

The State of Philippine Democracy: 1987

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The assumption of President Aquino to the Presidency has seen the installation of a number of structures and processes that supposedly constitute the restoration of democracy to the country. These include the Constitution, Congress, electoral processes and political parties among other things. However, caution must be exercised lest these become the mere formalisms of democracy.

Introduction

The return of "democracy" to the Philippines after a decade and a half of dictatorship through what is popularly referred to as a "people power revolution" in February 1986 has been enthusiastically welcomed by millions of people in the Philippines and throughout the world.¹

Only recently, Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul S. Manglapus proposed to host a conference of the world's newly restored democracies sometime next year. The conference aims to bring together leading figures to discuss common problems of countries going through the redemocratization process. He added that the Philippines should be the "capital of new democracies" because President Aquino was the most acclaimed of these countries' leaders.² Ironically, it was also at about the same time that the government of this "capital of new democracies" indecisively decided to expel an Australian journalist for writing a report that was perceived by some officials to be detrimental to the interests, including among other things, security interests, of the country.

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After one and a half decades of dictatorship, the Philippines still has a long way to go in its efforts at rebuilding the nation and redemocratization. There are those who see the redemocratization process simply as the return to the institutions and processes before the imposition of the dictatorship in 1972; holding elections, reconstitution of the Congress, and the reinstatement of a free press, among other things. They argue that democracy has been reinstated with these institutions and processes in place. We would like to introduce a note of caution at this point. The process towards redemocratization may have begun, but we should recognize that we still have a long way to go. The pains and sacrifices towards the institution of democracy still await us.

Unfortunately, the Manglapus proposal is consistent with the disheartening trend among some still euphoric Filipinos who continue the embarrassing exercise of self congratulations, bordering on hubris, brought about by the events of February 1986. In spite of all that is happening around us now - coup attempts left and right, bombings and sparrow attacks - they still stubbornly cling to the myth that what we have now is a democracy.

It has been almost two years now since that historic event. The reality that the problems of the Filipino people did not depart with the dictator has begun to set in, even among the more euphoric Filipinos. Poverty and unemployment continue to be the basic problems, and the situation seems to be getting worse; the much vaunted economic takeoff remains more of an objective rather than a reality; and the very stability and capacity of the government to govern continues to be threatened by a multi-pronged insurgency: that of the left (led by the CPP-NPA), the right (led by disgruntled rightist elements in the military like Colonel Gregorio Honasan) and the separatist movements in Mindanao and in the Cordilleras.

Over and above all these domestic problems is the external or international factors. For one, we are deep into the debt trap: we have a foreign debt approaching \$30 billion whose interest, much less the principal, we can hardly afford to pay. Then, there is the constant threat of external (read: American) intervention.³

It is within this general context that this paper discusses the state of democracy in the Philippines. By focusing on the state of democracy in the Philippines under the Aquino administration, it argues that the Aquino government meets the traditional criteria of liberal democracy as far as the forms of any traditional liberal western-oriented democratic institution are concerned. However, it further argues that the substance of such democratic forms are the more significant aspects in any discussion of the future of democracy in the Philippines.

Formalisms of Democracy

The term "democracy" originated from Greek meaning "rule of the people." Essentially, it meant the situation wherein the people actually participate in directing the activities of the state. This is done through citizen participative mechanisms like elections and representative bodies like Congress.⁴ Thus, any government that is to be called democratic should at least have the following basic institutions and forms:

A fundamental law, or a constitution that is framed by representatives of the people;

Elections to choose the leaders and representatives of the people;

Political parties that serve as the vehicles for interest aggregation and articulation; and

A representative body, usually the Congress, composed of elected members who are supposed to be representing the people either geographically or sectorally.

The state of democracy in the Philippines will be discussed in this essay employing the above as initial indicators. However, it will be imperative to look at the substance of these various forms of democracy in looking at the future of democracy in the Philippines.

