

Integrated Rural Development in the Philippines: The Coordination Problem

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The integrated approach to rural development is distinguished as a conspicuous concern in the field of public administration vis-a-vis the development agenda of Third World countries. Different approaches and models on rural development programs have been adopted by the developing countries from the Western countries' expertise only to discover that disparities in terms of context and background encumber the applicability of such models. It is imperative, therefore, that selection of a particular method should depend on the existing political, economic, cultural, and social conditions of the country involved. Integrated rural development (IRD) as an approach basically requires the achievement of two broad objectives: (1) a coordinated and concerted effort of comprehensive development for the rural areas; and (2) the creation of an institutional base at the grassroot level to ensure effective participation. The nature of IRD programs demands a wide variety of administrative policy, financial and technical inputs, and at the same time increases pressure on national government planning and organizational machinery. These activities have generated multifarious problems, one of which is the problem of coordination. Lack of coordination is identified as a chronic issue plaguing rural development planning. Thus, attempts have been directed towards the coordination and integration of development efforts through the enactment and creation of laws and implementing agencies, respectively, deemed to be supportive to carry out such activities.

Introduction

Public Administration as a practice and a discipline has faced several challenges and changes and is undergoing an era of uncertainty and turbulence.¹ This can be attributed to the experimentation in political modernization and ad-

ministrative reforms that flourished during the last two decades which has produced "political hypertension" and "administrative disillusionment."² To meet such dynamics of change and challenge, Public Administration adjusted its "focus" and "locus" from time to time.

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¹Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence* (New York: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971).

²John D. Montgomery, "The Populist Front in Rural Development: or Shall We Eliminate the Bureaucrats and Get on With the Job?" *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXIX, Number 1 (January-February 1979), pp. 58-65.

In recent times, rural development has emerged as a prominent field of involvement of public administration. Rural development administration which significantly holds a major focus and commitment of public administration shows a unique resemblance toward New Public Administration in so far as program goals, structures, and commitments are concerned.³ Rural development, particularly in the developing countries, has become a "populist front."⁴ One scholar observes that in the context of Asian countries the distinction between national development and rural development is a mere "conceptual" issue.⁵

Rural development has long been central to the development agenda of the government of South and South East Asia, thus massive resources have been infused into the sector since the mid-fifties.⁶ In spite of the consistent efforts during the past decades, the developing countries in general, and South and South East Asian countries in particular,

have shown a "persistent rural crisis."⁷ An increasing frustration and pessimism is being observed among the social scientists in these regions. One scholar wrote that his feeling of frustration increases directly with the number of materials reviewed,⁸ even as another scholar perceived the changing dynamics of rural development as "fashion at certain periods in history."⁹ Rural development programs were observed to be generally geared to the maintenance of the essential features of the existing political-economic structure but failed to produce significant improvement of peasants' conditions.¹⁰

Involvement of Public Administration in rural development activities has also created a constant "tension within the

³Shiviah S., "Rural Development Administration," *Kurukshetra*, Vol. XXIX, No. 7 (January 1981), pp. 23-26.

⁴Montgomery, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁵Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Key Issues and Problems of Managing Integrated Rural Development: An Overview," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (January 1982), pp. 47-59.

⁶Carlos P. Ramos, "Institutional Mechanism for Managing Integrated Rural Development," *APEX Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (April-June 1978). Also see Salahuddin Aminuzzaman, *Rural Elite and Rural Development in Bangladesh* (Dacca: University Grants Commission, 1980) Chapter III, which specifically deals with resource allocation for rural development activities since the 1950s.

⁷Barrie N. Morrison, "The Persistent Rural Crisis in Asia: A Shift in Conception," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. LII, No. 4 (1979-1980), pp. 631-696. Also see Kalpana Bardhan and Pranab Bardhan, "The Green Revolution and Socio-Economic Tensions: The Case of India," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (1973), pp. 285-292.

⁸Sylvia Guerrero, "A Concept Paper on Rural Development" (Quezon City: Institute of Social Welfare and Community Development, University of the Philippines, n.d.), mimeo.

⁹Raul P. de Guzman, "Complementation and Integration for Rural Development," in Dionisia A. Rola (ed.), *Integrated Rural Development: Problems and Issues* (Quezon City: Management Education Council, University of the Philippines, 1981), pp. 177-178.

¹⁰Keith Griffin, "Growth and Impoverishment in the Rural Areas of Asia," *World Development*, Vol. VII (1978), p. 365.

public organizations."¹¹ The clientele are still suspicious about the role of public administration system, with particular focus on bureaucracy, in the goal accomplishment process of rural development.¹²

Most of the rural development programs in the developing countries are spoon-fed by the international aid-giving agencies which have their own program priorities. This wide divergence of program priorities and of the evolutionary process of rural development activities has also been attributed to an apparent absence or lack of a "rural development philosophy" or "ideology" which would set and guide the future patterns and framework in the rural development process. Consequently, this creates confusion and dilemma in the implementation process.¹³

