

Governance: Issues/Problems in the Philippines and the Role of the University of the Philippines

OLIVIA C. CAOILI*

This paper examines the issues/problems of governance in general and in the Philippines in particular. It then looks at the programs and activities of the University of the Philippines which have a bearing on governance and tries to assess the relevance and adequacy of these programs/activities in the light of contemporary social realities. Lastly, the article explores the possible role(s) that the UP should undertake and how it can maximize the use of its intellectual and material resources for the effective governance of the country.

Introduction

Webster's *New World Dictionary* gives the meaning of governance as "the art, manner, function or power of government."¹ The word "government" is in turn given a variety of meanings. It refers to the exercise of authority over a state or to the direction, control, rule or management of the state. It means the right, power or function of governing or an established system of political administration by which a nation, state or district is governed. Often, the word government is used to refer to all people or agencies that administer or control the affairs of a nation, state, or any of its subdivisions.

Traditionally, the study of governance and government has been the preserve of such disciplines as law, philosophy, political science and public administration. However, with the growing complexity of social and political life and the increasing interdependence in the relations among contemporary societies and nation-states, other social sciences have become more interested or concerned with the problems of governance and government. Ordinary citizens and the general public have, of course, always been concerned with governance since they are the beneficiaries of responsible and effective government or victims of tyrannical and inept government.

As members of the academe, we are no less affected by government. Hence, it is but proper that we should be interested in understanding the issues and problems of governance and be able to lend our expertise in proposing solutions to these. It is in this context that this paper seeks to examine the issues/problems of governance in general and in the Philippines in particular. It will then look at the programs and activities of the University of the Philippines which have a bearing on governance and try to assess

*Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. This paper was initially presented at the Faculty Conference, University of the Philippines, held at the Development Academy of the Philippines, Tagaytay City, December 19-20, 1988.

the relevance and adequacy of these programs/activities in the light of contemporary social realities. Finally, it will explore the possible role(s) that the UP should undertake and how it can maximize the use of its intellectual and material resources for the effective governance of the country.

Perspectives on Governance

Our present concepts, institutions and practices of governance have been transplanted or adapted from Western societies where these evolved from their experience. As such, we need to briefly examine these concepts, institutions and practices in the historical social milieu in which these developed. This will enable us to see the interface and dynamics between government and the society or community upon which the former is based. For successful or effective governance necessitates, as much as possible, the congruence or harmony between social/community values, institutions and aspirations and individual freedom with political institutions, values and goals. Underlying effective governance is a recognition of the moral basis of governmental decisions and actions. Effective governance likewise requires that governmental/political institutions have access to and are able to mobilize resources in society -- manpower, organizational and material -- in the pursuit of agreed upon goals and aspirations.

In contemporary usage, the concept of government is inevitably linked with that of the state. The state is a form of social organization. It consists of a group of people living in a definite territory, having an organized government and possessing sovereignty or independence from external control. Although organized societies or communities have existed since antiquity, the state as defined above, particularly the nation-state, is of relatively recent origin.

Government is the machinery or the instrument of the state to achieve its goals and purposes. It is composed of "specialized governing officials who operate in the name of the land and its people."² These officials are invariably engaged in the formulation (or decision-making), implementation (or enforcement) of public policies (i.e., projects, programs and whatever governments choose to do or not to do in society),³ and interpretation of rules or adjudication of disputes arising from these policies. The structure or patterns of relationships among these officials, their particular powers and functions, and the relations between them and those whom they govern are usually defined or delineated by the constitution or fundamental law of the state. These powers and functions are elaborated further by statutes and laws, and to some extent, by long established political customs, traditions and usage in a given society.

On the basis of these patterns or structures of power and authority, governments are usually classified or labeled (along with their degenerate forms) as monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy) or democracy (mobocracy), depending on who exercise the power to rule. Based on the extent of the territorial division of power between the central government and its constituent units, governments are classified as unitary or federal. A government is called presidential or parliamentary depending on the relationship between those who exercise the legislative or policy-making and executive or policy-implementation functions.

This paper, however, is less concerned with analyzing forms of government as with what constitutes effective governance. A basic requirement for effective governance is that a government must possess legitimate authority. By authority is meant "the established right, within any social order, to determine policies, to pronounce judgments on relevant issues, and to settle controversies, or more broadly, to act as guide to other men. When we speak of an authority, we mean a person or body of persons possessed of this right."⁴

Authority is distinguished from power by the fact that the latter lacks legitimacy. Social power is simply the "capacity in any relationship to command the services or the compliance of others."⁵ Legitimacy may be defined as the "foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right."⁶ Implicit in this statement is the recognition of a moral order underlying governmental authority. The legitimacy accorded to a government is essentially derived from, or based upon the consensus of the community or society which is governed. As MacIver explains:

the authority of government does not create the order which it presides and does not sustain that order solely by its own fiat or its accredited power. There is authority beyond the authority of government. There is a greater consensus without which the fundamental order of the community would fall apart. This consensus plays a different role under different forms of government...But always, whether mainly acquiescent or creatively active, it is the ultimate ground on which the unity and the order of the state repose.⁷

As can be seen from the above quotation, the fundamental order in a given community or society historically precedes the establishment of government. From this perspective, government exercises authority for two main ends. One is "the maintenance of the established code, in so far as that code is formulated legally, that is in statutes and laws.... This end of government includes, therefore, both the vindication of justice and the ratification of the established order."⁸ The other end of government is "the readjustment of this order to new conditions and to emergent needs."⁹ In this context, effective governance necessitates order, hence, the maintenance of the status quo, but must also promote justice and accommodate social transformation to meet the changing conditions and needs of a given community/society.