Before the imposition of martial law in 1972, the Philippines was commonly referred to as the "showcase of democracy in Asia." Ours in fact has all the features of any liberal, western oriented democracy, complete with the trappings of democracy, unabashedly patterned after that of the United States: the Philippines had the formalisms⁵ of a two-party system, periodic elections, an elected congress which was a replica of the bicameral congress of the United States with a Senate and a House of Representatives, a constitution, and a free, often referred to as a licentious press. The Philippines, in fact prided itself as having one of the freest presses in Asia.

Such democratic formalisms, however, have been criticized by some students of Philippine history as exactly that: formalisms that did not really constitute genuine democracy. At best it was democracy in form, one that catered to the elite, and not to the masses of the people. Such arrangements were further entrenched by the patron-client relationships among many elements of the population, most graphically illustrated by the relationship between the landlords and their tenants, a relationship marked by extensive dependency which meant, for all intents and purposes, the preservation and

persistence of the feudal and semi-feudal structures and relationships in the Philippines.

With the imposition of a dictatorship in 1972, Marcos abrogated the 1935 Constitution, closed down Congress, rendered moribund the political parties, snuffed out the free press, cancelled elections at all levels, and banned all forms of political activities. In short, Marcos extinguished whatever kind of democracy that was in the Philippines.

For a decade and a half, he supplanted these various forms of democracy with dictatorship-sponsored ones. He created his own constitution, introduced the referendum (which he managed) as a way of consulting the people, organized a rubber stamp assembly, created his own political party and controlled the press. He did all these in line with his general effort to legitimize his dictatorship and provide a semblance of the workings of a democracy. He even called his dictatorship "constitutional authoritarianism."

The dictatorship lasted for a decade and a half in spite of the "lifting" of martial law by Marcos in 1981. By 1986, the so-called people power revolution erupted driving the dictator and his family and cronies out of the Philippines.

Since the dictator fled, we have begun the process of what many refer to as redemocratization. Indeed, some democratic forms have been restored to the Philippines:

- 1) We have a constitution that was overwhelmingly ratified by the Filipino people in February 1987.
- 2) We have elected a Congress composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
- 3) We are preparing for local elections in January 1988.
- 4) We are witnessing the revival of the old "two-party system" with the resuscitation of the Liberal and Nacionalista parties.

But are we really progressively moving towards the establishment of genuine democracy in the Philippines? A democracy that actually empowers the people and allows them to participate in directing the State?

The 1987 Constitution

After the assumption of President Aquino of the Presidency of the Philippines, one of her first acts was to promulgate a freedom constitution which proclaimed a revolutionary government and the drafting of a new constitution.

The 1987 Constitution loftily declares that the Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Specifically, Section 1 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies states:

The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

Commitment to democracy notwithstanding, it should be noted that the 1987 Constitution is largely a product and amalgamation of the various class interests that dominated the Commission. It was a Commission, dominated by members from the elite. According to Wilfrido Villacorta, who was himself a former member of that Commission:

The composition of the Commission was clearly elitist. But even if the members were elected, it could not probably have been more broadly based, given the nature of our electoral system . . . (L)ike the 1899, 1935 and 1972 Constitutional Conventions, class interests played a very important role in the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Many factors were responsible for this development: the predominantly elitist composition of the Commission, the visible as well as "invisible" forces that influenced the decisions of many of the commissioners and the very ideological foundation - moderate in form, conservative in substance- of the (Aquino) dispensation.⁶

The 1987 Constitution was overwhelmingly ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite of February 1987. Thus, whether we like it or not, that constitution is here to stay, unless, of course, another Marcos comes to the scene, a scenario not totally precluded by the Constitution.

There are those who argue that the 1987 Constitution is a product largely of the elitist orientations of majority of the commissioners. As such, they were more conservative and were quite sympathetic to the economic and security interests of the United States. The Constitution contained provisions that essentially protected the interests of the transnational corporations in the Philippines. Specifically, these were the provisions that pertained to the proportion of ownership that may be allowed to foreign investors, and the provision pertaining to the protection of local business.