Problems of rural development is possibly a well-researched subfield of public administration and scholars from both East and West have shown considerable

interest in the field,¹⁴ although some of the research work of Western experts are termed as "rural development tourism" by a critical observer.¹⁵ In any case, due to its dependency relationship with the West, Asian countries had to borrow several Western-sponsored ideas/models of rural development and had to keep on experimenting under different aid-package programs. Unfortunately, the basic difference of the East and the West in the context and background of modernization/development has reduced the applicability of those models in the developing countries of Asia.¹⁶ The use of different economic models for designing, evaluating, and monitoring the rural development programs has also been questioned.¹⁷ Political anthropologists have further observed that an ill-defined, odd-designed, and half-hearted rural development program has always resulted in "unilateral actions" and is marked with a growing "class conflict" among the be-

¹¹Gary E. Hansen, *The Politics and Administration of Rural Development in Indonesia: The Case of Agriculture* (Berkeley, California: Center for South and South East Asian Studies, University of California, 1973), p. 44.

¹²Dan Fritz, "Bureaucratic Commitment in Rural India: A Psychological Application," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (April 1976), pp. 338-356.

¹³Felisa D. Fernandez, *Project Impact Measurement Indicators for MIRDP (Mindoro Integrated Rural Development Program)* (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Economic Development, 1979), p. 26.

¹⁴Harry T. Oshima and Gerard Rikken, "Social Science Research on Integrated Rural Development in South East Asia," *Philippine Review of Business and Economics*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (June 1975). Also

see for details, H. Fukuri and H. Tsujii (eds.), *A Bibliography on Rural Development in Monsoon Asia* (Kyoto: The Association of Development Research and Training Institution of Asia and the Pacific, 1972).

¹⁵Robert Chambers, "A Lesson for Rural Developers: The Small Farmer is a Professional," *Development Digest*, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (July 1981), pp. 3-12.

¹⁶A. T. R. Rahman, "Theories of Administrative and Political Development and Rural Institutions in India and Pakistan," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October 1969), pp. 243-256.

¹⁷M.J. Applegate, "The Use of Economic Models in Evaluating the Impact of Rural Development in LDCs," Faculty Working Paper No. 38, Washington D.C., USAID, 1975, p. 16.

neficiaries and the sufferers in rural Asia.¹⁸

In fact, the very nature of the integrated rural development programs demands a wide variety of administrative policy, financial and technical inputs, and increases pressure on national government planning and organizational machinery. Such programs are both technically and organizationally complex. This organizational complexity of IRD can produce staggering results in program achievements. The Agrarian Reform Program of the Philippines, for example, was established to improve land tenure, develop agricultural and physical infrastructure, strengthen local institutions, improve farm management, etc. All these activities require the cooperation of at least 16 major government agencies and the coordination of at least 10 other government or quasi-governmental financial institutions. It seems to be a gigantic, if not an impossible task. Thus, broadly speaking the IRD or any other integrated development effort has generated multifarious problems in the accomplishment process, which include (1) institutional-structural, (2) strategic-managerial, (3) operational-procedural, and (4) behavioral-psychological.¹⁹

¹⁸Guy J. Pauker, "Political Consequences of Rural Development in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 386-402. Also see Borhanuddin K. Jahangir, *Differentiation, Polarization and Confrontation in Rural Bangladesh* (Dacca: Center for Social Studies, 1979), pp. 167-169.

¹⁹Desmond L. W. Anker, "Rural Development Problems and Strategies," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 108, No. 6 (December 1973), pp. 461-484. Also see Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Organization for M-99

IRD as an approach basically aims to achieve:

(1) a coordinated and concerted approach of comprehensive development for the rural areas; and (2) the creation of an institutional base at the grassroot level to ensure effective participation.

There arises, however, at least two basic but critical questions on these operational objectives of IRD:

Given the current state of affairs, does there *really* exist a sound, well-established *institutional framework* and *effective coordination and integration* possible among relevant institutions? If so, how?

Keeping the social, educational, and political status of the rural people in the background, can they effectively involve themselves in the planning and development process?

This paper, therefore, examines the first aspect of the issue and deals specifically with the "coordination" problem of IRD in the context of Philippine experiences. The paper explores the conceptual framework of coordination and attempts to review the existing research work on the coordination problem of IRD in the Philippines. This paper is primarily based on library research, key informants, and resource persons.

Coordination: A Conceptual Review

"Coordination" of men, materials, resources, and structures is one of the most

Extension Services-Problems of Coordination and Implementation," *Economic Research Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 1975), pp. 160-171.

essential aspect of management functions. It is the crucial part of the conversion process where mobilization, allocation, and utilization are prime components for a desired decision or outcomes.²⁰

Mary Parker Follett sets out certain principles of coordination in terms of organizational effectiveness: (1) Coordination should be made by direct contact of the responsible person or authority concerned; (2) It should be made at an early stage; (3) Coordination should be viewed as the reciprocal relations of all the factors in a situation; and (4) It should be considered as a continuous process.²¹

She further argued that coordination should be based on "fact control" and not on "man control." She therefore proposed for cross functioning and for horizontal rather than vertical authority. She identified two broad ways to achieve perfect coordination: (1) compromise; and (2) integration. Coordination, however, can be a product of a collective responsibility, where the chief executive takes an effective role of convincing and arbitration.²²

²⁰Gabriel U. Iglesias, "An Approach in Appraising Administrative Capability of the Regional Framework for Coordinating the Implementation of Regional Development." A paper presented at the seminar "Senior Level Seminar on Institutional Capability for Regional Development: Focus on Coordination," August 1980 (Mimeo).