One of the more salient observations regarding the historical development of contemporary states, particularly the Western industrial states, is the growth of the public bureaucracy or the rise of "Big" government. Where before, governments were expected to perform minimal functions in society (such as the collection of taxes; the maintenance of law and order; defense of the territory of the state from external threats; the administration of justice; the provision of public services necessary for maintaining internal commerce and promoting harmonious relations with other states), contemporary governments are now expected to do much more. Governmental functions now include, for example, planning for and leading in activities to promote economic development; providing health, education and welfare services; promoting the growth of science and technology; ensuring the conservation of natural resources and safeguarding the environment; promoting and protecting the rights of the poor, the disadvantaged, the minorities, women and the elderly; and others. The area of

governmental regulation and intervention in social life has thus expanded dramatically over the years.

Expectations of government action are especially pressing among the Third World countries which are aspiring to catch up with the "good life" that has been attained by the developed, industrialized countries. Governments in the Third World are expected to be able to generate employment; redress social inequality and massive poverty; attract foreign investments; restructure the economy and increase the growth rate of the gross national product; and, maintain its national sovereignty. At the same time, Third World governments must grapple with problems of nation-building -- of promoting national unity and dealing with dissidence and separatist movements -- problems which, for many of the Western industrialized countries, had been historically resolved before issues of economic development emerged. These popular expectations from contemporary governments place inordinate demands on public resources and inevitably expand the scope of governmental authority and responsibility and, along with these, enlarge the public bureaucracy.

It is apparent that the problems of governance in the Western developed countries differ in terms of magnitude and urgency from those faced by the Third World countries. These difficulties of governance are compounded by the fact that the sense of nationhood or cohesiveness of the political community in many Third World countries is still tenuous. Often, there is a lack of consensus among the governed population regarding the goals and priorities of public policy. After all, many of these countries were artificially carved out of natural, indigenous communities by their erstwhile colonial masters, which then subjected them to centuries of domination and exploitation. Thus, questions of state sovereignty and the legitimacy of governments in these countries remain serious issues.

For as long as a government is perceived to possess legitimacy, it can expect popular support, i.e., continued compliance with its laws, orders and acts. As one scholar puts it: "Legitimacy gives an important magic to acts of state."¹⁰ It is legitimacy which strengthens a state's sovereignty.¹¹ The latter justifies what power the people or government have or would like to have. Legitimacy is thus a powerful instrument of government. When a government's claim to legitimacy is not recognized or honored, there is usually a breakdown of political order and social instability sets in. During such times, governance becomes difficult if not impossible as civil disobedience, sabotage of governmental institutions and processes, and even rebellion or civil war may break out.¹²

Aside from legitimacy, a government has three other instruments or weapons by which to carry out its policies. These are education (or propaganda); force, i.e., physical compulsion or threat of force (or violence); and, economic measures (or economic manipulation). Social acceptance and effectiveness of these instruments of government policy are tied up with the question of legitimacy. When people think that these are legitimately used, they call these education, force, or economic measures; when people think that these are used unfairly or illegally, they call these propaganda, violence and economic manipulation.¹³

The capacity of a government to formulate and implement the necessary policies to promote the progress and well-being of its citizens enhances its claim to

sovereignty and legitimacy. Such capacity is determined by a number of interrelated factors such as the organization or structure of policy-making and policy implementing institutions; their capacity to perceive and respond to the needs and demands of the population by transforming these into implementable public policies. Effective policy implementation requires adequate public resources -- organizational capability; professional personnel and budgetary or material support including adequate communications with the target population or clientele; leadership; and, social commitment among the public officials in the pursuit of agreed-upon goals of the government. It can thus be seen that the effectiveness of government reinforces its legitimacy. In turn, this legitimacy enhances a government's capacity to perform its functions of policy-making and implementation.

Governance in the Philippines

Given the foregoing perspectives, let us now briefly examine the nature of governance in the Philippines. Western political concepts, government institutions, laws and political/governmental practices were superimposed by colonizing powers on early Philippine society which had its own concepts of power, authority, law, political status and roles; and, its own culture. Inevitably, the system of government that developed over the years acquired a character of its own, Western in form and structure, but quite different in many aspects of its functioning and operation. For example, there are many instances where laws are more honored in the breach. This is because some of these laws were derived from Western legal norms and social ethics which are not necessarily congruent with Filipino ethics and social values.

The discrepancy between our legal norms and social ethics is one reason why graft and corruption has remained unabated in this country, despite the passage of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act¹⁴ and other similar laws, and despite the establishment of various government agencies to investigate and prosecute graft and corruption cases.¹⁵ As O.D. Corpuz explains: "while graft and corruption is illegal, it is not unethical."¹⁶

The prevalence of nepotism in the civil service may be explained in a similar manner. In the Filipino value system, promoting the welfare of one's family and kin is given high priority. This can lead to such extremes as the appropriation of public office, goods and resources to promote family interests. The frequent intrusion of this particularistic norm in the realm of public administration, where universalism ought to be the guiding norm of behavior, had its roots in our colonial experience. The Filipino family (and kinship) became a greatly strengthened institution during the Spanish regime, especially with the introduction of the religious ritual of co-parenthood, i.e., the *compadrazgo* system. Owing to the failure of the Spanish colonial government to provide essential public services such as education, health and welfare in many areas, the Filipino family had to take on some of these functions. The family likewise became a refuge against the exploitative colonial authorities. These interactions between the family and government continue to underlie much of our present political and administrative institutions and processes.

The Filipinos (particularly the *ilustrados* or the educated elite) became committed to the ideals of liberal-democratic governance during the short-lived Philippine

Republic. This is evident in their adoption of the Malolos Constitution.¹⁷ However, the outbreak of the Philippine-American War and the subsequent defeat of the Filipino forces prevented the implementation of this Constitution.

