, after all, logging and mining contribute to the accumulation of capital. The upland peoples contributed little to upland development, as defined within the theory of capital growth, and were more often seen as a threat to this process. The discourse could only be consistent by cracking the whip over a few thousand people in order to save the much larger sector in the society from the curse of backwardness. At that time, the discourse on development was still at a stage when the destruction of a culture-bearing group of people was viewed as necessary. The upland peoples served as the sacrificial lambs to be offered on the altar of the gods of profit and progress.

The Logic of Resistance and Reform

But where there is force, there is resistance. The punitive techniques which the state had unleashed on the upland societies, both indigenous and migrant, led to confrontations between the forces of the lowland discourse and the upland societies. At the same time, the gradual emergence of alternative schools of pedagogy led to a shift in the way development was viewed by the intellectuals and academicians. This was coupled with a rising nationalist movement, which took the ideology of the left in some instances. The period of the 1950s, 1960s and the early 1970s was a watershed in the Philippine history of resistance. This period saw the peasant uprisings of the *Hukbalahaps* in Central Luzon and of the *sacadas* in the sugarlands of Negros, the growing restiveness of the laboring class and the students, and the rebellion of the intellectuals in the various universities. These occurred at a time when the global political system was in ferment with the birth of nation states comprising the Third World, accompanied by the emergence of doubts in the global academia on the efficacy of the diffusionist models of development.

Thus, the ruling class saw the necessity of reexamining the discourse, in relation not only to the uplands, but to the various centers of power and knowledge in Philippine society. The declaration of martial law in 1972 by President Ferdinand Marcos, though widely perceived recently as an early sign of a determined and deliberate attempt to hold on to power, was also a consistent systemic response to the growing threat. In the realm of politics, order must first be restored. Then, reforms could follow. Hence, the Green Revolution movement and the various rural and agricultural development programs were implemented in the early years of martial law. Marcos, in doing this, was merely practicing what, at the time, had been envisioned as the prime logic of progress: order first, before democracy.

The New Discourse: A Discourse of Compassion?

In 1975, three years after the declaration of martial law, Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) 705, otherwise known as The Revised Forestry Code of

the Philippines. One of the major thrusts of this Code was the intention to manage any form of forest occupancy. PD 705, as amended by PD 1559, stated in one of its provisions the following:

Kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants who entered into forest lands and grazing lands before 19 May 1975 without permit or authority, shall not be prosecuted: Provided, that they do not increase their clearings: Provided further, that they undertake the activities imposed upon them by the Bureau [of Forest Development] in accordance with a management plan calculated to conserve and protect forest resources in the area: Provided finally that *kaingineros*, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants shall, whenever the best land use of the area so demands as determined by the director [of the Bureau of Forest Development], be ejected and relocated to the nearest accessible government resettlement area.

Unlike the previous punitive discourse, wherein upland societies were viewed as constraints which required punishment, PD 705 considered them as constraints which should be disciplined and controlled within the logic of development. This, in turn, was derived from the initiatives, interests, and rational calculations of the lowland-based power. Before, this power had cracked the whip mercilessly, imprisoning and uprooting people from their own lands in the process. Now, it used a different kind of control mechanism—the sophisticated science of management and its attendant technologies.

Thus, the birth of the forestry extension agent, the modern day equivalent of the American missionary, was made possible. The forestry bureaucracy, acting at the behest of the state, dispersed its individual representatives to the uplands to educate its people on the proper techniques in hill farm cultivation and the proper choice of cropping systems. They also introduced the concept of efficiency in order to transform the economy of the uplands from a subsistence to a market basis, thereby extending the discourse of capitalism to the same population which, earlier in history, was victimized by its onslaught.

The upland societies, in order to be classified as recipients of the discourse of management, must willingly and gladly relinquish their old ways, which it branded as destructive, and assimilate alien concepts of farming, some of which, under a different name, were very similar to the ones they had been practicing. At this point, the discourse of management assumed the ultimate form of domination: not only did it improve on the normalizing and alienating effects of the former discourse, but it also introduced the strategy of making the upland societies, the former objects of techniques of control, active participants in such techniques. In effect, the upland societies were turned into subjects engaged in a discourse of domination of which they were themselves the objects—a concept which Michel Foucault (1979) calls self-subjection.