²¹Henry C. Metcalf and Lyndall Urwick (eds.), *Dynamic Administration—The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett* (New York: Harper and Row, 1940), pp. 295-303.

²²Mary Parker Follett, *Freedom and Coordination* (London: Management Publications Trust Ltd., 1949), pp. 64-69.

Ahmed points out that the problem of coordination in rural development activity can be properly met by creating vertical linkages between local governments and national bodies and by achieving a horizontal integration among bodies instituting the institutional machinery of rural development process at the field level. He therefore identifies the following guideposts for coordination and integration of organizations involved in rural development: (1) that each organization's interest and entity be safeguarded; (2) that its aims be valued and reorganized; and (3) that its participation and "organizational-personality" be considered relevant, if not essential, for the success of the program.²³


The UN Center for Regional Development sets out certain criteria for measuring coordination among which are: (1) a common goal or purpose; (2) an organization structure; and (3) a built-in servo-mechanism or central mechanism. The Center has also outlined at least three specific mechanisms to attain higher degree of coordination, viz.:

- (1) Coordination through exchange of information;
- (2) Coordination through negotiation; and
- (3) Coordination through control.

This model was examined in the light of the Philippine experience by Brillantes who found out that a strong coordinative

²³Yusuf J. Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated Rural Development Programmes: A Note on Methodology," *International Labour Review*, Vol. III, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 119-142.

Figure 1. Coordination model



capacity can be attained at any point within the range starting from the points after "negotiating" up to the end of "control."²⁴ The model is shown in Figure 1.

Brillantes concludes that if the proximity towards "control" in the continuum is closer, the level of coordination is higher; and the higher the level of coordination is, the more significant is the level of program efficiency.

A Review of Existing Researches

Lack of coordination has been found to be a chronic issue that handicapped

development planning in general, and rural development process in particular, in the developing countries.²⁵ Factually, "planning has never had a glorious day in the Philippines."²⁶

The issue of coordination, in rural development program has drawn considerable attention of Filipino scholars since the early sixties. Laus evaluates the role of the Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD) as a development coordinator and concluded that "coordination by the PACD had been largely ineffectual." This study further

²⁴Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., "Development Councils as Coordinating Mechanisms for the Planning and Implementation of Development Programs [and] Projects: Focus on Region II" (Masteral Thesis, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1979).

²⁵Dennis A. Rondinelli, "National Investment Planning and Equity Policy in Developing Countries: The Challenge for Decentralized Administration," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. X, No. 1 (August 1978), pp. 45-74.

²⁶Vicente B. Valdepeñas, "The Philippines," in Vip Vat Hoong (ed.), *Development Planning in South East Asia* (Singapore: Regional Institute for Higher Education and Development, 1973), pp. 64-83.

²⁷The first study was sponsored by the Community Development Research Council of UP in 1960; for details, see Remigia C. Laus, *Coordination of Agencies in Community Development Programs* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1960).

revealed that the nature and complexity of the coordination problem grew proportionately with the technicality of the program or of the program component. Similarly the Provincial Community Development Council failed to show adequate promise, concern, and commitment as a coordinating body for managing rural/community development activities at the provincial level.²⁸

Einsiedel studied how lack of coordination hindered the ambitious development programs in that area.²⁹ Aurora Carbonell-Catilo observed a similar problem.³⁰ She reviewed the inactive role of local governments in program coordination on the one hand, and an overactive and self-concern role of line agencies, on the other. Catilo concluded that both reasons equally ferment the scope of poor coordination at the field level.

Iglesias, who primarily devoted some of his basic research on coordination problems of rural development in the Philippines, observed that rural develop-

ment in the Philippines never achieved considerable organizational success. One of the major problems that he identified is the lack of coordination in efforts, resources, and policies.³¹ Coordination problems happen to be a "built-in" defect in rural development activities in the Philippines. The success stories of coordination and achievement in rural development in the Philippines, experienced so far, are not of organizational or structural perfection but are of the extraordinary "personality" and "individual" role-orientation variables.³² Iglesias elaborated that the problem of coordination did not only cause structural disillusionment but also turned to be a costly issue when it created an "implementation gap."³³

Evaluating the role, function, and composition of the Regional Development Council (RDC), the highest and most decentralized planning and coordinating body, Iglesias observed that "although the RDC was supposed to be a coordinating body for planning and implementation, in reality it is predominantly preoccupied with data gathering process." Iglesias puts forward his model comprising four basic components: (1) Structure, (2) Policy, (3) Technology, and (4) Support. He argued that only with a policy that is supported by the national

²⁸Araya Wongse, "Some Factors Associated with Coordination in the Provincial Community Development Council" (Unpublished Master's thesis, Institute of Social Work and Community Development, University of the Philippines, 1964).

²⁹Luz A. Einsiedel, *Success and Failure of Some Community Development Projects in Batangas* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, 1968).