The Americans gradually introduced institutions and practices of liberal-democratic governance during their colonial rule. However, they did not alter the underlying social structure which was characterized by glaring social and economic inequality.¹⁸ In fact, many of their colonial policies, particularly the free trade relations between the United States and the Philippines, reinforced the economic dominance of the traditional landowners. Consequently, political and economic power became more and more concentrated in the hands of a minority --i.e., the elite. Such a situation gave rise to contradictions in policy-making and implementation in which the colonial government paid lip-service to democratic goals but fell far short of achieving these. Nonetheless, the Americans developed a modern, professionalized civil service; and gradually permitted Filipino participation in the legislative and judicial institutions and processes. These features of governance were later on institutionalized in the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as mandated by the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934.

In 1971, Filipinos set out to rewrite the colonial Constitution of 1935. However, this effort was frustrated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos' declaration of martial law in September 1972. The 1973 Constitution was thus finally drafted and ratified under duress and ended up institutionalizing an authoritarian government.

In 1986, Filipinos finally had an opportunity to rewrite their Constitution in an atmosphere of freedom. The painful experience with over a decade of dictatorial government strengthened the Filipino people's commitment to the principles of governance in a liberal-democratic state. Such a state essentially encompasses what had slowly and successively evolved in the Western world as "a society and the politics of choice, the society and politics of competition, the society and politics of the market."¹⁹ In sum, a liberal-democratic state can be described as one in which "both the society as a whole and the system of government were organized on a principle of freedom of choice."²⁰

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution embodies such principles of democratic governance as the tripartite separation of governmental powers and system of checks and balances. However, it takes a more extensive Bill of Rights, and has novel provisions on human rights, on social justice, and other areas of governance. It incorporates safeguards against the possible abuse of executive powers and provides guarantees to individual freedom even in times of emergency rule. It also mandates that the state should undertake economic and social reforms (such as agrarian reform) to democratize Philippine society as well. For the continued survival of a truly constitutional liberal-democracy can only be assured by an egalitarian society where the majority of the population can truly exercise free choice and are empowered to participate in the political and economic decision-making processes.

The Constitution was overwhelmingly ratified in February 1987, thus further investing the present government with legitimacy. The ratification results may, of course, be interpreted as simply a vote of confidence for President Aquino rather than a vote for the Constitution or a rejection of the return of the Marcos government which,

along with its loyal supporters, continued to claim legitimacy. Whichever interpretation may be used, it is a fact that the ratification resulted in greater acceptance of (and lesser opposition to) the Aquino government's claim to the right to rule by Filipinos as well as by foreign governments.

Let us now briefly look at the essential features of governance in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Democracy is reaffirmed in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Article II, Section I declares: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The succeeding sections of Article II enumerate the State's goals to create the necessary conditions and environment that are essential for the enjoyment by the people of the blessings of democracy, such as the maintenance of peace and order; the protection of life, liberty and property; the promotion of general welfare and of a just and dynamic social order; the promotion of social justice and a plural society; and, the full respect for human rights. These principles and state policies are further elaborated in the succeeding Articles of the Constitution.

Article VI, Section 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, provide for political institutions that promote democratic self-government. These include a President and a Vice-President directly elected by the citizens, and a popularly elected bicameral legislature - - the Congress. The representation and articulation of both national and local interests are thus assured and these are reinforced by a novel provision on sectoral, ethnic and minority party representation, through the party list system in the House of Representatives.

Article VII which contains constitutional provisions on the Executive, particularly those limiting the powers of the President to suspend the privilege of the *writ of habeas corpus* or to declare martial law, minimizes the possibility of a return to authoritarian rule. The Constitution provides that Congress and the civil courts shall continue to function even after martial law has been proclaimed. Moreover, the Supreme Court is empowered to review acts of the President, including "the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." It can thus assert its role as the guardian and last bastion of individual rights, freedom and democratic rule.

Democratic self-government is further promoted in Article X granting more autonomous powers to local governments and on the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. There are provisions for a more accountable local government structure through decentralization, with mechanisms for popular recall of elected local officials, initiative and referendum. The Constitution provides for taxing powers of local governments which shall accrue exclusively to the local authorities for a just local government share from national taxes and proceeds from the utilization of and development of the national wealth in a local government area. It provides for elected local legislative bodies with sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.

Effective democratic government is enhanced by Article XI on the accountability of public officers, based on the principle that "public office is a public trust." Sections 4 to 14 mandate the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, with ample powers to

investigate complaints against public officials and employees. There is also a provision for an anti-graft court, the Sandiganbayan, to try erring officials. These provisions are intended to foster a more responsible and responsive bureaucracy.

Democratic governance is reiterated by the Constitutional provisions empowering citizens to participate in the political and governmental processes. Article XIII mandates that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means." It guarantees "the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making" and provides for the establishment by law of adequate consultation mechanisms. It creates an independent Commission on Human Rights with powers and functions to investigate human rights violations and to recommend measures to promote human rights.

Article XVI, on the role of the armed forces vis-a-vis civilian political authorities and the national police force vis-a-vis local executives, is an additional safeguard for the attainment of democratic governance. The principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military is enshrined both in Article II, Section 3 and Article XVI, Section 5. The Constitution mandates that the military is the protector of the people and the State and that members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines must show respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.

In order for democratic political processes to function effectively, these have to be supported by equally democratic social and economic structures. Thus, there are Constitutional mandates for the necessary socio-economic changes to be undertaken to foster an egalitarian and a just social order where economic opportunities, power and wealth shall be equitably distributed and properly utilized for national development and progress. These can be seen in the lengthy provisions on civil, political and human rights; on the promotion of the national patrimony for the national benefit; on the duty of the State to promote distributive justice; and on the provisions on the protection of rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being.