The whole strategy of control used by the lowland-based power to invest the uplands in the whole discourse of development was totalizing. It was so complex and encapsulating that the upland peoples were left with no choice but to allow themselves to be subjugated. Failure to comply with the prescribed farming systems imposed by the bureaucracy would once again expose these peoples to the punitive discourse. Such is the compelling power of PD 705. Control is the imperative, and failure to allow oneself to be captured and normalized within its confines will lead one back to a punitive situation, in which legal classification as a criminal and scientific classification as a destroyer of ecosystems will once again be summoned to provide the logic for punishment.

Thus, a close and critical analysis of the discourse leads one to conclude that the logic of management, the technique which pursues the imperative of development, does indeed derive its coherence and impetus from the worst fears of the lowlands: the fears of floods and droughts which are believed to be outcomes of forest destruction. However, the hegemony of the power which articulates and dispenses the strategies which would pursue that development must be protected from the onslaught of resistance. Control must be matched by a compassionate face, one that allows the subjugated to participate in a kind of development whose logic is not their own. This false sense of power which reproduces the hegemonic structures of power and knowledge invests the uplands in a discourse of control which smiles, a strategy of domination which compassionately cracks the whip.

The discourse of upland development perfectly manifests all of these. And the fact that it all started during the early years of martial law completes the logical explanation. Marcos and his ruling clique had to maintain their hegemony. The declaration of martial law provided the political leverage to crack the whip on those who threatened it. But repression begets resistance. In the realm of development, the metaphor of martial law with a smile found its most sophisticated manifestation. And the Philippine uplands, together with the rural poor in the countryside, became objects of that smile.

Social Forestry: A Compassionate Cracking of the Whip on the Philippine Uplands

The issuance of PD 705 unleashed forces which led to the emergence of various government programs relative to forest land occupancy. Consistent with the tilt of the discourse towards the scientification of control, the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) which is presently known as the Forest Management Bureau, adopted four major strategies along this line. These included rural development forestry, production forestry, environmental and reclamation forestry, and various support programs (Alvarez 1983). The initial strategies adopted by the BFD under rural development forestry were the Forest Occupancy Management Program (FOM) in 1975 and the Communal Tree Farming Program (CTF) in 1978.

Simultaneous with these government programs, the academic community was in the process of formulating a concept of managing communities in forest lands which would deviate from the punitive measures adopted by the government at the time. The results of these parallel endeavors were the evolution of the social forestry concept in forest management and the adoption of the Integrated Social Forestry Program.

The program aimed to mobilize forest resources for the economic and social progress of the nation, through the involvement of kaingineros and other forest occupants in food production and in the rehabilitation of forest lands. With social forestry, the state hoped to harness the forest communities as a vehicle for rural development. Thus, social forestry has become the perfection of the discourse towards the uplanders, a discourse of development in which they are now recognized as potential partners and not as legal criminals and environmental threats. Social forestry has become a language of modernizing compassion, a discourse in which the state incorporated the Philippine uplands. In the process of doing this, the control structures which are necessary and imperative, are hidden in the power of a compassionate language of partnership, participation, equity, and security of land tenure.

One could therefore argue that the evolution of the concept of social forestry, and its eventual adoption as a full-blown government program for rural upland development, was driven by the desire of the government to expand productive capabilities and protect existing productive infrastructures. It is apparent that the major driving force behind the change in the structure of the policy discourse was not the recognition that the uplands deserve compassion, although this view could have partly influenced such decisions. Instead, the birth of social forestry as a state program was a direct result of the failure of punitive measures in effectively containing the upland societies. For the state, the people of the uplands deserved compassion, not as a confirmation of the nature of their beings nor an effort to truly empower them, but as a deliberate attempt of an organized power to appropriate compassion as a means of maintaining and expanding its hegemony.