For instance, there is a constitutional provision that unnecessarily ties down Philippine industrialization strategy to agriculture. While we do not discount the importance of the agricultural sector, to limit the industrialization strategy to agrarian industrialization in the Constitution effectively forecloses other modes of industrialization, e.g., manufacturing.⁷

Another significant provision that is relevant to the future of democracy issue pertains to the openness of the Constitution to foreign investments, allowing foreigners to own as much as 40% of equity of industries.⁸ We are not unaware of the many insidious practices of foreign business to actually control huge sectors of the Philippine economy through dummies.

Then, there is the issue of the Constitution's hesitation to go out all the way to protect the Filipino businessman from foreign competition, an indispensable factor in the process of industrialization as demonstrated by the experiences of Japan, Korea, India, the United States and Britain. Instead, the Constitution qualifies its protection: "the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair *foreign* competition and practices."⁹ The Constitution in order to be pro-Filipino must be unqualifiedly pro-Filipino. Qualifying the protectionist provision of the Constitution dilutes its being pro-Filipino.

These are the yardsticks by which it should be measured when gauging its democratic-ness: to what extent does the Constitution actually empower the people? to what extent does it protect the interests of the people, vis-a-vis the elite and the international sector?

This is not to say however that the 1987 Constitution is totally devoid of provisions inspired by the general spirit to bring power to the people, which lies at the very gut of democracy. For instance, the article on Social Justice and Human Rights¹⁰ specifically contains a section defining the rights of people's organizations, emphasizing their roles as vehicles for citizen participation. Article XII Sections 15 and 16 provide:

The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means . . .

The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Then, there is the provision pertaining to initiative and referendum which aims to empower the people "to propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body." However, the process is so cumbersome, that it is almost impossible for any one to operationalize such initiative: it requires the signatures of 10% of all registered voters, and *every* legislative district must be represented in the petition by at least 3% of its voters. If there is just one legislative district where the petitioners are unable to obtain at 3% of the signatures of qualified voters, then the initiative automatically dies.

Another provision that aims to empower the people is that on sectoral representation.¹¹ The Constitution allocates certain seats for specific sectors in in the House of Representatives; labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and others. Except for the labor sector, the other sectoral berths remain unfilled. Such seats must be filled immediately if only to demonstrate the President's political will give meaning to the empowerment process.

We therefore have a constitution that, at least at the level of rhetoric, lays down the foundation and ideals of a democracy. Whether or not the various mechanisms to empower the people do exactly that still remains to be seen.

Elections and Political Parties

Before the imposition of martial law, the electoral process in the Philippine political system was described as a "two-party system," the two major parties being the Liberal and the Nacionalista parties. However, an examination of the programs of both parties revealed that both parties had no fundamental differences as far as platform and program of action were concerned. Their differences lay primarily in the identities of their leaders. However, both parties continued to represent the elite upper class of society. Thus what we had was essentially a one party system dominated by two factions.

One observer summed the situation thus:

Parties were essentially indistinguishable. Politicians campaigned on broad issues but not on programs. In fact, as Francisco Araneta and John Carrol have observed, a party with a strong program of social reform would destroy itself because those reforms cut across the system of alliances and particularistic rewards that are the basis for power. The usual campaign issues were graft and corruption, public works and human services, the economy and peace and order. Campaigning on issues meant promising change but not providing a program of change.¹²

Under martial law, Marcos organized his own party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). However, like other participative mechanisms under the dictatorship, the KBL was essentially corporatist, a mechanism by which the dictator tried to extend his influence and dominance over the rest of society. It was simply an aggrupation of the many groups in the society that catered, or were forced to cater to the regime, if only to be able to obtain patronage from the highly centralized government. It was devoid of any platform or ideology, hence for all intents and purposes, was not a genuine political party. It was organized around the personality of one man.

Towards the end of the dictatorship, other political parties began to emerge. This included the United Democratic Organization (UNIDO) organized under the leadership of Salvador Laurel. There were also other parties such as the Lakas ng Bayan and the PDP. An examination of the platforms of these parties will reveal that although they basically promise change, they still lack a comprehensive alternative program founded on an ideology.