³⁰Ma. Aurora Carbonell-Catilo, "The Problem of Coordination: The Case of Skills Training Implemented by National Line Agencies in Batangas," in *Program Development and Management Improvement in the Province of Batangas*, Research and Publications Program and the Local Government Center, University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, 1981.

³¹Iglesias, "Organization for M-99 Extension Services...."

³²Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Leadership Role in Implementation: Marcos Rice Self-Sufficiency Program, 1960-1970," in Gabriel U. Iglesias (ed.), *Implementation: The Problem of Achieving Results* (Manila: EROPA, 1976).

³³Iglesias, "An Approach in Appraising Administrative Capability...." p. 4.

power elite, a viable and responsive structure, adequate technological inputs along with environmental support, can a perfect condition for coordination be achieved.³⁴

Another critical aspect of coordination in rural development activities can be viewed from the horizontal relationship of the local government and the rural development agencies, like the Mindoro Integrated Rural Development Program, the Bicol River Basin Development Program, and the Samar Integrated Rural Development Program, where the local government unit either fails to provide its support or is even neglected by the functional bureaucracies of the rural development agencies (RDAs) in their program implementation. In fact, these newly emerged RDAs are virtually engulfing almost all the aspects of development which results in the declining motivation of the local governments.³⁵

Brillantes evaluated the coordination problem focusing on the Regional Development Council and concluded that "coordination is a major determinant of effectiveness."³⁶ Confused authority structure, poor leadership traits, obscure inter-agency relationship, diffused goals and lack of technical competence, and a potent tendency of centralization and "instrumental" and or pseudo-participation have frustrated the essence of coordination through the development councils. Again, Balitaan examines the role of the Provincial Development Staff (PDS) and

the Provincial Development Council (PDC) as coordinating bodies for managing development activities at that level.³⁷ His observation supported the findings of Brillantes. Both PDS and PDC are found to be subordinate institutions and are structurally incompetent in their efforts to coordinate development function.

The lead agency concept in integrated rural development has also confused the situation further. Astillero's study of the BRBDP showed that the very concept of lead agency creates geographical distance and generates a "long distance decision-making process" which affects the rural development program both in cost and time dimension.³⁸

Coordination in Rural Development Efforts: The Philippine Case

Rural development in the Philippines had always suffered from institutional "heterogeneity" since the 1950s starting from the days of community development programs. A 1953 UN report highlighted the approach of community development

³⁷Francisco G. Balitaan, "Planning and Coordination at the Provincial Level: The Role of the Provincial Development Staff (PDS) and the Provincial Development Council (PDC)," in *Program Development and Management Improvement in the Province of Batangas*, Research and Publications Program and the Local Government Center, University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, 1981.

³⁸Emmanuel Astillero, "The Bicol River Basin Development Program: A Case Study for Functional Coordination," in ADC-CPA, "Case Studies in Development Project Planning and Management-The Philippine Experience" (Manila: University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, n.d.), pp. 69-90.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁵For details see "Complementation and Integration of Rural Development Programs," in Rola (ed.), *op. cit.*

³⁶Brillantes, *op. cit.*

as a national development strategy and cautioned on the possible problems of coordination in terms of its concerted execution process.³⁰ Consequently in 1956, President Magsaysay formed the Community Development Council, the highest coordinating body to look after the Community Development (CD) programs in the Philippines. For close review and program execution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 156 in the same year created the post of Presidential Assistant for Community Development which took all efforts to coordinate the CD functions in the Philippines. In 1965 it was further institutionalized by creating an arm instead of the office of the Assistant, i.e., the Presidential Arm for Community Development was institutionalized and was later amalgamated with the MLGCD after the declaration of martial law.

Executive Order No. 121 of 1968 proposed the creation of provincial development committees to formulate an integrated and realistic development for the provinces in accordance with the approved national development plans. Later in 1972, Letter of Implementation (L.O.Imp.) No. 22, dated December 31, provided the guidelines for the formation of regional development councils (RDCs) which were primarily created to integrate the process of execution and planning at the regional level.

In view of the extended rural development activities, President Marcos through Letter of Instructions (L.O.I.) No. 99

³⁰United Nations, *Report of the Mission on Community Organization and Development in South and South East Asia* (New York: United Nations, December 1953), pp. 13-15.

in July 1973 formed the Cabinet Coordination Committee for Integrated Rural Development Program (CCCIRD) to ensure a higher degree of program coordination at the apex of the government. The Secretary of Agriculture was appointed as the chairman of the Committee. The Committee was empowered "to create a single interagency staff to which technical personnel from all different departments would be detailed and that would be headed by an Executive Director." Meanwhile, the President created different integrated area development agencies through different presidential decrees. The President appointed the Secretary of Agriculture as Cabinet Coordinator for Bicol, the Secretary of Natural Resources as Cabinet Coordinator for Mindoro, and the Secretaries of Defense and Local Government as Cabinet Coordinators for Cagayan and Samar, respectively.

At the same time, attempts have been directed towards the coordination and integration of development efforts at the local level under the leadership of local government units. Memorandum Circular 76-110 of the MLGCD calls for organization and maintenance of development bodies that will "coordinate and integrate diverse efforts of the various public and private entities directly engaged in implementing plans and projects leading to the rapid socioeconomic growth of the area."