The mere fact that social forestry, as a development concept for the uplands, originated in the lowlands, casts doubt upon its logic, if that logic purports to be liberating and empowering. To reinforce this argument, one can easily recognize through the language of PD 705, Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1260, and Ministry Administrative Order (MAO) No. 48, the elements of force and cooptation. At worst, one could even feel that social forestry, as a concept which promotes social equity, is only secondary to the objectives of promoting increased productivity. Social forestry is a typical manifestation of the carrot and stick metaphor: the people of the uplands are offered a position in an uneven partnership to pursue a kind of development whose discourse derives its logic and impetus from lowland and capital-based interests. Failure to agree with the terms of such a partnership leads an uplander away from the realm of compassion, back to the realm of punishment,

wherein he will once again be treated as a criminal and a threat, and this time, he is no longer just a threat to the ecosystem but also to the economic system. Thus, it could be said that social forestry was not conceived out of pure compassion for the underdevelopment and poverty of the uplands, but more as a control mechanism which could protect the development of the lowlands from the alleged destructive effects of upland farming. In short, social forestry was designed not to control the uplands less, but to control them better. The reasons were both economic and political: the country needed programs to bring about economic development, and the state under Marcos needed policies which could buttress its sagging popularity and contain the rising unrest in the countryside brought about by communism. At that time, in the eyes of the state, social forestry filled both roles well.

Politically, social forestry appears to have temporarily strengthened the hegemony of the Marcos faction of the elite. Before the *Batasan* parliamentary elections in 1984, the ruling party, *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (KBL or New Society Movement), counted social forestry as one of its major accomplishments as well as using it as a campaign promise. On several occasions, the party distributed thousands of stewardship agreements to upland cultivators as part of their campaign to get votes.

The rise of the communist movement in the rural and upland areas in the Philippines also motivated the state to adopt development programs which will give the rural population a sense of empowerment and participation. In the words of Bryant and White,

... participation [is] valued as an alternative to revolutionary movements. ... The reasoning [is] that if people could be mobilized to be part of the development process, they would be less available to revolution (1982).

With social forestry, people in the uplands are led to believe that they are now partners in the development process, thereby giving them a false sense of power.

Economically, social forestry appeared as an institutionalization of a program to protect the growth of capital in the lowland structures of production from the backwardness of the marginal upland periphery. In doing this, the developing lowland center incorporated the underdeveloped upland periphery into the discourse of capitalist development and consigned it to be a provider of cheap labor and raw materials. Moreover, the uplands became resources which could be tapped as cheap labor in the prevention of floods and droughts which threaten the lowland capital accumulation activities. In some instances, social forestry projects were established to serve as farms for raw material inputs for forest-based industries and development enterprises. These, in turn, are controlled by the national and transnational bourgeoisie engaged in agribusiness such as the big pineapple and banana plantations in Mindanao, by the petty bourgeoisie engaged in small-scale cottage industries, or by government parastatals exemplified by the dendro-thermal energy plantations operated by semi-government-controlled electric cooperatives.

Social forestry also played a role in the expansion of the discourse purveyed by the merchants of transnationalized development, namely the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The massive World Bank effort in the Philippines had two objectives: to stabilize the deteriorating political situation, especially in the countryside; and to completely open the economy to the free flow of foreign capital and commodities. Centralization of political power in one section of the elite, particularly the Marcos faction, was essential to the achievement of these goals. It was also seen as necessary to rationalize the economy to integrate it more decisively into the US-dominated international capitalist order (Bello *et al.* 1982). It is interesting to note that most of these projects are within integrated irrigation programs in areas where plantations and other agribusinesses owned by multinational corporations are located. It could be said that social forestry was, in some cases, utilized in drawing the uplands into the mainstream of capitalist production and inserting them into the transnational development discourse, as provider of cheap labor in the production of raw materials and in the protection of the watersheds for the benefit of lowland interests.

One could refute these statements on the basis of the argument that the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP) and its precursors, Communal Tree Farming (CTF) and Forest Occupancy Management (FOM), provided the upland communities with income and livelihood. In 1984, the BFD reported that ISFP participants had already gained benefits through the harvested trees and agricultural crops. According to BFD, the total income generated by 44,446 participant-farmers was already close to 21 million pesos in just one and a half years of operation (BFD 1984). This conclusion was, however, questioned by a Forestry Development Center Study (1985) which claimed that ISFP participants had only an average net income of 465 pesos in its one and a half years of operation. This, according to the study, was very low considering the fact that some ISFP projects actually started in 1975 under FOM and in 1978 under CTF and, therefore, should have already attained or be approaching their economic maturity (FDC 1985).

