

Public Administration in the People's Republic of China: Challenges on Political-Administrative Entanglements

EDNA CO*

The issue of politics/administration dichotomy is as relevant to China as in other countries. The Chinese experience during the Mao era underscores the need to delineate the functions between the two. During the said era, no separation existed between ideology (represented by the Party) and organization (represented by the State). As a consequence, the bureaucracy is staffed by members rich in ideological and revolutionary spirit but bereft of technical and administrative competence. The overlapping function of the Party and the State engendered a scenario wherein there are too many decision-making agencies on one hand and power is overconcentrated in the Party committees which oversees the other. Realizing that the present scheme of things are antithetical to the welfare of its one billion inhabitants, the post-Mao leadership led by its paramount leader Deng Xiao Ping, instituted wide ranging political and economic reforms. To the Chinese leaders, the revamp is not a repudiation of the basic communist thinking but rather an improvement of what is essentially a correct socialist state under the people's dictatorship, led by the working class.

"The key of reforming the political structure is the separation of the functions of the party and the government."

-Luo Hao Cai, *Administrative Structure Reforms in China*, 1987

Introduction

Fresh from its victory from an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle waged through a powerful people's war over four decades ago, the People's Republic of China immediately plunged into the challenges of socialist construction. In the 1960s, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was launched. Sinologists believe that the Cultural Revolution is one in a series of a continuing revolution and internal struggles launched by the Chinese people, spearheaded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Chinese and non-Chinese people alike vary in their perceptions and reactions to the Cultural Revolution. Some observers, particularly those who strongly adhere to Mao Zedong's principles of the proletarian revolution, say that the Cultural Revolution is an imperative program that will ensure the continuance of a people's victory and that will combat the onslaught of revisionism. However, some quarters are of the opinion that given the framework of a new era in China, when the principal struggle is no longer class struggle, the Cultural Revolution comes on as a hard position of the Party, alienating a large section of the Chinese society from contributing to the agenda of total reconstruction.

Master of Public Administration student, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

The period of the Cultural Revolution laid down policies, directions and organizational disciplines that affected all fronts of work -- economic, socio-political, organizational, as well as cultural.

Critics of the Cultural Revolution increasingly assert the need to drift away from a Party-centered orientation towards one that tolerates, if not supports, participative organization and liberal economic and administrative institutions to be able to gain fresh insights and generate quicker results for the socialist construction.

Between the period of the Cultural Revolution and now, China has been under constant political and organizational turmoils, both in government and within the Party. A number of political scientists now describe China's politics as changing; in fact, it is emerging with a partially open-door policy.

The reform process of the post-Mao era is fast gaining attention for China. Some observers indicate appreciation for political liberal reforms. On the other hand, the pro-Mao analysts view the process as a bend towards reformism and the dominance of revisionism in China's continuing social struggle.

A major arena in the reconstruction and reformation process is the administrative and political organizational structure of China. Central to this issue is the role that the Chinese Communist Party played specifically from the period of the Cultural Revolution after the liberation and onward. The Party has been a dominant organ in the life, politics, and in the shaping of the future of the Chinese people. The Party and its role are a controversial issue in Chinese politics. Over the decade, this controversy has been the subject of discussions and deliberations in Party congresses, plenums, as well as in government assemblies.

The debate on China's efforts at liberalizing reforms endures. Among the important features of the issue are the Party-government entanglement and the politics-administration dichotomy. While the issue is primarily an internal debacle within the People's Republic of China, it has also gained the interest and attention of many public administrationists and political scientists in many countries.

This paper deals with the organizational concerns of the bureaucracy, including the ongoing political and organizational reforms. It will also discuss the structural and organizational interests within the framework of China's modernization.