Letter of Instructions (L.O.I.) No. 542 of 1977 extended the power of the RDC chairman authorizing him to "direct the formulation of an integrated regional development plan to include plans of na-

tional government agencies, regional development bodies, and local governments in the regions, and to coordinate and implement the development programs and projects in the regions and establish a monitoring system." Consequently, L.O.I. No. 61 of 1978 provided an extended fund for the cited functions of the RDC.

L.O.I. No. 448 of 1978 further granted certain discretions to the regional directors to enhance the administrative capability as far as personnel aspects were concerned. Another development followed per L.O.I. No. 554 requiring local executives to monitor national development programs being carried out in their respective jurisdictions. The content, nature, and essence of L.O.I. No. 554 are virtually contrary to L.O.I. No. 542 and L.O.I. No. 448.

Finally in 1978, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1376 created the National Council for Integrated Area Development (NACIAD) with the President as the Chairman, the Minister of Agriculture as Vice Chairman, the Ministers of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD), the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), the Ministry of the Natural Resources (MNR), the Ministry of the National Defense (MND), the Ministry of Public Highways (MPH), the Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and the Budget Commissioner as members. However, lately the President issued Executive Order No. 708 and designated the Prime Minister as the Chairman of the NACIAD, a position previously held by the


President. The NACIAD is virtually the highest level of coordinating body; its structure is shown in Figure 2.

With this evolution of efforts to generate maximum interagency coordination, there still prevails a significant degree of malcoordination. The need for a stronger institutional implementation machinery becomes more apparent in the light of institutional and operational limitations encountered under these "ad hoc" coordinating committees. Poorly structured linkages between planning and implementing agencies at the regional and local level still prevail.

Some of the LOIs have also created confusion and dilemma in terms of the role and relation of the local government units and development councils thus aggravating the coordination problem further. Besides this, the structural arrangement still remains so that each of the line agencies involved in the rural development (RD) is nominally coordinated by RDCs but virtually under effective control of its respective mother agency. Thus, the RD efforts in reality are fragmented and the usual *kanya-kanya* (each to his own) mentality still prevails and frustrates the ambitious RD programs. Moreover, the local government bodies are nominally involved in the planning, execution and coordination of the rural development programs, although rural development as an approach and as a national policy speaks highly about the participation of local governments in rural development activities.

To ensure proper execution of rural development programs, as experienced by

Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the National Council on Integrated Area Development



the Philippines, two types of coordination model exist:

(1) committee/council type, and (2) public authority/public enterprise. Both received their legal support from different Letters of Instructions or Presidential Decrees.⁴⁰ None of the two, however, could show promising responses to the actual need of the hour.

The lead-agency concept in program coordination and leadership creates structural-behavioral problems. It generates frustration among the participating agencies, while some of the participating agencies feel that they are insignificantly involved insofar as policy making is concerned. Moreover, the lead agencies have also been blamed as biased towards its organizational goals in particular. Again, in some cases the lead agency is replaced from time to time, e.g., the Bicol Area was initially led by MANR, and later by MPW. In the case of CIADP, the lead agency was initially the MA after which the MPH took over. Such shifts in the lead agency also affect the program structure, priorities, and even the nature of participation of the component agencies.

While in the case of a corporate body like the MIRDP, the body itself acts as a sort of a lead agency. In this case the body, as a project type of organization, attempts to work more flexibly bypassing traditional bureaucratic rules and procedures. These agencies are again directly under the NACIAD, which is practically the most powerful coordinative body.

⁴⁰Iglesias, "Key Issues and Problems..." *op. cit.*, p. 16.

Such link of the corporate body creates an unequal relationship between the body and traditional line agencies and the local governments. The corporate body, therefore, becomes a "superfluous agency" and generates structural-behavioral problems. These corporate bodies are supposed to coordinate the rural development functions of the component agencies and local governments, but actually do not have any formal obligatory instruments to ensure participation, collaboration, coordination, or control of the agencies involved. The corporate agency does not hold any hierarchical superiority or authority over the concerned agencies nor are the line agencies in any case responsible to the corporate body in terms of administrative authority and sanctions. Moreover, the corporate body, if examined in detail, seems to be "overburdened" with several activities or program packages at the same time. Take the case of MIRDP with the following project components: road, port, watershed protection, irrigation, agricultural support, minority assistance project and schistosomiasis control, etc. which are taken care of by the MPH, MPW, MNR, National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Ministry of Agriculture (MA), Presidential Assistant for National Minority (PANAMIN), and Ministry of Health (MOH). Such functional diversity and complexity make it almost impossible on the part of MIRDP to organize and coordinate those programs effectively within its time and resource constraints resulting in inefficiency, inconvenience, and waste. In most cases, these area development

authorities also lack adequate personnel, technical know-how, and program drive.⁴¹ The program diversity of these organizations make the goals of the organization more confusing and encompassing. On the other hand, the traditional line agencies seem to play an inert role because they feel their authority and functional jurisdiction are being encroached by those "all-encompassing agencies."