The only serious political party that presented an alternative ideology and program of action during the 1987 Congressional elections was the Partido ng Bayan. However, they lost during the elections suggesting two things: (1) that they did not have the necessary logistics (guns, goons, and gold) that are standard fare for traditional politicians and political parties; and (2) the Filipino voter still is more personality rather than issue oriented. It is widely conceded that the administration senatorial slate of President Aquino won largely because of her popularity.

With local elections around the corner, the once moribund and ideologically bankrupt pre-martial law Liberal and Nacionalista parties have been resuscitated. There have been many commentaries (both in broadcast and print media) excitedly proclaiming the return of the two-party system in the Philippines. We would like to once more introduce a cautionary note lest we blindly accept the claims that since what is emerging now is a two-party system, ergo, a Philippine democratic system.

Senate President Jovito Salonga was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court as the official president of the Liberal Party; Senators Orly Mercado, Saguisag, and Tanada have formally joined the Liberal Party, and opposition Senator Joseph Estrada is reportedly going to follow suit soon. On the other side, there are reports that Enrile has organized the Nacionalista Party. There are likewise reports that Vice President Laurel will revive the Nacionalista Party. All these amidst talk that there may be reunification in the Nacionalista Party. However, such a reunification between the various factions of the NP - Laurel, Enrile, Adaza, etc. - have been dismissed because of Laurel's reported reconciliation with President Aquino once more. A disgusted Adaza remarked that Laurel, who has flip-flopped on many political issues is a "political pendulum who is neither here nor there."

Amando Doronila, one of the more respected newspaper political analysts summarized the situation thus:

What we have today - 20 months after the February upheaval - are coalitions of factions, many of which are composed of remnants of the old Nacionalista and Liberal Parties of pre-martial law years and the Marcos Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Ideologically, the configurations of factions have not found their measure and are defining themselves according to tendencies.¹³

All these party dynamics (some would prefer to use the term circus) suggest that the party system in the Philippines is a long way from developing into political parties in the real sense: complete with a program of action or change, and a definite ideological stand. Our parties here remain personality oriented, and convenient vehicles for politicians to realize their ultimate goal of attaining power and self-aggrandizement.

Congress

The 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress of the Philippines shall be composed of two houses, namely a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Before the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Congress that we had was hardly a representative body, representative here is taken in terms of representing the various sectors and classes of society, most notably the poor. On the contrary, Congress was traditionally dominated by the rich and the powerful, landlords, who composed the elite of society. Among their primary instruments in accessing political power was the traditional "guns, goons and gold."

A study of the Philippine Congress before the imposition of martial law revealed its clearly elitist orientation and composition, which to a certain extent account for the manner its abolition was easily accepted by the Filipino people. According to Robert Stauffer.

Congress worked for extremely narrow interests, namely preserving the dominance of an elite largely identified with traditional sectors of the economy and in turn largely resistant to change . . .¹⁴

With the imposition of a dictatorship in 1972, the Congress was abolished. Not many cried out against the abolition because it was perceived by many to be unresponsive (and even irrelevant) to the needs of the people anyway. Besides, it was dominated by the elite, landlords, and their class who were there to protect their own interests, many people thought. To a certain extent, its abolition was even welcomed by many sectors of the population.

Thus, during the initial years of the dictatorship, there was no Congress, with Marcos being the sole legislator and executor of laws. However, towards the end of the '70s, Marcos, consistent with his attempts to provide some semblance of legitimacy (and democratic-ness) to his regime, ordered the creation of a body that would take the form of a congress, a lawmaking body supposedly composed of representatives of the people, a basic institution in any democracy. This was the *Batasang Pambansa* composed of members who owed their positions to the dictator. As such, it was against their very nature to check the executive, for after all they were his creation. Consequently, the *Batasang Pambansa* was dubbed as one of the most expensive rubber stamps in the world.