The writer utilized secondary reference materials from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, publications on Asian and China Studies. She also tried to integrate observations and insights as well as interviews with Chinese people knowledgeable on China's public administrative and political systems, while she was on a brief visit to the People's Republic of China in 1986.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong's Cadre Policy

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) is a crucial turning point in Chinese modern history. In Mao's term, the GPCR is a "Revolution within a revolution,"

taking place within a socialist country. The GPCR was a step to arduously fight revisionism and the influences of the "capitalist roaders" in Chinese society.¹

The GPCR strongly influenced the mode of Chinese economic management as well. In the field of economic development, GPCR of the 1960s was characterized by participative management allowing to bridge the gap between the bourgeoisie and the working class in the political sphere. It transformed the manner of application of the old points system in the large majority of communes from its bureaucratic piece rate form where payment is made per output, to a kind of time payment.² The old piecework system was to be replaced by periodic awards based on scales established by revolutionary pacesetters. The worker's classification by points or grades depends on the physical strength, age, experience and political attitudes.³

Tachai, the famous cooperative brigade in Northern Shansi, was a showcase of the GPCR's so-called participative and job enrichment approach. In Tachai, commune members' performance was to be measured not only by the amount of work done, but also by the worker's revolutionary spirit.⁴ In the case of Tachai, which was upheld as an exemplar of a commune's collective and revolutionary spirit, job and merit evaluations were done in the new, open and informal periodic evaluation. Moreover, evaluation, was conducted on a collective basis. Proponents of the approach believed that this manner of undertaking evaluation saved large administrative costs, as against those incurred by the old, formal grading of men and their tasks. Furthermore, the group evaluation was viewed as providing a popular check against managerial corruption and favoritism.⁵ No longer do supervisors and technical experts alone administer job and merit evaluation. All members of the collective farm enterprise now do so. Members of the commune confide that the reduction of hierarchy raised the levels of group cooperation and developed a climate of high trust inside the enterprise, thereby encouraging more productive activities.

In many succeeding experiences on the management of rural communes, peasants placed a strong attack on the overspecialization of jobs. In its stead, the policy on management stressed work schemes that would bridge the gap between mental and manual labors. The approach is that work is arranged such that it allows workers to participate in managerial tasks, even as both managers and the so-called rank-and-file sweat on the shop floor. The managerial tasks referred to in this context include the workers' increasing role even in the decision-making within the cooperatives or economic brigades.

Skills, strength, years of experience, intensity of work and political consciousness constitute the important criteria of an effective worker. Very much like a worker with self-actualization needs in Maslow's "hierarchy of needs," an individual (in the commune) is strongly motivated in placing the collective well-being ahead of or over the individual interests.⁶

The Chinese mode of economic management at the time of the GPCR was highly emphatic on the sense of fulfillment that one finds in his work as he extends service to others. Mao stressed the commitment to the work as a top priority in public service value system. While this value system may have had some degree of effectiveness among the Chinese cadres, what China failed to indicate was whether this work behavior was

dominant and well accepted by a large number of workers, specifically among the rank-and-file or in the non-cadre level. There is reason to doubt the fair acceptability of this value as manifested by the open admission of China on the decreasing initiative and productivity by workers at one time during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, political attitude and revolutionary spirit, factors which weigh in a worker's performance, are extremely difficult to pin down. Very much prone to subjectivism, these criteria are neither easily measurable nor quantifiable. What economic managers at the time of the GPCR could have done, was to establish in more measurable terms the political attitude and revolutionary spirit as expressed in a worker's performance.

In the Political Arena

In the 1970s, Mao Zedong, while agreeing that corruption and ossification of the cadre force were problems, felt that these were not the major problems.⁷ According to Mao, the major problem concerned revisionism, with the bureaucracy and those working in it as the main source giving rise to revisionism.⁸

Mao Zedong and Deng Xiao Ping both concluded that the quality of the cadre force was the major stumbling block to the implementation of the policies.⁹ Mao attributed the problem of the bureaucracy to some faulty work style that emanates from the cadre's bureaucratic and feudal ways and mentality. However, he did not dispute the necessity of the bureaucracy. What Mao attempted to rework was a bureaucracy that would be more effective, and by effectiveness was meant deeper ideological commitment. His logical solution to the problems on bureaucracy was therefore an increased study on Mao Zedong Thought. Mao also recommended that staff be put under mass supervision in order to avoid being "divorced from the masses."¹⁰

Furthermore, Mao believed that the politically reliable forces, such as the workers and peasants, tend to fare badly when judged by the criterion of technical and professional competence.¹¹ On the other hand, the intellectuals and technicians who are eyed with suspicion, possess the skills necessary to push the construction process forward.