Democratic self-government, as is now enshrined in the Constitution, requires other conditions to foster and nurture its existence. It necessitates an informed and active citizenry; socially-committed and responsible leadership; a vigilant and responsible press; and an economic system that promotes equality or reduces poverty. The mass of citizens must become literate and have access to information. Hence, these requirements necessitate accessible mass educational system; and, a free and widespread press and broadcast media. The Constitution actually provides in Article XIV that it is the duty of the State to protect and promote the rights of citizens to quality education at all levels and to make such education accessible to all. In line with this, Congress enacted in May 1988 the Free Public Secondary Education Act or Republic Act No. 6655 which is now being implemented by the administration.

We must now try to assess whether the conditions for democratic governance are present in our society. For example, what proportion of the citizenry are literate and knowledgeable enough to be able to meaningfully exercise their right to choose local and

national officials or to vote in referenda? What proportion of the citizenry have access to information about government policies, activities of officials, i.e., how many households are reached by newspapers, or own radio or television sets? How free and how responsible are the media in disseminating information? If the structure of media ownership is relatively widespread rather than concentrated or monopolistic, there is a greater possibility for freedom of information dissemination, and for a more educational and critical press and broadcast media. Obviously, this paper cannot answer all the above questions.

The requisite conditions for democratic self-government are inevitably related to the distribution of wealth in a country. Democratic self-government needs to be supported by an economy where there is a relatively equitable distribution of wealth. For economic power breeds political power. As Dudley Seers aptly observed:

An economic system with large numbers of undernourished and unemployed at the bottom end of a long social ladder can never provide a firm basis for political right or for civic order. Those with high income from profits or salaries are not merely slow to tackle the great social problems of poverty and unemployment; they will inevitably try to find ways of maintaining privilege resorting (as dozens of historical examples show) to political violence rather than give it up. Conversely, those without jobs or adequate incomes will sooner or later try to obtain them through a regime which would not allow organized opposition.²¹

Let us now briefly examine some social and economic realities that must be addressed daily by our government. This examination can give us some sense of the difficulties of achieving our constitutional ideals of liberal democratic governance.

The daily accounts by the mass media remind us of the continuing breakdown of law and order, and of dissidence and injustices committed in many parts of the country. As of January 1988, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Renato de Villa reported that there were at least 14,063 criminals on the loose throughout the country, some of whom were members of 1,846 organized crime syndicates. From January to November 1986, the crime rate had increased by about 5 per cent over the national average of criminal incidents. The number of carjacking incidents increased from a previous average of 3.5 vehicles to 8 vehicles stolen daily.²²

The number of unlawful killings by government and government-backed paramilitary forces has reportedly increased since January 1987. The most publicized incident was that of the Lupao (Nueva Ecija) massacre in February 1987 where 17 villagers, including six children, were killed by Philippine army soldiers.²³ Many of these killings remain unsolved.

The problem of dissidence led by the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) forces continue to preoccupy government military forces and cause the diversion if not wastage of much-needed public and human resources for economic development purposes. Similarly, the Muslim separatist movement led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) remains unresolved. The continuing armed conflict has disrupted the lives of many communities in Mindanao and the Visayas as civilians leave their villages for the safety of evacuation centers. The casualties from these armed conflicts remain high on the part of both dissidents and government forces and from civilians caught in the crossfire.

Undoubtedly, the problem of dissidence and ethnic separatist aspirations are largely caused and fueled by the continuing inequality in the distribution of wealth in the country; the lack of opportunities for economic advancement and improvement of the quality of life for many poor people; and, perceptions among dissidents or rebels of government neglect or apathy about their plight. The latest statistics show that the lowest 10.0 per cent of families in the country received only 2.0 per cent of total family income while the top 10.0 per cent received 36.4 per cent of total family income. The top 30 per cent of all families received over three-fifths (63.5 per cent) of total family income while the lowest 70 per cent shared only 36.5 per cent of total family income.²⁴

Related to the problems of income inequality is the increasing number of families who are barely subsisting or who live in poverty. It has been estimated that some 51.2 per cent (4,801,707.6) of all families in the Philippines in 1983-1984 lived with incomes below the poverty line. This is based on the amount of money needed to buy the minimum food requirements for a family of six in order for them to remain healthy and strong enough to work. If the provision of basic necessities such as clothing, shelter or housing, medicine and others were included in estimating the poverty line, 70.7 per cent of all families would be classified as having incomes below the poverty level.²⁵ It was found that the proportion of those living in poverty was greater among families living outside the Metropolitan Manila area.

The high incidence of families living in poverty is related with the problems of widespread malnutrition, disease and high mortality, especially among children. A report submitted by then Minister of Health Azurin to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in February 1986, showed that three out of every 10 Filipino children become malnourished before they reach the age of five and only four out of 10 children grow up to be "healthy."²⁶

Malnutrition not only leaves surviving children with poor intellectual development, it also makes them susceptible to infections and diseases. This can be seen from the fact that half of all deaths in the country are infant deaths. Out of 1,000 births, 78 die before reaching the age of five. This makes the Philippines number 76 in a list of 137 countries classified in the Under-Five Mortality (U5MR) by UNICEF.²⁷ The four leading causes of infant deaths are pneumonia, avitaminosis and other nutritional deficiencies, respiratory infections and diarrhea. Many of these communicable diseases are now preventable because of advances in science. Yet, so many Filipino children die of these maladies largely because of poverty which, coupled with parental ignorance, prevents them from getting immunization.