One of the hallmarks of the Aquino regime was its redemocratization thrust. After the Constitution was ratified, she immediately called for the election of members to both Houses of Congress. Our concern here is their representativeness.

To determine democratic representation, one only has to take a look at its composition, to draw a profile. This could easily be determined since all members of Congress are required to file a statement of assets and liabilities. An examination of the statement of assets and liabilities filed by all members of Congress revealed that majority (23 of 24) of the senators are millionaires. An essentially similar profile was drawn for the House of Representatives. Landowners and members of the elite composed majority of the members. The question is inevitably raised: by virtue of its class orientation and background, are we headed once more towards a Congress that will primarily legislate, not for the people, but to protect their own interests? The land reform and anti-dynasty issues should be illustrative.

Land Reform. Land reform should be the heart of the government program of an agricultural society. This is what empowerment is all about. This is what democracy should be all about.

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provided a special provision declaring that all agricultural lands shall be subject to agrarian reform.¹⁵ However, such an agrarian reform provision is limited by so many conditionalities and qualifications (some would say loopholes), that a genuine agrarian reform program is virtually impossible. For one, the 1986 Constitutional Commission shirked the responsibility in defining the heart of any land reform program, that of retention limits. This is one area where the basic criticism of the work of the 1986 Constitutional Commission rings true: that they legislated where they should not have, and did not where they should have.

So Congress now has the responsibility of passing a land reform program. If the deliberations in Congress are any indication, then we might as well kiss all hopes for a genuine land reform program goodbye. As suggested earlier, the proposed bills in Congress are largely influenced by the class orientations of its members. There may be a few congressmen and senators who want a genuine land reform program like Agrarian Reform Committee Chairman Bonifacio Gillego who initially proposed a zero retention limit; but they have to contend with numbers: the majority who are in the Congress protect their own (or their clients') interests, in this case, their land interests.

Anti-Dynasty Proposal. The intentions to avoid a dynasty is spelled out in the 1987 Constitution.¹⁶ The President herself has issued statements that she supports the anti-dynasty intent of the Constitution. She has been publicly quoted as saying that in line with the anti-dynasty spirit of the Constitution, she has actually tried to convince her relatives not to run.

Taking its due from the constitutional intent to prevent the rise of dynasties, and from the President's statements supporting anti-dynasty

measures, the members of Congress likewise have made proposals to prohibit dynasties. They have defined various permutations as to what constitutes a dynastic relation, as to who is prohibited from succeeding whom, and other similar questions.

But if current developments and frantic preparations for the coming local elections are any indication, and with hundreds of relatives of political leaders filing certificates of candidacies, one would think that members of Congress are operating in another political milieu. Either that or the hundreds of potential public officials are simply not taking seriously the Congress' effort, nor the President's statements. For how could they take the President's statements seriously when, a few days after declaring her support for anti-dynasty measures, she was reported supporting her sister-in-law who wanted to run for mayor of Quezon City, and a brother-in-law who wanted the mayorship of Malabon. Add to this her numerous relatives holding public positions: a Senator brother-in-law, a Congressman brother, a sister-in-law Congressperson, another Congressman uncle, and many more. We therefore not only have a confused electorate, but also confused public officials. As a consequence, the absence of political will on the part of the President to give spirit to the anti-dynasty provision has seeped down to the level of many politicians and their relatives who have signified their intention to run in the coming local elections, anti-dynasty provision notwithstanding.¹⁷ If this were any indication of the presence or absence of the political will of the president, then the future of Philippine democracy as far as dynasties are concerned is not exactly that bright. Such developments make a mockery of the spirit and intent of the anti-dynasty provision of the country's fundamental law, not to mention the efforts of the senators and congressmen of the republic.

The State of Philippine Democracy

In order to be able to peer into the future of democracy in the Philippines, it is necessary to look at the present state of democracy in the country. This paper tried to do that, using as indicators, the traditional institutions and processes (some would prefer to use the term formalisms) of democracies: the constitution, elections, political parties and congress.¹⁸ A look into the state of such democratic formalisms revealed that there is still a lot of room for improvement. In other words, there is still a lot of work to be done in the general effort at conscientization.