Another strength which ISFP boasts of is its recognition of the uplanders as actively engaged in participatory and equitable development. However, studies conducted by various researchers at De La Salle and Ateneo de Manila Universities documented cases of reluctance on the part of the upland farmers to participate in ISFP projects. One De La Salle study conducted in an FOM project traced this reluctance to the farmers' perception of the relatively brief two-year land tenure (Bernales and de la Vega 1982). A similar conclusion was reached in the study conducted by the Ateneo de Manila University in a CTF project despite the fact that the CTF certificate already provided twenty-five years. Seventy percent of CTF participants interviewed felt that the land cultivated under the project can be easily taken away from them by the government (Aguilar 1982). Security of land tenure was cited by Rosemary Aquino (1983) as one of the major concerns of upland communities.

The study conducted by the Forestry Development Center at the University of the Philippines at Los Baños pointed out other factors which hindered effective participation and shattered the equity claims of ISFP. Complaints concerning such matters as the unfair distribution of and access to employment opportunities, and the question of whether the criteria for joining projects are being followed, were raised by forest occupants. Similarly, there were questions raised as to whether the actual recipients of the stewardship certificates are really its prospective beneficiaries. In one project, almost sixty percent of the participants felt that the project benefits were not equally enjoyed (FDC 1985).

Based on these studies, it could be deduced that ISFP failed to deliver what it purports to give to the upland communities. It promised income-generation, yet the data proved otherwise. It preached of security in land tenure and equity, yet the participants and farmers in many social forestry projects failed to perceive them. This, in itself, is proof of the fact that social forestry was conceived not primarily to develop the uplands, but to keep them in their proper place in relation to the much broader development scenario for the greater portion of the population.

Conclusion

Social forestry, with all its rhetoric and despite the acclamations of its drumbeaters, remains a discourse of development whose subjects are the lowland-based interests. With the entry of foreign capital in the form of foreign aid and loans used to finance some social forestry-related projects, such discourse is expanded to include the western and alien notions of development preached by the WB, ADB, USAID, and other purveyors of development, which draw their logic from the growth of transnational capital at the expense of the dependent periphery. One of the misfortunes of the Filipino rural poor, which includes the peoples of the uplands, is the fact that the Philippines, through its elites and the structures which support their power, is an active participant in such enslaving and unequal arrangements. The hegemony maintained by national capital forms a continuity with the hegemony maintained by transnational capital. The hegemonic class in the Philippines, which is dominated by lowland-based interests, considers the uplands in the same way the hegemonic class in the metropolises considers the Philippines, as an open frontier for capital expansion and for surplus extraction. The discourse of the metropole assumed various forms across time, from punitive colonization to compassionate development supports and postcolonial special relations. In a similar fashion, the discourse of the lowland-based center was transformed from punitive discourses of arrests and prosecution to a discourse of modernizing compassion.

The tragedy of the Philippines as well as the uplands, which both exist as peripheries, is the fact that such discourses of compassion are anchored on a hegemonic premise built on the expansion of capital on a global level. Hence, such

compassion must only be delivered to parties who are willing to play roles made for them in consonance with such a premise. Those who resist are threatened with punishment: aids and technical assistance could be stopped, upland occupants could be imprisoned or relocated. Social forestry, like foreign development packages, is indeed a discourse of compassion. But more than that, it is an ideological apparatus for the maintenance of hegemony and the furtherance of a dominant discourse. For this reason, it is necessary that the whip must be cracked, although it is done with benevolent compassion. If it fails to solve the problem of underdevelopment, at least it insures the containment of a population which potentially threatens the development of the much broader sector of the population. In the words of Arturo Escobar (1985: 388-389):

... Development has been successful to the extent that it has been able to penetrate, integrate, manage, and control countries and populations in increasingly detailed and encompassing ways. If it has failed to solve the problems of underdevelopment, it can also be said . . . that it has succeeded well in creating a type of underdevelopment which has been until now . . . politically and economically manageable.

This is the reality of the discourse of development; this is the reality of social forestry in the Philippines.

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