Looking back at this policy, the intellectuals of the post-Mao era view such policy and approach as "isolationist" from the outside world. Such limited perception by Mao consequently developed a narrow sense of loyalty and service to the masses.

If one goes by the definition of the bureaucracy by Max Weber, Mao's concept or actually the absence of a clear-cut concept on the bureaucracy, is unacceptable. Weber's model of a bureaucracy is a formal organizational structure, a notion that did not exist in China during the period of Mao, or something that Mao did not believe in, much less, put into practice. Weber gives a technical meaning to bureaucracy and identifies basic characteristics of a formal model, thus:

- (1) The organization follows the principles of hierarchy;
- (2) Operations are governed by a consistent system of abstract rules that are applied to individual cases; and,
- (3) Employment in the organization is based on technical qualifications.¹²

At some point in the post-Mao era, some professionals raised criticisms on Mao's irregular committee meetings and erratic style in the operationalization of the committee system. The committee system which the Party adopted is an arrangement of political leadership that enhances collectivity or group role in decision-making and in the execution of decisions rather than a political leadership that is vested on a single person.

According to Mao's critics, the operationalization of the committee system by Mao was quite arbitrary. Mao was said to have used irregular and illegal party (and state) conferences, to mobilize support for his policies.¹³ In effect, Mao worked through a committee-of-one system. Mao was also described to possess intense charisma that there was profuse glorification specially by the working classes for his word and policies. Some quarters raised serious attacks on Mao as promoting "individual autocracy" and "patriarchalism."¹⁴

Learning from the negative experiences, Deng Xiao Ping emphasized the need for constitutional mandate to convene meetings and for the leaders to follow more formal procedures in the preparation and conduct of party committee meetings.¹⁵

Today, many intellectuals and middle-aged professionals are cautious not to return to what was perceived as a grim arena of Communist politics, particularly that which dominated the period of the Cultural Revolution. They believe that what occurred during the Cultural Revolution was a "leftist tragedy of huge magnitude."¹⁶ Moreover, many intellectuals during the post-Mao era view the period of the Cultural Revolution and that of Mao as a period when bureaucracy was virtually dead.

Summing up the period of the GPCR and onward till the early 1970s, one finds that the essence of the Chinese political and economic development was one of emphasis on internal strengthening and rebuilding. It may be one that nearly bordered on isolationism. The period was also characterized by intense sustenance of the ideological commitment to the work, whether in the communes or in the bureaucracy.

What was glaring was that Mao appeared to be the most prominent feature in Chinese politics and modern history. This fact alone brings to the fore the question of how much collectivization had been practiced in the process of pushing the work in the Party and the bureaucracy. The irony of the situation is that the most populous country in the world was influenced by a powerful man of ideology and politics.

At that point in Chinese history, the Communist Party appeared to be the center of policy and decision-making. Yet, no literature nor person spoke in much detail and much less with criticism, on the workings of the Party and its relations with other structures of power and decision-making. The seeming reticence on Party dynamics furthered the projection of Mao as the most powerful man in China until his death in 1976.

The dominance of the Party conversely relegated into the background the invigoration of the bureaucracy.

Mao Zedong's policies on the Party, cadre participation, economic management and bureaucracy may not strictly be regarded as "policies" in the administrative sense of the term. Rather, Mao's prescriptions came more as a political tool of

empowering the working class and thus, manifest a preferential option for the proletariat and the peasantry of China. Mao was quite emphatic on the role of the "suspicious intellectuals" vis- a-vis the reliable forces composed of workers and peasants, in the task of rebuilding China. What Mao seemed to have overlooked was the fact that it was a period within which China was pushing for reconstruction, and therefore stress was to be placed not so much on class struggle and class contradictions. In this context, the emphasis of the leadership could have been placed on the participation of all groups from a cross-section of the Chinese society, all in the name of socialist construction.