Brillantes noted that the RDCs failed to coordinate the development activities because they tried to coordinate through a process of mere "negotiation" and "exchange of information."⁴² Both these methods seem to be weak devices for the purpose. Brillantes further located a balance point between control and negotiation that would provide perfect conditions for coordination. Philippine experience with the integrated area development rural development authorities has shown that all the coordination efforts that have been taken so far lies loosely between "negotiation" and "exchange of information." Factually, those efforts have only consumed time, accumulated paper work, enhanced red tape, and resulted in "implementation gap" and "pseudo-participation."

The relationship between the provincial offices of the NACIAD and the provincial development councils is not clearly defined. As such, the cooperation and

⁴¹Benjamin Cariño, *Development and Technical Problems in Integrated Regional Planning: The Bicol Case* (Quezon City: National Development Research Center, 1975), p. 24.


⁴²Brillantes, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

support from the provincial governors is in most cases found to be minimal, if at all.

Provincial offices of some of the IAD projects are headed by provincial governors of the respective provinces and are supposed to report to the project director of the concerned IAD authority. Such reporting of a political personality to an administrative authority has also created a politico-administrative dilemma. Again for functional coordination, each of the implementing departments or line agencies is supposed to submit its respective annual project plans, budget, and the corresponding work program to the project director for approval within three months before the start of each Fiscal Year. Such control over the budget and project plan has created frustration not only among the traditional line agencies but also among ministries. Budgetary control over the line agency of a certain ministry virtually takes away from the ministry its traditional line of authority. This, therefore, leads to a confusing relationship between the IAD authority and the participating ministry.

The multiple line of linkages of the structure of development administration system of the Philippines is shown in Figure 3. One really gets confused as to who is responsible to whom, to what extent and degree, and why. It is also observed that rural development functions are being carried out simultaneously by at least three vertical structures, sometimes under nominal cooperation of integrated approach and sometimes under the control of traditional ministerial structure.

Figure 3. Multiple Lines of Linkages of the Development Administration System of the Philippines



Problems of Rural Development: Some Methodological Issues

Two schools of thought can be distinguished in the present literature on the role of the bureaucracy in the developing countries. One school of thought believes that a strong and modern bureaucracy could be uncontrollable by the weak and relatively medieval political institutions. This situation, it contends, would in turn be detrimental to the development of the political institutions in the developing countries. Riggs, one exponent of this school of thought, argues that a strong bureaucracy in the absence of strong countervailing political institutions becomes autonomous and responsible for nothing and accountable to nobody.⁴³

In the developing countries the bureaucracy is, therefore, characterized as an instrument of oppression, highly elitist and generally anti-developmental by nature.⁴⁴ Apart from this, the bureaucracy as an institution acts as a "self preserving entity"⁴⁵ for its own welfare. Bureaucracy itself is engaged in a process of "internal contradiction of politics," or what Gar-

⁴³Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-167, also see Lucian Pye, "The Political Context of National Development," in Irving Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 25-43.

⁴⁴Emajuddin Ahmed *Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth: Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Dacca: University Press Ltd., 1980).

⁴⁵Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *Bureaucratic Self Preservation* (Dacca: University of Dacca Press, 1980).

cia-Zamor calls the conflict of "political-micro bureaucracy" and "administrative micro-bureaucracy." More specifically, the first one is popularly termed as "policrats" and latter is known as "technocrats."⁴⁶ The policrats are those members of the bureaucracy who virtually frustrate and act as "conspirators" of development. The technocrats on the other hand, are over-concerned with the technicality of the issue and develop a "mechanistic approach" to development. Therefore, in the final analysis the pace of development is equally retarded both by the policrats and technocrats.

The second school of thought is diametrically opposed to the first one. It argues that a strong but enlightened bureaucracy could act as a leader in the process of development. It, therefore, emphasizes the importance of the rapid increase in the capability of public administration system in the developing countries.⁴⁷

The distinction between bureaucracy and political system, with their corresponding roles in development, is possibly analyzed in an oversimplified fashion by Public Administration scholars of the

⁴⁶Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, "Micro-Bureaucracies and Development Administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 (1973), pp. 417-423.

⁴⁷Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," in Fordyce Luikar (ed.), *Symposium on the Research Needs Regarding the Development of Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Countries* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966). Also see "Introduction" in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966).

West when they segmented both in an arbitrary manner. Political issues and administrative questions in the developing countries should possibly be better examined in a detailed process of "compromise, accommodation and adjustment" between the political system and administrative arrangements. In such a case the Western models and positions of Public Administration seem to be inadequate and incompatible in the politico-administrative reality of the developing countries.

The scholars of Public Administration in the developing countries have, therefore, challenged and discarded the Western model of Public Administration. In this regard, a unique similarity is being observed in the model building process of Public Administration in the developing Asian countries and their counterparts in Latin America. During the recent years Western-sponsored models are not only rejected but even termed as "Trade School Model" of Public Administration; one author called it "Atlantic Model."⁴⁸

Pinto of Brazil and Iglesias of the Philippines therefore proposed an alternative model of Public Administration to meet the development problems and issues in the developing countries.