The high incidence of poverty and the continuing armed conflict in many parts of the country have particularly harsh consequences for the nation's children and youth. A report submitted by the Department of Social Welfare to President Aquino in July 1987, showed that about 10 million (or 29 per cent of total) children and youth are in "especially difficult circumstances." These included 2.4 million children victimized in armed conflicts; 5 million exploited children (i.e., working children, street children and sexually exploited children); 1.9 million children in tribal communities; and, 659,000 mentally or physically retarded children.²⁸

The above facts serve to highlight the demand for governmental services to alleviate the plight of many Filipinos and the need for long-range policies to solve the root causes

of these problems. The magnitude of these and other problems and the limited resources available to government which it can allocate to meet competing needs and demands from Philippine society underscore the perennial difficulties of policy-making and implementation. Undoubtedly, this has kept many people interested in if not preoccupied with politics.

Increasing participation of people in elections may be viewed as an indicator of growing interest in politics and government. In the February 2, 1987 plebiscite to ratify the Constitution, 86.8 per cent of the 24,997 million registered voters cast their ballots.²⁹ In previous plebiscites in the country, voter turnout was estimated to be from 46.22 to 68.12 per cent. In the May 11, 1987 Congressional elections, it was estimated that some 85 to 90 per cent of the 26.4 million registered voters cast their ballots.³⁰

The above statistics clearly show increasing popular participation in political decision-making. Yet in terms of substantive participation, the majority of the population are still at a disadvantage. Massive poverty and the pervasiveness of traditional clientelist politics make many voters susceptible to vote-buying and terrorism during elections. Reports about the manipulation of election results and the large number of electoral protests filed by losing candidates with the Commission on Elections belie the reality of popular democracy.

The traditional elites and the higher income class continue to be over-represented in the legislative body, i.e., Congress. Majority of the senators belong to the upper income class of society. Twenty-one of 22 senators who submitted their statements of assets and liabilities in 1987 have annual incomes of over a million pesos. Moreover, the five wealthiest senators belong to the families of landed oligarchs and prominent political clans that have dominated Philippine society for many years.³¹ In the House of Representatives, 148 (75.5 percent) of 173 congressmen who submitted their statements of assets and liabilities are also millionaires.³² Moreover, a tally made by the Institute for Popular Democracy showed that out of 200 elected representatives, 130 belong to traditional political clans while another 39 are relatives of traditional clans. Only 31 congressmen have no electoral record prior to 1971 and are not directly related to the traditional political clans.³³

Up to the present time, the 25 members in the House of Representatives who are to be chosen through a party-list system have not been named. This is because the mechanics for their selection have to be spelled out by legislation of Congress. The 25 other members who are to be appointed by the President to represent the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and others, have not all been chosen. The first few who have been appointed have not taken their seats as the House of Representatives has insisted that their appointments be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.³⁴ We have also witnessed the recent protracted debates between the President and Congress, and between the House of Representatives and the Senate on the postponement of the barangay elections originally scheduled for November 1988. Such actions by the national political elite can be interpreted as an attempt to delay the implementation of the Constitutional mandate regarding democratic self-rule and to curtail popular participation at the grassroots level.

Clearly, the above facts do not augur well for an ostensibly representative policy-making body. The wide gap in social class, power and wealth between the elected representatives and those whom they represent limits the ability of legislators to have a genuine empathy for the real needs and demands of the majority of Filipinos. Moreover, conflicts of interest are likely to occur and those in power are likely to opt for maintaining the status quo. This has been glaringly evident in the attempt to emasculate House Bill No. 400 on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The landlord bloc in Congress used all available strategy and tactics, including media blitz, in order to ensure the original CARP bill's defeat and the adoption of their own version of agrarian reform. And yet only 20 per cent of our population reportedly own 80 per cent of the total land in the country.³⁵ This example merely illustrates the difficulties of promoting radical social and economic change and of achieving the goal of social justice in the Philippines through the normal legislative process.

Despite the enormity of social and economic problems faced by Filipinos and the apparent defects in the existing political institutions, there are indications that people continue to have faith in their political leaders and the present system of government. This can be gleaned, from public opinion polls periodically undertaken by the Social Weather Station (SWS) since May 1986. The SWS March 1987 public opinion, for example, showed that marked positive perceptions of the Aquino administration extend over a wide range of performance issues and, in direct comparison with the previous Marcos Administration, there is a high consensus that the present administration is better.³⁶ The overall findings of the March 1987 survey essentially confirm the findings of an earlier SWS survey in October 1986 which indicated sustained popular support for the Aquino government since the May 1986 survey.³⁷

Majority of the respondents in the March 1987 SWS survey perceived the Aquino Administration as better than the Marcos Administration in terms of "a more peaceful society" (78 per cent of total respondents); "protecting human rights" (75 per cent of total respondents); "fighting corruption" (75 per cent of total respondents); "developing livelihood opportunities" (70 per cent of total respondents); "acting according to what people want" (68 per cent of total respondents); and effecting "land reform" (63 per cent of total respondents).³⁸ Compared to Marcos, Aquino was perceived as better and was best rated in "telling the truth" (68 per cent of total respondents). Mindanao had the biggest proportion of positive raters.

Public support was also extended to the Aquino Administration on the issue of how it had handled perceived threats to her government, as well as related policies of reconciliation with communists and Muslim rebels. There was majority support in the way the government handled the threat of Muslim rebels (59 per cent), the communist rebels (57 per cent), the Marcos loyalists (56 per cent), and the military men who aspire for government power (55 per cent).³⁹ The survey also found that President Aquino's policy of reconciliation was favored by respondents.