Marx views the state as the instrument that, in the guise of the common good, actually serves itself and the interests of the ruling class. Taking off from this view and overriding what the state so upholds, the People's Republic of China, during the era of Mao, regarded the state and the functions thereof, as that organizational arm that should advance the interests of the working class, instead of the ruling class or the elite. Therefore, in this sense, the state function has to be political. It cannot be otherwise. At that time, the leadership in China was beset with a range of problems, namely:

- (1) A number of old cadres with but few technical skills;
- (2) Overstaffing of the bureaucracy; and,
- (3) Increased opportunities for corruption by cadres due to policies of "economic liberalization".¹⁷

Old cadres were maintained within the bureaucracy because they were politically committed elements with a rich experience in the Chinese struggle. Their experience and enduring revolutionary spirit count as the *principal qualification* that kept them in the bureaucracy. A lifelong tenure was enjoyed by cadres even as very few of them have technical skills. The younger, competent and qualified people were therefore deprived of positions and opportunities in the bureaucracy.

Another feature of the Chinese bureaucracy was the dominance of the Party on many decision-making committees of the bureaucracy. Party committees assumed various sorts of administrative functions. Party cadres were spread out in various positions within the bureaucracy. The cooptation of the state by the Party dried up the initiatives of evolving new leaders and had actually failed to hasten the modernization of the country.

Deng Xiao Ping's Concept and Policy on Modernizing Management

Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiao Ping believed in the pursuance of a political commitment to the policies that administrators or workers pursue. In fact, both strongly hold that political criteria should always play an important part in the selection of cadre forces. But unlike Mao, Deng Xiao Ping who took over the chairmanship of the Communist Party from Mao, stressed the need for cadres to be younger and more specialized and professionally competent.

Under Deng Xiao Ping, cadres were given incentives to hone up their professional competence and technical skills. But these efforts at upgrading must go hand in hand

with sound ideological growth. Until today, there has been an ongoing review of Party membership, re-registration, and if necessary, purging based on measures of competence.

Moreover, there were recommendations from various quarters, particularly from the lawmakers and the intellectuals, that the Party confine itself into three functions, namely, of performing political leadership, of formulating significant policies and of recommending persons to important posts in government.

Part of the recommendation in the People's Congress was for the Party to be pushed further away from the tasks of government and bureaucracy and for the Party not to stifle the administrative policies and operations of the state.

Recommendations on the delineation between functions of the Party and of the bureaucracy were themselves positive contributions at the time of Deng Xiao Ping.

The campaign initiated by Deng Xiao Ping further advocated continuing reforms, particularly in the Party and in the bureaucracy.

Reforms During the Post-Mao Era

Economic Management System. Side by side with the political reforms in China after the death of Mao, came the reforms in economic management in the cities and in the countryside.

After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 1978, some principles for reforms were introduced in the economic system, thus:¹⁸

- (1) Broadening and ensuring ownership and decision-making powers of rural production teams;
- (2) Resumption and protection of the private plots and family sideline production;
- (3) Implementing the policy of distribution according to work;
- (4) Reopening the country fair trade;
- (5) Raising the state purchasing prices for farm and sideline products; and;
- (6) Signing of contracts between the state and industrial and commercial enterprises, run by collectives or individuals so that revenues will be shared instead of all being remitted to the state.

After a few years, some defects in the economic management system were felt. For instance, on the matter of ownership, only public ownership was emphasized while the market function was negated.¹⁹ Under this system, the state exercised excessive rigid control over enterprises.

The earlier reforms in economic management in the 1970s dealt with the relation between central and local governments, but not with the relations between the state

production unit and producers. As a consequence, producers' initiative was not harnessed and limited production hardly coped with the demands of the Chinese people, as well as the imperative for the social reconstruction and modernization.

The philosophy of "egalitarianism" says that despite the rates and level of production, everyone will have his share and will eat. This did not keep pace with the new situation after liberation. Because no matter what the contribution is, whether profit or loss, the workers will have a share. His initiative remains unchallenged. Production is thus hindered.

With these conditions as a backdrop, the Party Congress resumed discussions on economic and political reforms. The Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 outlined a rejuvenated program for China's economic and political reforms. The Beijing Review Publications²¹ list down the most significant reforms that are underway as:

(1) The system of state monopoly on the purchase and marketing of grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops has been replaced by the system of contracted purchases. Agricultural production is thus linked to market demand and therefore promotes diversification.