Pinto puts his model as:

$$(i) \text{ DGAC} = f(L,D,P,R,S)$$

$$(ii) \text{ DGAC}+ = f(L,D,P,R,S) + (PF)-$$

⁴⁸Peter O'Brien, "Destruction and Creation of Development Alternatives," *Economic and Political Weekly* (August 2, 1975), pp. 1166-1176.

$$(iii) \text{ DGAC} - = f(L,D,P,R,S)-(PF)+$$

where DGAC = Development Goal Accomplishment Capacity,

L = Leadership,

D = Doctrine,

P = Program,

R = Resources,

S = Structure,

PF = Political Functionality.⁴⁹

The model concludes that development would be the function of leadership, doctrine, program, resources and structure, and development should further positively or negatively be affected by the internal political functionality of the government. A similar idea is presented by Iglesias who depicts his model of administrative capability as follows (the figurative form is given by the author):

$$\text{AC} = f(P,S,T,S)$$

where P = Policy,

S = Structure,

T = Technology,

S = Support,

i.e., administrative capability would be the appropriate function of policy, structure, technology and political support.⁵⁰ Virtually both models sound the same and echo the real need of the developing countries. Each model takes into account

⁴⁹Rogério Feital Pinto, "Political Functionality and Administrative Effectiveness: Three Models of Latin American Public Administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (1969), pp. 329-341.

⁵⁰Iglesias, "An Approach in Appraising Administrative Capability...."

the political and administrative reality of developing countries.

Thus, an evaluation of the role of public administration in the developing countries sounds more appropriate, pertinent and pragmatic if it were done in the framework of the *Pinto-Iglesias model*.

Problems of rural development in general, and issues of coordination in particular may be reviewed or addressed broadly from two perspectives: the political and the administrative.

Some scholars believe that political support for rural development is the *sine qua non* for the strategy of implementation and coordination.⁵¹ Seshadri underscores the fact that for proper planning, execution and coordination a considerable linkage between political authority of the upper and lower echelons of the government machinery is essential. Without such linkage, a mere conceptual coordination is achieved, but functionally ineffective and vague.⁵² Unfortunately, the political solutions of rural development problems are always neglected in the developing countries and also possibly in the Philippines. There are, however, examples from two provinces in the Philippines — Laguna and Tarlac which show that if conscious efforts were made, the local governments could very effectively manage and coordinate the nation-

al agencies assigned in the provinces and could ensure smooth rural development activities.⁵³ Aquino observes that the dimension of decentralization and regional development is highly correlated. She found out that administrative efficiency, growth of local economy, extension of local services, and the overall level of rural employment in certain areas are significantly dependent on the nature and extent of local autonomy of the appropriate local governments in the region.⁵⁴

Efforts have been made by Filipino scholars to explore the problem in a wide politico-administrative dimension. Most of those solutions are inclined towards the *Pinto-Iglesias model*, which has made a blending of political and administrative factors.

Ocampo, therefore, offers his approach towards the problem when he submits his models, which he calls Model I and Model II.⁵⁵ In model I, which is more political in nature, he suggests that each region should be governed by a regional governor, who would be an elected political leader and would be politically and administratively dominant with respect to its constituent local governments and national government field offices within

⁵³Amando M. Dalisay, *Mobilizing Resources for Rural Development Through Local Government* (Los Baños: College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, 1966), p. 16.

⁵⁴Belinda Ancheta Aquino, "Dimensions of Decentralization and Development in the Philippines" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1974).

⁵⁵Romeo B. Ocampo, "Perspective Plan for Administrative Development Models for Regional Organization," College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines (Mimeo).

⁵¹Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, "Political Commitment and Administrative Support: Pre-Condition for Growth with Equity," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 43-60.

⁵²K. Seshari, *Political Linkages and Rural Development* (New Delhi: National, 1976), pp. 63-66.

the region. The governors would act as the leader of political and administrative authority within the region. Ocampo, equally cautious about the political conditions and behavior in the Philippines, puts his "compromise" Model II in the light of the administrative and political reality of the country. Model II advocates for appropriate regional development authorities. These authorities should be a "super-agency" of the national government with adequate authority and designed to enhance comprehensive and integrated development.

Iglesias develops a more realistic approach when he proposes a Regional Government Model.⁵⁶ The regional government should have a regional assembly (*Batasang Pampook*), a Regional Executive (Chief Minister), and a politically elected cabinet, i.e., a government with all its organs. This otherwise meets the basic components of the *Pinto-Iglesias model* of Public Administration.

Since coordination is primarily a product of obsolete and ill-designed structure, poor leadership, inadequate policy planning, obscure control, and diffused authority, such an idea of regional government sounds quite promising and might fill the vacuum of authority and structure and provide appropriate political support. In other words, this might enhance the process of development as far as program planning, coordination, and execution is concerned. Such a

⁵⁶Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Political and Administrative Issues in Regional Planning and Development," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXI, Nos. 3 and 4 (July-October 1977), pp. 324-341.

model has the following aspects:

- (1) It provides adequate structure, policy, and support;
- (2) It would enhance administrative convenience for its geographical proximity;
- (3) It would provide closer and consistent support of the political authority;
- (4) It would initiate an approach of mobilization of local resources;
- (5) It would ensure a blending of policy planning and execution in the same authority; and
- (6) It would create a politico-administrative structure which would integrate, control, direct, and mobilize all the line agencies concerned in development through a single authority with political and administrative sanction.