In a more recent (February 1988) public opinion poll conducted by the Ateneo University, there are indications that the government needs to double its efforts in solving the country's economic problems, particularly unemployment. The survey found that "majority of the people believe they are poorer now" compared to the previous year. Nonetheless, the survey also showed that there were still more respondents (32 per cent)

who were expecting a "better life" next year than those who were "gloomy" about the future.⁴⁰

In summary, this section of the paper has shown that Filipinos are committed to the principles and institutions of liberal-democratic government. This comment has grown out of their historical experience, especially the trauma of authoritarian rule under Martial Law from 1972 to 1986, and is embodied in the new Constitution which received overwhelming support from the majority of the populace during the February 1987 plebiscite. Continuing commitment to liberal-democratic governance is also indicated by the increasing popular participation in elections.

The paper has also pointed out the shaky socio-economic conditions upon which liberal-democratic governance rests. There is widespread social inequality; massive poverty; unemployment; continuing dissidence in various parts of the country; and the secessionist threat in Mindanao led by the MNLF. These conditions tend to contradict some of the ideals of liberal-democracy such as equality, freedom of choice, empowerment of the people and social justice. The enormity of the socio-economic problems that Filipinos expect to be solved by government, further underscores the fragility of our liberal-democratic government. This observation becomes even more salient vis-a-vis the Report on the October 1986 public opinion poll which showed that Filipinos viewed the "possibility of eventually being disenchanted with peaceful means of bringing about democratic change." The report further stated: "Marcos deposed and Aquino installed notwithstanding, Filipinos are not ruling out the possibility for other modalities of social change."⁴¹ Against this background, let us now focus on the role of the University of the Philippines in the governance of our country.

The University's Role in Governance

The University of the Philippines was created by Act No. 1870 on June 18, 1908. It was mandated by its charter to "give advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences and arts, and to give professional and technical training to every qualified student irrespective of age, sex, nationality, religious belief, or political affiliation." Its initial direction and growth was guided by the vision of its first President, Murray Bartlett. His concept of "efficiency" became the "watchword in developing the University of the Filipinos -- efficiency, founded upon scholarship and inspired by character."⁴² He envisioned the UP to be an "abode of scholarship" and a "training ground for men who would be leaders of their people." Towards this end, Bartlett emphasized the need to develop "character." In his words:

..... The first necessity of the university is not to graduate skilled engineers, agriculturists, or physicians, nor is it even to produce efficient scholars; first of all, it must turn out men and women, and manhood and womanhood are built upon one foundation - the development of character.⁴³

Against this background, let us now briefly look at the UP's progress in the past 80 years and its contributions to governance in this country.

The University of the Philippines, since the time it was set up, has been actively involved in the country's governance. It has served as a training ground for the country's political leaders, administrators, educators, physicians, scientists, engineers and other

professional manpower, entrepreneurs and citizens. Four out of ten Philippine presidents, since Manuel Quezon, obtained their law degrees from the UP and one attended the University for part of his College education.

Many members of the Philippine legislature have come from the UP. In the 1963 Congress, for example, 39.06 per cent of its total members (24 senators and 104 representatives) were recruited from UP.⁴⁴ Many justices of the Supreme Court have come from UP and many more of our lower-level officials -- cabinet secretaries, under-secretaries, bureau directors, governors, mayors and others have been educated in the University.

Even today, there are many prominent members of government in all three branches who passed through the halls of the University. The UP remains as the premier institution of learning in the country, providing and lending its expertise towards the solution of various social, economic and political problems.

Training for future and present leaders in the governance of the Philippines is provided by various units and colleges of the University. The College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) provides formal courses and degree programs for understanding society, government and the duties of citizenship. It has the largest concentration of social science departments (nine) in the country.

Within the CSSP, the Department of Political Science is directly involved in providing courses on government, politics and administration. It offers both undergraduate and graduate degree programs up to the PhD in Political Science. Many of its Bachelor's degree graduates go on to study for the law degree. Those who finish its graduate degrees go on to work in the various departments of the Executive Branch, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs or join the faculty of state or private universities and colleges. Many faculty members of the Political Science Department serve as consultants to various government officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches. Many of them are also consulted by the mass media to analyze and interpret political events, notably election trends and results, and to participate in public fora or talk shows. Other social science faculty members are similarly consulted by the media and one sociologist has a regular public affairs program on television.⁴⁵ This means, social scientists extend their educational functions beyond the halls of the University.

The College of Law has provided basic education and training for many of the country's political leaders, administrators, judges and justices. Four past presidents of the Republic have passed through its portals -- Jose P. Laurel, Sr., Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino and Ferdinand E. Marcos. Many of the leaders and members of the legislature, the judiciary and local governments who are UP graduates have similarly gone through the College of Law. In addition to providing for the Bachelor and Master of Laws Degree Programs, the College of Law has since 1984, also been conducting continuing short-term legal education and training programs for practicing lawyers, judges and local government officials. These short-term training programs have been conducted by the UP Law Center which was established by Congress in 1964.⁴⁶

In 1984 - 1985, the various training programs conducted by the Law Center benefited a total of 9,717 participants.⁴⁷ The UP Law Center also provides technical assistance to

the members of the Legislative branch by conducting research and drafting proposed legislation for them. The researches done by the College of Law faculty and by the staff of the UP Law Center as well as the UP International Studies Institute of the Philippines (ISIP) provide valuable information for government policy-makers and administrators to help them improve their professional competence and decision-making.

The College of Public Administration (CPA) is another unit of the UP which is directly involved in providing formal education for future and incumbent government officials and civil servants. The College offers degree programs leading to the Bachelor of Arts, Master and Doctor of Public Administration. In addition to these formal degree programs, the CPA assists government agencies in systematizing their administrative management and upgrading the qualifications of their incumbent personnel through short-term training programs designed and conducted by the College under its Policy Studies Program and Administrative Development Center. These two units have recently been fused to form the Center for Policy and Administrative Development.