(2) Delegation of decision-making power to the enterprises is undertaken through:

(2.1) institution of a contract system among all newly recruited workers in state-owned enterprises;

(2.2) revamp of the leadership system within enterprises with the introduction of the responsibility system for the manager. The focus of the enterprise Party committees has been shifted to guaranteeing and supervising the implementation of state principles and policies;

(2.3) introduction of a contract responsibility system which links the amount of profits retained to performance.

Under the new set-up, special economic zones are identified and selected in specific sites either for industrialization or foreign investment. These zones are open to private enterprises, on condition that taxes are faithfully remitted to the state. Likewise, regulations on tax remittances are provided for and are continuously reviewed and re-examined for improvement.

On the whole, economic planning and marketing are still centrally carried out by the state. The so-called planned commodity economy is a mechanism of "the state regulating the market and the market guiding the enterprises," thus, planning and market are not mutually exclusive and irreconcilable but can be integrated.²² Consumer goods which used to be purchased by the state, are now purchased and marketed in different ways, including purchase by contract, selected purchase, and enterprises doing their own marketing.²³

In integrating enterprises owned by the whole public, the system of management in said enterprises is not necessarily under the control of the whole people; neither is the state in control of them. The managerial responsibility system is such that contracts are instituted to define the relations of enterprises with regard to their respective respon-

sibilities, power and interests.²⁴ Thus, in such case, qualified managers are selected. The selection is done through a process of competition; a system of reward or penalty is instituted according to the economic performance of the enterprise and the managers. The set-up allows managers to assume full responsibility and integrate the authority of managers with the role played by the workers and staff as masters of their enterprises.²⁵ The different forms of the managerial responsibility system which are now being introduced, including contracting and leasing, are useful experiments in separating ownership from management.²⁶

The 1980s also saw the beginning of modernizing economic management capabilities. High in the priority of improving and honing management skills, was the organization of qualified personnel. The qualified personnel were to start high-technology research and development, information, bio-engineering and new materials.²⁷

The integration of advanced technologies and scientific and technological research at home and abroad intensified in the effort to add up to the modernization of China.

From 1983, based on promulgations in 1982, taxes were levied according to the stipulations by the state. Profits were no longer turned over by the enterprises to the state; instead, enterprises had to pay taxes to the state.

Today, the state continues to devise measures, policies and economic legislations on pricing, finance, taxation, and credit.

Political Management System. In the political arena, transformations started since 1982.

The Fifth National People's Congress and the Twelfth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party were separately held in 1982. These two Congresses were a turning point in the furtherance of reforms in the political organization and state structure. The Twelfth Party Congress was the forum that declared the separation of the Party functions from those of government. It specifically stated that: "cadres should conscientiously study Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought and acquire general scientific and professional knowledge."²⁸ Unlike during the period of Mao, the Congress merely stressed the "ideological affairs as first duty of Party members."²⁹

Pursuing and expanding Deng Xiao Ping's cadre policy, the party congress upheld the four basic transformations of cadre force, namely:

- (1) More revolutionary;
- (2) Younger in average age;
- (3) Better educated; and,
- (4) More professionally competent.³⁰


Hua Guofeng added a recommendation to Deng Xiao Ping, namely, the accountability of the cadres to the masses, the important role of elections and opinion polls, and lastly, the establishment and improvement of systems concerning the examination,

assessment, supervision, reward and punishment, removal, rotation and retirement of cadres.³¹

After the Fifth National People's Congress in 1982, more reforms were made in China's state structure. These reforms were viewed as improvement on the earlier reforms instituted soon after the liberation, rather than as antithesis or contradiction to China's socialist set-up. According to Chinese leaders, the reforms emerged to improve what is essentially a correct socialist state under the people's dictatorship, led by the working class. Furthermore, while recognizing that it has earlier patterned its system after the Soviet model, China is evolving reforms and structures based on the particularities and the specific conditions and needs of China.


Prior to the Fifth National People's Congress in 1982, the state structure could be illustrated in Figure I.