Coordination of Integrated Rural Development Program: Other Possible Alternatives

Governments in the developing countries have generally tended to choose from among four patterns of organization design for rural development planning, execution, and coordination.⁵⁷ These include:

Pattern a - Parallel programming and implementation by separate sectoral organization that are weekly orches-

⁵⁷United Nations, Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, *Public Administration Institution and Practices in Integrated Rural Development Programs* (New York: United Nations, 1980), p. 14.

Figure 4. Pattern a: Parallel Programming and Implementation by Separate Organization





Figure 5. Pattern b: A Strong Coordinating Body with its Own Implementing Arm



Solid lines represent formal lines of command; broken lines represent informal contacts between units.

Figure 6. Pattern c: A Strong Coordinating Body without its Own Implementing Arm





Figure 7. Pattern d: Decentralized Integrative Framework



Source of Figures 4-7: United Nations, Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

trated by a national coordination body (Figure 4);

Pattern b - A strong coordinating body with its own implementing arm (Figure 5);

Pattern c - A strong coordinating body without its own implementing arm (Figure 6);

Pattern d - A system which is based on a decentralized integrative executive framework (Figure 7).

In Pattern a, coordination of rural development activities is assigned to a single ministry, which would ensure coordination through "exchange" and "negotiation" at the field level. Also at the national level, coordination would be achieved by a high power coordinating body.

In Pattern b, coordination is multiple. Along with the assigned ministry, a central coordinating body would also carry out the coordination function. Therefore, the field units would be under a three dimensional review, i.e., from their respective ministry, to the assigned ministry for coordination, and to the field offices of the central coordinating agency; but such multi-dimensional coordination might create confusion, duplication, and misunderstanding.

In Pattern c, a central coordinating body aims to ensure coordination from the center as a directing and controlling authority, without having field or regional level offices. In most countries, such pattern is widely practiced.

In Pattern d, a system is built on a decentralized integrated executive framework and may involve a considerable

amount of administrative reforms and change in structural arrangement. This system demands the consolidation of all government offices in each region into a technical team under the management authority and control of a regional development director and the severance of the hierarchical ties between national ministries line officials in the region. At the lower level, identical steps are also to be devised. This pattern integrates all development functions into one authority at certain levels under a single leadership who is duly accountable to the higher level authority. Such design appropriately matches the following conceptual demands of coordination: (1) coordination at an early stage; (2) coordination as a vice versa process; (3) coordination through authority; (4) coordination with control and direct contact; and (5) coordination as a continuous process

Pattern d, has successfully been applied in Tanzania, and proved to be an effective model for structural arrangement for developmental coordination. In almost the same fashion, the block development officer (BDO) in India and the circle officer for development (COD) in Bangladesh are performing rural development activities and successfully managing the same at the grassroot administrative

⁵⁶G. Ram Reddy, "The Role of Block Development Officer: Promise and Performance," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (April 1967), pp. 97-108. Also see in this aspect for African context, Olatunji Oyinlove, "Coordinating Development: The Administrative Officer and the Technical Officer in Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (October 1967), pp. 256-264.

unit of these countries.⁶⁸ The BDO is the officer in charge of a block, the lowest development unit while the COD is in charge of a *Thana*, the lowest administrative and development unit. All the ministries involved in rural development activities have their own field offices at block or circle levels and the BDO/COD holds administrative command, control, and authority over these line agencies of the different ministries within his jurisdiction. This control and command contributes significantly in terms of coordination. Both the BDO and the COD are under the Ministry of Establishment which is a sort of "super ministry" in these countries. The line agencies receive plans and strategies from their respective ministries, which are coordinated by a National Council for Rural Development in both countries. In the case of Bangladesh, for effective political support and linkages, each of the *Thana* is assigned to a member of parliament, who acts as the development coordinator and plays a role to heighten interministerial relationship through his political endeavor. This development coordinator holds the rank of a deputy minister of the national government, aside from his role and function as member of the parliament.

Conclusion

The paper reviewed the question of coordination in rural development in terms of a theoretical framework of coordination principles and later considered

the problem in the light of the Pinto-Iglesias model and the existing practices. Broadly speaking, the problem can be seen in two perspectives: the first through political reorientation and reorganization where a regional political structure is suggested by some scholars; while the other aspect is merely administrative or structural. The latter can be done by designing a structural arrangement where an official at the lowest level of program execution would be given appropriate authority, control, and command over the line officials. This approach seems to be quite simple and achievable in terms of politico-administrative reality in the developing countries. The main limitation of this approach is that it virtually ignores the dynamics of politics in the development process and emphasizes bureaucracy and administrative infrastructure. But experience from developing countries reveals that such assumption is not always right. In some cases this approach is too costly. Although the Pinto-Iglesias approach is more democratic in its flavor and content, it does not ignore the role and importance of bureaucracy and administrative structure in the development process. One approach sounds more democratic by its nature and content, while the other seems to be a mere administrative reordering. Choosing any of the approach would depend on the existing political, economic, cultural, and administrative conditions of a country, as well as upon the political philosophy of the government in power.