Indeed, such developments - the promulgation of a new constitution that is at best, half-hearted in its commitment to the attainment of the real objectives of democratization, the convening of a congress that is dominated by elite and powerful officials, the reemergence of a one-party two factions system, a party system that is personality rather than issue oriented, and the emergence of a new crop of potential political dynasties throughout the

Philippines - these do not reflect well of the state of democracy in the Philippines.

In a speech before the Civil Liberties Union last December 1, well known and respected nationalist historian Renato Constantino summed the state of democracy in the Philippines thus:

It is, indeed ironic that under an administration which owes its birth to people power, we have been experiencing a gradual distortion of the concept of democracy itself, beginning with the disregard for people's organizations, the return of elite rule and the politics of money and dynastic power, the distortion of the promised government by consultation into consultation mainly with foreign investors and visiting foreign officials.

Such an outlook, though seemingly pessimistic, is actually realistic. It provides an opportunity to be optimistic about the activist role of all concerned, citizens in bringing about genuine democracy in the Philippines. It underscores the importance and urgency of vigilance on every Filipino so that never again will we have a dictatorship in our country.

Endnotes

¹ Letizia Constantino in her article "Democracy" emphasizes the difference between "people's power" and "people power": the former is "exercised by a group of people for some immediate purpose," the latter "is exercised in conscious defense of the long term interests of the vast majority, the working people of a country. People's power is organized and politicized." *Education Forum*, 7:114-115, June 1-30, 1987, p. 10.

There are likewise those who disagree in referring to the February 1986 events as a revolution. For instance, Walden Bello characterizes the Aquino regime as "elite populism" arguing that "what took place in those glorious February days was not an evolution but essentially a transfer of power from one faction of the Philippine elite to another . . . And yet this government does not simply represent a return to the formal democratic system that preceded the imposition of the Marcos dictatorship in 1972." Walden Bello, "Aquino's Elite Populism," in *Midweek* November 19, 1986.

F. Sionil Jose agrees. According to him, "what transpired in February 1986 was no revolution - there was no transfer of power from one class to another; it was a restoration of the old oligarchy which Marcos attempted to destroy or coopt." *Solidarity* No. 113, July-August 1987. p. 3.

² *Philippine Daily Inquirer* December 5, 1987. The news item added that the proposal had the approval of President Aquino.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs may have had the best of intentions in making such a proposal. However, it may perhaps be quite premature, and even presumptuous, to be labelling ourselves as the "capital of new democracies" in the world.

³ Indeed, there is empirical, and historical basis, for the claims that American intervention into the Philippine political economy is a reality. The more recent examples are the February

1986 and August 1987 events: American intervention during the so-called people power revolution of February 1986 was so open. For instance, Reagan's comments about the conduct of Philippine elections, a purely internal matter, and Senator Laxalt's "order" for Marcos to "cut cleanly" are examples of naked intervention into purely internal matters. Again, during the attempted coup of August 1987, the US military attache to the Philippines was reported to have intervened for Colonel Honasan. Indeed, the United States continues to deal with the Philippines as if it were still their colony. Such extreme interest in the internal affairs of the Philippines stems from what many Filipinos naively refer to as "special relations" between the Philippines and the United States. After all, does not our so-called "special relations" stem from the historical fact that we are America's only direct colony, a relationship whose auspicious beginning was marked by the Philippine-American war at the end of the nineteenth century where between six hundred thousand to a million Filipinos were killed in the name of American democracy?

⁴ The dictionary defines democracy as "(1.) Government by the people, exercised either directly or through elected representatives.(2.)A political or social unit based upon this form of rule.(3.)A social condition of equality and respect for the individual within the community." *American Heritage Dictionary*, 1979, p. 351.

Ebenstein and Fogelman add specific features of democracies. According to them, "(D)emocracy ... meant free elections; a free press; freedom of political association; freedom of religion, thought and free speech; equality before the law; the right to oppose government; the right to choose one's job; the right to form trade unions; the right to move freely within one's own country, go abroad temporarily, or emigrate permanently. Above all, freedom from fear is basic in the Western concept of democracy. Ebenstein and Fogelman, 1980, pp. 167-168.