Figure 1. State Structure Prior to the 1982 Congress



One notices the changes in the state structure after the 1982 Congress. These structural changes were also endorsed by the Party Congress also held in 1982. See Figure 2.

Figure 2. State Structure after the 1982 Congress



In the state structure prior to the 1982 People's Congress, the National People's Congress was the legislative organ. It was composed of representatives directly elected by the people. Because of its huge number, the session of the congress turned out to be very cumbersome that it found difficulties in convening itself.

Representatives to the Judicial Organ in various levels, were likewise elected by the people. Therefore, those who held judicial posts were definitely popular, but not necessarily competent enough to tackle issues and cases on justice.

The procuratorial organs which managed financial and other administrative affairs of the state, were also elective posts.

According to the constitution adopted in 1982, the posts of the President and Vice-President to the state are established.³²

In the 1982 Congress, the Standing Committee was created. The committee assumed some functions which used to be tackled by the People's Congress.

Constituencies elect their representatives to the people's congress at the county level. The county is the basic unit of power, therefore, it is here where democracy is exercised most. Above the county level, representatives are installed through indirect elections. Thus, Chinese democracy is characterized by both direct and indirect representation, although a one-party system continues to prevail.

At the grassroots level, the people are encouraged to exercise democratic management. State-run enterprises for example, practice democratic management through congresses of workers and staff.³³

Among the political reforms pushed by the Fifth National People's Congress were the reduction in the number of ministries and commissions from 52 to 41; the number of ministers and vice ministers from 505 to 167; and, the average age of employees in the bureaucracy from 64 to 58.³⁴ Similar reductions were made on the bureau and the department levels. Based on data from twenty-eight ministries and commissions, the number of department and bureau heads has been reduced from 2,450 to 1,398 with a drop in average age from 59 to 54.³⁵

A professor of Law at the Peking University, Luo Hao Cai, identifies key areas of administrative reforms. According to Luo, "the key to reforming the political structure is the separation of the functions of the Party and the government."³⁶ This necessitates also the cutting out of units or organs within the Party committees that overlap with those in government. Luo also advocates for the transfer of the operation of the economy by state administrative organs into enterprises which have a wide range of autonomous powers.

Another interesting and expedient component of the administrative reforms is the development of the so-called Public Servants System.

Luo classifies public servants into two categories, namely: political officials who are employed and managed according to the Constitution and organic laws and who hold office for a specific period of time. Then, there are the public servants in the professional work. They are employed in accordance with the Public Servants' Law through statutory examination and open competition and have a permanent tenure.³⁷

Such specifications and detailing out of the new political structure and administrative reforms precisely articulate the intent of the government structure to separate and distinguish itself from the Party policies, politics and dynamics. These emerging reforms outline a perspective towards the positive and dynamic growth of the state structure in China.

Under the new political set-up, the state is encouraged to assert itself, to define its powers, responsibilities and authorities, while delineating itself from the structure, powers and functions of the Communist Party.

The Party, after the political restructuring, appears to have been relegated to the background, particularly in terms of running administrative affairs of the state. Moreover, it has relinquished decision-making powers to the proper legislative body of the state.

The Party, through its congress, confines itself to undertaking such functions as:

- (1) Providing political leadership;
- (2) Proposing policy decisions on important issues; and,
- (3) Recommending cadres for key posts in state organs.³⁸

Largely drawn up through the efforts of the Party, the constitution provides for the separation of the functions of the Party and the state. The Constitution prescribes how such separation of functions could be enacted.

The Party, even as it provides political leadership, ensures that organs of state power, mass organizations and all types of associations are respected in their decisions as well as in the conduct of their affairs.

Proposing policies and recommending cadres to key state posts seem to decrease Party powers, which the Party used to possess prior to the introduction of political reforms. Such diminishing functions are indicative of a power-sharing or power redistribution by the Party with other structures of politics.

However, the core of this issue is not so much on defining the boundaries between Party and state functions, but on how such definitions on the limits are operationalized. In the case of China, it may as yet be premature to judge the success or possibility of a clear-cut dichotomy between functions of the Party and of the bureaucracy. The reforms are new. Mechanisms have freshly been laid out. Perhaps, in a couple of years or so, it may be worthwhile to take stock of the theory and application of the Party and administrative dynamics in China.