The Local Government Center (LGC) which is attached to the CPA, likewise provides research services and short-term training programs for both elective and appointive local officials. Its ten-week Local Administration and Development Program (LADP) has benefited 1,073 local officials and received an award as the most outstanding extension program of the University in July 1985. Since 1968, the LGC has trained a total of 3,134 local officials in various aspects of local administration.⁴⁸

In addition to these, the CPA faculty and research staff render consultancy services to national agencies and local governments, public corporations and international organizations on governmental administration, organization and management, fiscal administration, rural development and others. They have provided advice and assistance to the reorganization efforts of the national government under different administrations. The research findings of the CPA faculty and staff have served as important inputs not only to the formal academic courses; they have also aided much in the improvement of the delivery of public services. This is especially so with respect to research evaluating government programs.

The School of Urban and Regional Planning (SURP), like the CPA, provides for formal academic degree programs (up to the PhD level), training, research, extension and consultancy services in its special field of study. From 1971-1988, the SURP has provided short-term courses for 695 individuals in various aspects of environmental planning and development, land use planning and urban and regional planning.⁴⁹

Similarly, the College of Social Welfare and Community Development (CSWCD) offers academic degree programs, research, extension and consultancy services in its area of expertise. Its faculty and staff have especially been active in helping various communities and groups (such as women) to organize themselves for self-help development projects. It is in this program area where they have been instrumental in helping to educate and empower citizens. The CSWCD has benefited 1,391 participants in its training programs from 1982-1986. These included community workers, farmer-leaders, fishermen-leaders, barangay workers, community organizers, youth leaders and field workers of various government agencies.

The College of Education is another unit that has been active in offering both formal degree programs and short-term training programs for students and teachers of various grade and college levels all over the country. Available data show that from 1981 to 1987, a total of 1,384 individuals have participated in its training programs.⁵⁰

Other units of the UP such as the College of Science, School of Economics, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Institute for Small Scale Industries have all contributed to improving the expertise of the country's human resources for more effective public service. Similarly, the other professional schools and colleges -- the Colleges of Dentistry, Medicine, Nursing, Public Health, Agriculture, Engineering and others -- have performed their own functions of providing education, research and extension service. Many of their graduates have risen to leadership positions in their respective fields of specialization.

As can be seen from the above, the University has contributed substantially towards the improvement of the country's governance through its teaching, research and extension functions. Its alumni have assumed leadership and held responsible positions in the three branches of government; others have assumed the role of critics or even opposition. Much of the positive achievements in the country's past governance have been attributed to the leadership of UP alumni. It must be admitted, however, that many of our current problems in government are similarly traced to the decisions and actions of some of the outstanding UP alumni who were part of the past national leadership. Such problems have been spawned by decision-making motivated by self-interest more than considerations of national interest and welfare. This has led some to question the quality of education that the University has been providing. There is the implicit view that perhaps while the University has been able to promote academic and technical excellence, it has neglected consideration of moral and ethical values and standards in its programs of instruction.

But equally significant is the fact that the termination of the past authoritarian regime was due in large measure to the collective efforts of many UP alumni, faculty and staff who increasingly served as social critics and organizers of cause-oriented groups at the risk of political harassment and even imprisonment. The activities of these individuals contributed much to the political education and empowerment of ordinary Filipinos. For while it was openly acknowledged that one of the University's valuable role was that of social critic, it could not fully assume this role without risking the ire of the establishment and endangering its very survival. The University could not also speak with one voice as many of its leading faculty and staff had been coopted by the past administration, and were thereby inhibited from openly criticizing governmental policies and programs.

Concluding Observations

In summary, the UP has much to contribute to the improvement of the country's governance through its various degree and non-degree programs designed to train future as well as incumbent political leaders, administrators, civil servants and citizens. Through its research and extension programs, it provides valuable information on various areas of national concern and technical assistance to decision-makers as well as ordinary citizens.

It appears that many of the University's programs that have been briefly described above, were formulated in response to perceived needs at various time periods. It appears that many of these have operated independently of each other and are weakly interrelated. Linkages between these various programs and activities have, in large measure, been provided by individual scholars who have assumed leadership in these areas or have become recognized experts by their colleagues. There is, therefore, a need to review these as a whole in order to strengthen their institutional linkages and maximize the use of University resources in the service of the country's more effective governance.

The University has grown in size over the years. It is now composed of four autonomous campuses and several regional units. This has resulted in the increasing bureaucratization of its governance. There is a growing consensus that the collegial nature of decision-making in the University has become increasingly eroded over the years. Democratic governance and effective participation in decision-making among the rank and file have become as much of a problem in the University as these are for the whole country.

There is a need to review existing University structures to make them truly participatory. For example, the University Council's membership is limited to faculty members with the rank of assistant professor or higher. Instructors do not participate in its deliberations and decision-making. Yet they are as much a part of the academic community and are affected by University Council decisions.

There is need for a University assembly or a body that will include not only all faculty members but other members of the academic community such as researchers, extension workers, students, etc. There is also a need for a deliberative and coordinative body which will bring together representatives from all the four campuses. As it is now, each campus has its own University Council. Consequently, there is no venue to discuss and coordinate academic programs and course offerings within the system. There is a need to coordinate these in order to maintain uniform standards and safeguard academic excellence. The Presidential Advisory Council is doing some of these functions but its membership is limited to administrators from each campus.

There are other needs in the University that must be addressed. At present, there is a need to reform the existing procedure in order to ensure independent and speedy investigation of complaints or administrative decisions against faculty members and employees and thereby promote administrative due process. There is a need to institutionalize existing consultation mechanisms to select university administrators. The grassroots-initiated democratic process of selecting the incumbent University president should be considered as a model for institutionalizing popular participation in the University. This in turn should inspire the establishment of participatory structures and processes in other public institutions. The University must lead the country in practicing the principles of democratic governance which it teaches.