⁵ Formalisms may be processes, institutions, practices, etc., that exist only in form. Formalism was actually a term coined by development administration expert Fred Riggs in his study of western public administrative structures imposed on Third World countries. According to Riggs, formalism is "the existence of extensive forms and procedures that are not expected to work in practice; the degree of discrepancy between prescribed form and actual practice." It was within this general context that democratic institutions and processes in the Philippines (like elections, political parties and Congress) fall short of what they are supposed to be in theory and, hence, are formalistic structures.

⁶ Wilfrido V. Villacorta, "The Dynamics and Processes of Writing the 1987 Constitution," paper presented during the Third National Conference on Public Administration, Metro Manila, September 28 to 30, 1987, pp. 5, 10.

⁷ See for instance the discussion of Alejandro Lichauco, *Towards a New Economic Order and the Conquest of Mass Poverty*, (1986) which emphasizes the need for the Philippines to embark on its own industrialization program, one not limited to agriculture industrialization. Economist Hilarion Henares articulates a similar critique in an interview "How to Produce Our Own Progress," *Midweek*, December 2, 1987.

⁸ See Article XII section two, paragraph one.

⁹ See Article XII section one, paragraph two.

¹⁰ See Article XII.

¹¹ See Article VI section five, paragraph two.

¹² Richard Kessler, "A New Philippine Political System," in Carl H. Laude, *Rebuilding a*

Nation. Philippine Challenges and American Policy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1987), pp. 370-371

¹³ Amando Doronila, *Manila Chronicle*, November 21, 1987.

¹⁴ Robert Stauffer, *The Philippine Congress: Causes of Structural Change* (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 42.

¹⁵ See Article XIII sections four to six.

¹⁶ The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as member of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

¹⁷ For instance, the following is a sampling of many candidates for local officials in the coming elections who have dynastic relationships; Felix "Nansing" Alfelór, brother of Rep. Ciriaco Alfelór (PDP-Laban, Camarines Sur) to run against Gov. Luis Villafuerte running under the UNIDO banner; Former Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, the father of Rep. Amado "Dondon" Bagatsing (Kabaka, Manila) and Rep. Ramon Bagatsing, (Laban, Manila), to run as Mayor of Manila; The husband of Rep. Luz Clea Bakunawa (Ind., Masbate); to run against Emilio Espinosa, uncle of Rep. Moises Espinosa (Ind., Masbate) and Titot Espinosa (Laban, Masbate); The wife of Rep. James Chiongbian (Ind., South Cotabato); Jose Cuenco, brother of Acting Speaker Antonio Cuenco to run for Cebu City Mayor; Richard "Dick" Gordon, husband of Rep. Katherine Gordon (NP-GAD, Olongapo) to run for Olongapo mayor; The father of Rep. Eduardo Nonato Joson (Ind., Nueva Ecija) to seek again the gubernatorial post; Manila OIC Mel Lopez, brother of Rep. Jaime Lopez (Laban, Manila) to run for Manila Mayor; The brother in law of Rep. Tessie Aquino Oreta and President Aquino to run for Mayor of Malabon; Rolando Puzon, nephew of Rep. Leoncio Puzon (PDP-Laban, Cagayan) to run for Governor of Kalinga-Apayao; Vic Sumulong, nephew of Majority Floor Leader Francisco "Komong" Sumulong (UNIDO-Rizal) and cousin of Rep. Egmidio Tanjuatco (PDP-Laban, Rizal) to contest Rizal's gubernatorial post.

Competition within the same family has reached ridiculous proportions: For instance, in Paranaque, the hometown of the late Local Government Secretary Jaime Ferrer, the newspapers reported that at least four members of his immediate family will be competing for the mayoralty position of the town: his wife, his two sons, and his sister.

¹⁸There are of course other indicators such as a free press.