With its newly defined role, the Party is apparently treated as one of the two structures of power, the other being the state. However, inasmuch as the political direction has been taken, i.e., through the leadership of the Party, the country is moving ahead towards the advanced stages of socialism, the pace-setter still remains to be the Party. Even as dynamism and freedom are allowed to take place within the various political organs, the organizations and enterprises, the units could move about only within what the Party had declared as their bounds. The dominance of the Party still endures.

Summary and Conclusion

The modern history of China is a history of class struggle and of restoration whose process includes the gradual integration of various social classes, in the name of socialist construction.

The social process within and throughout the period was neither an easy or a smooth one.

The period of liberation until the death of Mao Zedong included a set of reforms based on the imperative to rebuild China from the ravages of a grim past. This period was characterized by an adamant posture on class interests, on the so-called political commitment, and the dominance of Party policies and structures.

As the process progressed, the Chinese people saw the expediency of further reforms. The one billion Chinese people apparently need more than just ideological commitment, during a period that calls for a fast transition to modernization and progress. Thus, the reformation within a New China set in, and quite rapidly during the post-Mao era. While reforms were being started, Chinese leaders assured that such efforts were not any indication of an eroding commitment to socialism, through the dictatorship of the proletariat.

China's experience is an articulation that politics should serve the interests of the public. China is confident that its political choice is correct. It is on its path to socialism. But the excessive functions of the Party that practically erode a wider and more democratic participation by all sectors towards progress, drew criticisms from various quarters. And China has accepted these criticisms. From then, China resolved to undergo a *kaifang*, or an internal relaxation on ideological controls, to be able to blend politics and competence. Furthermore, it resolved to loosen up the Party control over the state.

The efforts at drawing the line between Party and government are viewed by many people -- Chinese and observers alike, as a healthy sign of giving birth to a new dimension in China's progress and triumph. These initiatives necessitate a new form of revolution. The reformation is itself a revolution within the Party and within the People's Republic of China.

The reforms in China are introduced and practiced as though these were in a continuum of an ongoing socialist revolution. Today, what China requires are the "red" and "expert," those with "political integrity" and "professional competence." Those who do not adhere to the political choice that China has taken will always be censored. But no matter what its flaws or shortcomings may be, China still deserves the respect of any country in the world if only because China possesses an enduring political will.

Endnotes

¹Georgi Mantici, "Youth and Culture: Cinema and Youth, Yesterday and Today," in Arendrup, *et al.*, eds., *China in the 1980s and Beyond* (Curzon Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.

²Roberto Bernardo, *Popular Management and Pay in China* (University of the Philippines Press, 1977), p. 38.

³*Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁶Howard McCurdy, *Public Administration: A Synthesis* (Cummings Publishing Co. Inc., 1977), p. 273.

⁷Georgi Mantici, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁹Tony Saich, "Cadres: From Bureaucrats to Managerial Modernizers?," in Arendrup *et al.*, *op.cit.*

¹⁰Roberto Bernardo, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹¹Tony Saich, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹²Joseph Massie, *Essentials of Management* (Prentice Hall Inc., 1979), p. 73.

¹³Lawrence Sullivan, "Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 4, Winter, 1986-87, p. 607.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 612.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 621.

¹⁶Vera Scharcz, "Behind a Partially Opened Door: Chinese Intellectuals and the Post-Mao Reform Process," *Pacific Affairs*, *op. cit.*, p. 589.

¹⁷Tony Saich, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁸Foreign Languages Press, *China Facts and Figures*, 1987, p. 2.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Beijing Review Publications, "The 13th Party Congress and China's Reforms," 1987, pp. 43-44

-
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- ²³ Foreign Languages Press, *op. cit.*, 3.
- ²⁴ Beijing Review Publications, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.
- ²⁸ Tony Saich, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*
- ³² Foreign Languages Press, *op. cit.*
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- ³⁴ Tony Saich, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ Luo Hai Cai, *Administrative Structure Reforms in China*, 1987, p. 1.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ³⁸ Beijing Review Publications, *op. cit.*, p. 2.