There is also a prevailing observation that over the years, the University has become an institution for the maintenance of the elite, particularly those from Metro Manila. This is because its admission policies, particularly the UP College Admissions Test (UPCAT), have a built-in bias against graduates of ordinary public schools and those from the rural areas. For the most part, our ethnic minorities have also been disad-

vantaged by such policies. There is a need to re-examine these University policies in order to ensure democratic admissions in the University. This is imperative if UP is to continue to serve the wider interests of Philippine society and to lead in bringing about peaceful transformation towards a more egalitarian, self-reliant, progressive and just society.

Endnotes

¹David B. Guralnik, (ed.), *Webster's New World Dictionary* (Second College Edition, Toronto: Nelson, Foster & Scott Ltd., 1976), p.605.

²Alfred de Grazia, "Political Organization," Vol. II of *The Elements of Political Science* (New rev. ed., New York: The Free Press, 1962), p.10.

³For an elaboration of this, see Thomas R. Dye, *Policy Analysis: What Governments Do, Why They Do It and What Difference It Makes* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1976) and his *Understanding Public Policy* (Third ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1978).

⁴R.M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (Rev. ed., New York: The Free Press, 1966), p.63.

⁵*Ibid.*, p.62.

⁶"Legitimacy," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The MacMillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968), Vol. 9, pp. 244-247; the quotation is from p. 244.

⁷MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰de Grazia, *op. cit.*, p. 19. For a discussion of three types of legitimacy -- rational, traditional and charismatic -- see *ibid.*, pp. 15-21.

¹¹Sovereignty is defined by de Grazia (in *ibid.*, p. 13) as "the claim to power to make decisions affecting a state when that claim is authorized by the existing legitimate order."

¹²This is what prevailed, for example, during the Japanese occupation, under the puppet Philippine Republic. At that time, Philippine government officials and civil servants considered it a patriotic duty to sabotage the work of the Japanese-sponsored government.

¹³de Grazia, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁴Republic Act No. 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (August 1960).

¹⁵For an account of these various agencies, see Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler, "Administrative Measures Against Bureaucratic Corruption: The Philippine Experience," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July - October 1979), pp. 321-349.

¹⁶ Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 78-92. See also Ledivina V. Cariño, "The Definition of Graft and Corruption and the Conflict of Ethics and Law," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July - October 1979), pp. 221-240.

¹⁷ See Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960), esp. chap. VIII.

¹⁸ Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1942), pp. 293-308; 376-384.

¹⁹ C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy*, The Massey Lecture, Fourth Series (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1976), p. 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," in Charles K. Wilber (ed.), *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (First ed., New York: Random House, 1973), p. 10.

²² *Ibon Facts & Figures*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (February 15, 1988), p. 8.

²³ Details of these incidents are in the Amnesty International Report, "Philippines: Unlawful Killings by Military and Paramilitary Forces" (1988).

²⁴ National Economic and Development Authority, *1987 Philippine Statistical Yearbook*, Table 2.8, p. 114.

²⁵ *Ibon Facts & Figures*, No. 139 (May 31, 1984), p. 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. X, No. 23 (December 15, 1987), p. 2.

²⁷ James P. Grant, *The State of the World's Children* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) quoted in *ibid.*

²⁸ *Manila Chronicle*, July 11, 1987.

²⁹ *Ibon Facts & Figures*. Vol. I, No. 7 (April 15, 1987), p. 3.

³⁰ *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 12, 1987.

³¹ *Ibon Facts & Figures*, Vol. X, No. 15 (August 15, 1987), p. 8. On the traditional elite dominance in the old Congress and in the Batasang Pambansa, see Manuel A. Caoili, "The Philippine Congress and the Political Order," and Olivia C. Caoili, "The Batasang Pambansa: Continuity in the Philippine Legislative System," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (January 1986), pp. 1-35 and 36-59, respectively.

³² Willie Ng, "148 Millionaire Congressmen," *Manila Bulletin*, October 21, 1987, p.6.

³³ Quoted in *Ibon Facts & Figures*; Vol. I, No. 22 (November 30, 1987), p. 8.

³⁴"Undermining the People's Choice," *Manila Chronicle*, April 29, 1988, p.4; "House is Discriminatory," *Manila Chronicle*, April 30, 1988, p.4.

³⁵Quoted in *Ibon Facts and Figures*, Vol. X, No. 17 (September 15, 1987), p.8.

³⁶Felipe B. Miranda, "The March 1987 Public Opinion Report: A Political Analysis," Social Weather Stations Inc., 1987, p. 10.

³⁷Felipe B. Miranda, "The October 1986 Public Opinion Report: A Political Analysis," Social Weather Stations, Inc., 1986.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰Gene Orejana, "More People Feel Poorer Now, Says Poll," *Malaya* (May 14, 1988), pp. 1, 6.

⁴¹Miranda, "The October 1986 ...," *op.cit.*, p.2.

⁴²Quoted in Donata V. Taylo, "Bartlett as First President (1911-1915)," in Oscar M. Alfonso (ed.), *University of the Philippines: First 75 Years (1908-1983)* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1985), p. 5.

⁴³Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁴Remigio E. Agpalo, "Legitimacy and the Political Elite in the Philippines," *Philippine Political Science Journal*, No. 2 (December 1975), p. 2.

⁴⁵This is Professor Randolph David who regularly hosts the weekly "Public Forum" program on Channel 13.

⁴⁶Republic Act No. 3870, June 15, 1964.

⁴⁷Data from the UP Law Complex.

⁴⁸Local Government Center, *Annual Reports*, 1968 to 1987.

⁴⁹School of Urban and Regional Planning, *Annual Reports*, 1972 to 1987.

⁵⁰College of Education, *Annual Reports*, 1981-1987.